Suny R.G. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century

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esther kingston-mann

vulnerable to foreign attack. Evoking memories of the First World War and its

devastating aftermath, Stalin justiﬁed the brutalities of the 1930s as a necessary

modernising strategy. In his words:

those who fall behind get beaten. One feature of the history of old Russia

was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind . . . She was beaten

because to do so was proﬁtable and could be done with impunity. Either we

perish, or we overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.

Stalin thus invited the public to join in targeting ‘enemies of the people’ who

undermined the Soviet Union’s heroic struggle to become so powerful that

no outsider would ever again dare to invade ‘with impunity’.

Stalin’s gift for manipulating popular fears served him well in the years

to come, when the Nazi invasion provided a nightmare conﬁrmation of his

paranoid vision of the outside world. Between 1941 and 1945, the genocidal

invaders of the Soviet Union set themselves the task of exterminating twenty

million, and they massively over-fulﬁlled their quotas.

The Second World War and its aftermath

In 1941, European Russia was overrun by Nazi forces (aided by enthusiasts from

the Baltic states appropriated by the Soviets in the Nazi–Soviet pact of 1939).

In areas like Ukraine, hatreds engendered by the brutalities of collectivisation

overshadowed – at least initially – the Nazi threat to exterminate all Slavic

populations. However, in the course of the war, the brutal Nazi treatment of

‘subhuman Slavic races’ convinced many opponents of forced collectivisation

that genocide was far worse. Also important in engineering a public opinion

shift was a Soviet defence strategy framed in surprisingly patriotic, religious

and ‘peasant-friendly’ terms – complete with posters that featured ‘Mother

Russia’as an attractive middle-aged woman in a red peasant dress, with her arm

raised in summoning gesture, and the caption: ‘The Motherland is Calling!’

Under the pressures of war, state planning gave way to ad hoc measures

intended to meet the requirements of the front. Private plots were expanded,

and the war mobilisation of adult males enabled women to enter occupa-

tions from which they had previously been excluded. Many became heads of

households, and some even became collective farm managers. Although few

50 Joseph Stalin, ‘The Breakneck Speed of Industrialisation’, quoted in M. McCauley (ed.),

Stalin and Stalinism (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 92–3.

51 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after

Collectivization (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 314.

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women were able to emulate Pasha Angelina’s exemplary achievements in

the 1930s, by 1943, they comprised 50 per cent of Soviet tractor drivers.

In the

absence of men, and despite the long-term German occupation of the best

agricultural land and worsening shortages of agricultural machinery, peasant

women, children and older people were able – against all odds – to supply the

cities and the army with a signiﬁcant measure of their food requirements.

After the war, the extraordinary public trauma of 27 million dead was

targeted by Stalin, who warned an exhausted populace that the Soviet Union

was once again threatened by economic collapse, internal enemies and foreign

nations intent on obliterating ‘the Red menace’. Accordingly, Stalin demanded

the forcible relocation of ‘suspect’ populations, and crackdowns on suspect

economic activity. Millions of Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars and Chechens

were deported to Central Asia, the Urals and Siberia, where collective and

state farms were required to accept them as new members. An accelerated

policy of forced collectivisation was imposed in the former Baltic states and

other newly acquired territories; in Estonia alone, peasant resistance in 1949

triggered the deportation of several thousand supposed kulaks to Siberia.

In the late 1940s, Stalin also targeted ‘suspect’ economic activity on the

peasantry’s private plots, and increased taxes upon their agricultural output.

The peasantry’s time-honoured niche at the bottom of the Soviet hierarchy left

them with wages and beneﬁts far lower than those accorded urban workers.

Within the rural population itself, state farmers received a ﬁxed wage, but col-

lective farmers still received only what remained after compulsory deliveries

were provided to the state. In 1947, fears of a too-quickly resurgent peasantry

triggered a carefully designed currency reform that completely wiped out

peasant savings. By the late 1940s, Soviet women – like America’s ‘Rosie the

Riveter’ – were displaced from their wartime positions of leadership and higher

status. Although males were still in short supply, the number of women man-

agers and policy makers declined after 1945, as did the number employed as

tractor drivers. By 1959, only 0.7 per cent of the latter group were women.

Post-Stalin: the question of reform

From the peasantry’s perspective, the most notable feature of the post-

Stalin era was the abandonment of mass murder and deportations as core

52 Bridger, Wo m e n ,pp.15–17.

53 R. Abraham, ‘The Regeneration of Family Farming in Estonia’, Sociologia Ruralis 34, 4

(1993): 355.

54 Bridger, Wo m e n , p. 19.

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instruments of state policy. The familiar alternation of abundant harvests and

crop failure did not result in massive purge trials, executions or accusations

of treason. In the 1950s and 1960s, ofﬁcial exhortations and economic ‘cam-

paigns’, and a variety of non-lethal pressures and constraints fostered agricul-

tural initiatives that relied on ever-larger economic enterprises managed by

ever-larger contingents of supervisors and inspectors. In the reforms of this

era, the southern-born Nikita Khrushchev played a central role. Notorious for

the failure of his grandiose agricultural projects, Khrushchev was also notably

responsible for initiating a fundamental reversal in the relationship between

the rural sector and the rest of the economy. Under Khrushchev, the traditional

Soviet view of the countryside as ‘an internal colony’ that supplied funds for

industrial development began at last to give way. By the 1960s, the rural sec-

tor became – for the ﬁrst time in Soviet history – the recipient of signiﬁcant

government investment.

It turned out to be far easier for the Soviet ‘command system’ to foster dra-

matic, nationwide increases in income, educational levels and life expectancy

than to guarantee consistent improvement in rates of agricultural productiv-

ity. Between 1953 and 1967, the average income of the collective farm worker

increased by 311 per cent in real terms.

In 1956, pension beneﬁts for the aged,

disabled and sick were signiﬁcantly expanded, and in the 1960s, the wages

for collective farm workers were ﬁxed (and made no longer dependent on

the requirements of the latest Five-Year Plan). Peasants began to enjoy higher

incomes from labour on collective and state farms than from their private

plots. During the Khrushchev years, agricultural workers were at last restored

their freedom to move from one job to another. Compulsory grain deliveries

to the state were abolished, and some collective farms were permitted to set

up small teams of family members and neighbours to cultivate a given number

of ﬁelds. Allowed to sign contracts with state enterprises and determine their

own production objectives,

team members also received individual wages

and bonuses based upon the success of the team. Although such reforms pro-

duced only mixed results, they represented an outbreak of economic ﬂexibility

within the Soviet Union’s command economy.

By the 1960s, collective and state farms had become a source of important

social beneﬁts, particularly in the area of education. While in 1938, only 9.4 per

cent of the rural population possessed eight years of schooling, by the 1960s

55 Gertrude Schroeder, ‘Rural Living Standards in the Soviet Union’, in Robert Stuart (ed.),

The Soviet Rural Economy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), p. 243.

56 Moshe Lewin, Stalinism and the Seeds of Soviet Reform: The Debates of the 1 960s (Armonk,

N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1991).

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the ﬁgure stood at over 55 per cent, with women frequently better educated

than men. Although literacy levels for Soviet rural women far outpaced those

of women in predominantly peasant societies like Turkey or India, women

who became teachers, nurses, veterinarians and agronomists did not thereby

gain entry into positions of leadership. They continued as well to bear primary

responsibility not only for childcare and other traditional ‘women’s work’, but

also for labour on the private plots – where even by the 1960s most farming

was still done by hand.

These tasks, in addition to the collective farm’s

labour requirement continued to constitute the Soviet peasant woman’s ‘triple

burden’.

In important respects, the Khrushchev era introduced the dichotomies and

contradictions that eventually contributed to the downfall of the Soviet sys-

tem. Between 1953 and 1958, agricultural productivity increased by 50 per cent,

with private plots continuing to signiﬁcantly out-perform the collective and

state farms. Exhorting the rural populace to ‘double and triple’ their agri-

cultural output, Khrushchev launched a massive ‘Virgin Lands’ campaign in

Kazakhstan and Siberia. This venture was fatally undermined not only by the

usual climatic reversals, but also by the Soviet state’s penchant for bureau-

cratic national directives that ignored local conditions and local knowledge. In

Kazakhstan, for example, collective and state farmers were ordered to expand

the land area sown with corn regardless of whether the necessary equipment

or seeds were available; tractor drivers were everywhere paid according to the

size of the area they ploughed (thus encouraging them to plough as shallowly

as possible).

In 1963, a disastrous harvest – together with the setbacks of the

Cuban Missile Crisis – contributed to Khrushchev’s fall from power.

The Brezhnev era: stagnation, or deepening

contradiction?

Although the Brezhnev years are frequently described as an era of stagnation,

from the perspective of the rural populace, they were not. Less constrained

than in the 1950s, the rural populace began to create a world that differed from

the Stalinist model, recalled the values of an older peasant community and

incorporated changes that not only widened village perspectives, but inspired

many peasants to abandon the countryside for the city.

57 Bridger, Wo m e n , pp. 108–9.

58 Alec Nove, Soviet Agriculture: The Brezhnev Legacy and Gorbachev’s Cure (Los Angeles:

Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1988), p. 15.

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By the 1970s, the more horriﬁc memories of the Second World War and the

1930s had started to recede, and a semblance of ‘normality’ began to re-emerge

in the Soviet countryside. Despite the burden of Moscow-devised plans and

quotas, observers reported that the pace of rural life in the 1970s reﬂected the

rhythms of the crop-growing cycle – slow in winter and active during the hay-

making and harvest times.

Like their counterparts elsewhere in the world,

Soviet farmers performed a great variety of tasks at different seasons of the

year, worked irregular hours and faced unpredictable weather ﬂuctuations.

Deliberations by farm assemblies (skhody) were frequently skewed by gen-

der and age considerations or by patronage connections that individuals and

households established with the authorities – but the latter no longer freely

exercised the life and death powers of their predecessors.

Particularly in regions distant from Moscow, both the formal structures of

the collective farm and the requirements imposed by central planners were

signiﬁcantly modiﬁed by informal relations and negotiations within the col-

lective farm itself. New legislation gave collective farms the right to assign

‘private’ plots to member households, and village assemblies continued to

honour the pre-1917 commune principles that legitimised land claims on the

basis of labour and need. As in earlier years, private plots out-performed the

collective and state farms, but they were less crucial to peasant survival once

farm wage levels began to rise.

By the 1970s and 1980s, most of the rural populace were state employees,

but they bore little resemblance to their Western counterparts. Collective and

state farm workers expected – and received from their enterprises – guaran-

tees of education, health, shelter, old-age assistance, month-long vacations,

112 days of paid maternity leave and old-age pensions. Income differentials

between city and countryside began to narrow, as did the considerable wage

disparities between collective and state farms.

In the Soviet Union, agricul-

tural ‘jobs’ conferred far more than a wage; they mediated as well a set of

social, economic and cultural relations and obligations between individuals

and a wider community.

59 Basile Kerblay, Modern Soviet Society, trans. Rupert Sawyer (London: Methuen, 1983),

pp. 74–5.

60 Ibid., p. 87.

61 V. George and N. Manning, Socialism, Social Welfare and the Soviet Union (London: Rout-

ledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 31–128.

62 Susan Bridger and Frances Pine, ‘Introduction’, Surviving Post-Socialism: Local Strategies

and Regional Responses in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (London: Routledge,

1998), pp. 7–8.

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The Brezhnev era featured not only an increased reliance on material incen-

tives in the form of bonuses, increased procurement prices, education/welfare

beneﬁts and improvements in diet, but also a persistent refusal either to appre-

ciably diminish levels of political constraint, corruption or favouritism, or to

increase opportunities for individual freedom of action. Brezhnev’s massive

grain purchases from abroad provided the Soviet public with a diet based on

meat consumption (then considered a global indicator of rising afﬂuence).

Between 1960 and 1973, foreign grain purchases increased from 42.6 million

to 99.2 million tons, and domestic food consumption rose by 400 per cent.

The so-called ‘grain deﬁcits’ of this era were in fact an indicator neither of

food shortages nor of disastrous decline in agricultural production; they were

instead attributable to what one post-Soviet study describes as ‘excessive’ con-

sumption of animal feed and non-food derivatives.

According to reform

economist Tat’iana Zaslavskaia, Brezhnev’s policies were a cynical effort at

‘paciﬁcation through material incentives’.

During the 1970s, educational advances, greater freedom of movement and

a diminishing reliance on the private plot and household as guarantees of secu-

rity began to transform farming into an occupation rather than an inherited

status. However, the exercise of free choice increasingly included decisions to

abandon the collective farm. Rural women, eager to escape their ‘triple bur-

den’, moved into non-agricultural occupations as nurses, clerks and teachers –

and above all, as independent wage earners. Like their male counterparts –

particularly of the younger generation – they left the security of village life for

the equal security but higher pay and greater autonomy available in new

‘agrotowns’ and in the cities. While many sought greater autonomy and

higher social status, the surveys conducted by Zaslavskaia in the 1970ssug-

gested that physically arduous working conditions, inequitable wage rates and

corrupt ofﬁcials who rewarded lackeys rather than hard-working people far

outweighed the desire for upward mobility as motives for departure from the

countryside.

The highest levels of out-migration came from European agri-

cultural regions of the country; the lowest were in Central Asia, Kazakhstan

63 Harry Shaffer, ‘Soviet Agriculture: Success or Failure?’ in Shaffer (ed.), Soviet Agriculture:

An Assessment of its Contributions to Economic Development (New York: Praeger, 1977),

pp. 79–81.

64 See Ioffe and Nefedova, Continuity,p.76.

65 Zaslavskaia, quoted in Andrew Rosenthal, ‘A Soviet Voice of Innovation Comes to Fore’,

New York Times, 28 Aug. 1987.

66 Kerblay, Soviet Society,p.232.

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and the Caucasus. In 1959, 51 per cent of the population of the Soviet Union

lived on the land; by 1979, the ﬁgure stood at 37 per cent.

In the 1970s, living standards, incomes and literacy rates rose dramatically,

even as a repressive state bureaucracy fostered the creation of ever-larger

collective and state farm enterprises. The Soviet state raised procurement

prices for grain and livestock by 50 per cent in 1965, and awarded bonuses for

deliveries that exceeded plan requirements. Productivity rates rose between

1966 and 1970 (followed by signiﬁcant declines due to crop failures in 1972,

1979 and 1980). Yet overall, according to United Nations estimates, Soviet

agriculture achieved a faster rate of growth in volume and per capita than

any other major region of the world (including North America, Europe,

Africa and Asia). Between 1950 and 1975, Soviet agricultural output more than

doubled.

During the Brezhnev years, the tension between socio-economic improve-

ments and a command system of economic and political governance contin-

ued to mount. A highly literate populace no longer feared starvation, and

the lives of its younger generation were not shaped by the war, invasion

and attempted genocide that had so traumatised their parents and grand-

parents. These generational shifts undermined a Stalinist social contract that

had repeatedly promised modernisation and national security in exchange for

repression and bureaucratic control. Throughout the Stalin era, a constant

state of emergency was invoked to justify brutal constraints on rural and

urban freedom of action; a ‘crisis mentality’ was subsequently reinforced by

the Cold War between the United States and the USSR.

However, by the

1980s, a far healthier and better-educated populace had come to believe – with

good reason – that no nation was likely to invade the USSR with what Stalin

had called ‘impunity’.

It was in this context that Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the embodiment

of the Soviet social contract and its contradictory tensions. Born on a collective

farm and raised by grandparents after losing his father in the Second World

War, Gorbachev began work at fourteen as an assistant to a combine harvester

operator, and received a Red Banner of labour in 1948 for helping to produce a

record harvest on his collective farm. Making the leap from a North Caucasus

67 While these ﬁgures mark a dramatic rise in rural out-migration, it is useful to recall that

between 1950 and 1980, the rates of rural exodus from the American countryside were

far higher than in the Soviet Union. See G. Clark, ‘Soviet Agriculture’, in Shaffer, Soviet

Agriculture,p.38.

68 H. Shaffer, ‘Soviet Agriculture: Success or Failure?’ p. 93.

69 B. P. Kurashvili, ‘Ob’’ektivnye zakony gosudarstvennogo upravleniia’, Sovetskoe gosu-

darstvo i pravo 43 (1983).

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secondary school to the acquisition of a law degree at Moscow University

and eventually to a position at the top of the party hierarchy, he took advan-

tage of the best opportunities offered by the Soviet system. A beneﬁciary of

Soviet guarantees of education and social welfare, Gorbachev made a name

for himself as a proponent of incentive-based projects for raising agricultural

productivity rates. As the Politburo member responsible for agriculture under

Brezhnev during the 1980s, he spoke out in the name of others like himself

for economic restructuring (perestroika) that would signiﬁcantly diminish the

powerful Soviet constraints upon individual freedom of action.

Perestroika and the further transformation

of Russian rural life

As General Secretary of the party, Gorbachevemphasisedthe production needs

of agriculture and the interests of the rural populace. Building on the rural

experiments of the 1960s and 1970s, his reforms encouraged single families or

co-operative groups to take land and implements out of the large-scale collec-

tive farm for a given period, and use their own labour and management skills

to maximise production and increase their incomes. In 1990, new legislation

legitimised a variety of forms of tenure, ranging from outright ownership,

possession for life, leasehold and indeﬁnite, permanent or temporary use.

Committed to socialism and to economic growth, Gorbachev’s reforms pro-

duced a 21 per cent increase in health, education and other welfare beneﬁts, a

48 per cent rise in per capita income and an 8 per cent increase in productivity

rates.

Explicitly rejecting Soviet and pre-Soviet notions of the rural populace

as ‘raw material’ for industrial development, Gorbachev appealed for public

input into economic and non-economic decision-making at every level, but

especially within the agricultural and industrial workplace.

Gorbachev’s appeal unleashed a storm of criticism that touched every aspect

of Soviet life. Farm managers, agricultural specialists, teachers, writers, ordi-

nary farmers and social scientists denounced the incidence of alcoholism,

domestic abuse and disparities in health, housing, education and income

between the rural populace and their urban counterparts. Playwrights por-

trayed heroic collective farmers who demanded the right to ‘speak the Truth’

to collective farm managers,

while a resolution of the Twenty-First Congress

70 W. Liefert, ‘The Food Problem in the Republics of the Former USSR’, in D. Van Atta,

The Farmer Threat: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder,

Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 29.

71 Sovetskaia kul’tura, 23 Jan. 1986,p.5.

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esther kingston-mann

of the Uzbek Communist Party denounced corrupt ofﬁcials who overstated

the amount of raw cotton produced by hundreds of thousands of tons.

Farm

managers, workers and intellectuals targeted the ‘gigantomania’ that repeat-

edly led policy makers to assume that an unlimited increase in inputs – in

the form of supervisors, mechanisation, chemical fertiliser and the creation of

ever-larger economic enterprises – automatically produced increased agricul-

tural outputs.

Above all, rural critics rejected the notion – so deeply ingrained in the

minds of Soviet (and pre-Soviet) policy makers – that agriculture and the rural

inhabitants who made it work constituted ‘the bottleneck of the country’s

development and the main reason for its backwardness’.

Calls for the revital-

isation of farming communities coexisted with demands for market socialism,

greater opportunities to pursue long-term, enlightened self-interest, to acquire

land of one’s own, to be rewarded according to merit and to win respect and

acknowledgement for local knowledge, experience and expertise.

In the 1990s, the fall of Gorbachev, the break-up of the Soviet Union and

the accession to power of Boris Yeltsin marked an accelerated turn away from

the precarious, socialist/capitalist ‘balancing acts’ of the previous decade. In

its place, ‘shock therapists’ launched a revolutionary effort at social engineer-

ing that was to transform peasants into productive rural entrepreneurs. The

ﬁrst step in this process was to disentangle and sever property rights and

economic activity from the reciprocal social obligations within which – from

the peasantry’s perspective – they had always been historically embedded.

Convinced that the ‘natural’ desire to receive a piece of national wealth for

free would serve as a powerful engine for agricultural land reform, Russia’s

neo-liberal reformers proposed a series of ‘500’ and ‘1,000-day’ schemes for

the wholesale privatisation of the national economy. By 1994, the Union of

Private Peasant Farmers (AKKOR) reported that there were 280,000 private

farms in the Russian Federation alone.

However, among the former collective

and state farmers (and urban dwellers with no previous farming experience)

who became rural entrepreneurs, there was strikingly meagre enthusiasm for

Western-style ‘rugged individualism’.

In Nizhnii Novgorod, provincial governor Boris Nemtsov (later the ﬁrst

deputy prime minister of the Russian Republic) was hailed for his efforts to

72 Pravda vostoka, 31 Jan. 1986,pp.2–6.

73 T. Shanin, ‘Soviet Agriculture and Perestroika: The Most Urgent Task and the Furthest

Shore’, unpublished paper (1988).

74 L. Perotta, ‘Divergent Responses to Land Reform and Agricultural Restructuring in the

Russian Federation’, in Bridger and Pine, Surviving, p. 150.

434

Transforming peasants in the twentieth century

construct a fair, open and transparent exchange of land for shares,

but some

observers raised doubts about the efﬁciency and productivity levels of these

private farming ventures.

Even more troubling were reports that the suc-

cesses in Nizhnii were due to extra-legal pressures from local authorities that

recalled – in the words of economist Carol Leonard, ‘something that is remi-

niscent of the tragic collectivisation campaigns of the 1930s’.

But in any event,

few collective farms emulated the Nizhnii model during the 1990s. Frequently,

collectives ‘privatised’ by becoming joint-stock companies led by former col-

lective farm managers who attempted to obtain for their members the welfare

beneﬁts previously provided in the Soviet workplace. On occasion, collective

farm members voted to become individual peasant farmers in order to guar-

antee themselves secure individual ownership of lands that they continued to

work and manage collectively. Although, legally, they had split up, their inten-

tion was to ‘stay together’.

In the 1990s, insider trading and asset stripping

by farm managers, their cronies and friends undermined both the aims and

the legitimacy of efforts to establish a rural regime based on independent and

private economic activity. The most successful entrepreneurs often turned out

to be former farm managers whose networks and ‘social capital’ gave them

decided advantages in the new market economy.

In 1992, the price liberalisation policies introduced by Russia’s shock thera-

pists produced a devastating 2,600 per cent rise in consumer goods prices. By

December 1996, per capita monthly income in the Russian Republic stood at

47 per cent of its 1992 level.

In the cities and in the countryside, a black market

and systems of barter began to ﬂourish – and even to eclipse more normal

mechanisms of exchange. In this precarious context, many farm workers and

pensioners decided to remain on their collective farms and to rely – as in the

75 Introduced in the 1990s, this programme divided collective and state farm land into

private shares that could be redeemed in exchange for plots of land and other agricultural

assets that permitted individuals to farm independently. Shares were to be apportioned

by collective and state enterprises; individual claims were to be assessed in traditional,

pre-1917 village fashion – in accordance with current and past investments of labour

(i.e. with shares granted to both actively employed and retired workers). S. K. Wegren,

‘Political Institutions and Agrarian Reform in Russia’, in Van Atta, Farmer Threat,p.124.

76 Perotta, ‘Divergent’, p. 154.

77 C. S. Leonard, ‘Rational Resistance to Land Privatisation: The Response of Rural Pro-

ducers to Agrarian Reforms in Pre- and Post-Soviet Russia’, Post-Soviet Geography and

Economics 41, 8 (2000): 608.

78 Perotta, ‘Divergent’, p. 165.

79 M. Lampland, ‘The Advantages of Being Collectivised: Collective Farm Managers in the

Postsocialist Economy’, in C. M. Hann (ed.), Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices

in Eurasia (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 31–56.

80 P. Caskie, ‘Back to Basics: Household Food Production in Russia’, Journal of Agricultural

Economics 51, 2 (2000): 206.

435