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william taubman

After a February 1955 Supreme Soviet session demoted Malenkov from

prime minister to minister of electriﬁcation, Khrushchev’s next target was

Molotov. The two men collaborated against Beria and Malenkov, and although

they disagreed on Virgin Lands development (Molotov favoured investing in

previously cultivated areas instead), Khrushchev at ﬁrst kept clear of Molotov’s

foreign-affairs bailiwick. In 1954, however, Khrushchev had pushed for rap-

prochement with Tito’s Yugoslavia, partly to correct what he regarded as one

of Stalin’s most grievous sins, but also as a way to undermine Molotov, who had

been a prime architect of the Moscow–Belgrade split in 1948. When Molotov

objected to Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade in May 1955, Khrushchev responded

with an assault on Molotov at a July 1955 Central Committee plenum. Although

he was replaced as foreign minister in mid-1956, Molotov kept his seat on the

Presidium. Like Malenkov, who also remained on the Presidium, Molotov

would never forgive Khrushchev, would hold every error he made against him

and would take the ﬁrst opportunity to get even. The turmoil of 1956 gave

them that chance.

Khrushchev was not the only Soviet leader who favoured addressing the

Stalin issue at the Twentieth Congress. Beria’s arrest, investigation and trial

had widened the circle of those fully aware of Stalin’s crimes. After his execu-

tion, requests poured in for reconsideration of high-level purges. By the end

of 1955 thousands of political prisoners had returned home, bringing stories

of what had gone on in the camps, and in the process adding many of their

relatives to those who would support de-Stalinisation. Yet the Gulag system

was still functioning, the most famous show trials of the 1930s had not been

re-examined, and labour camps and colonies still held hundreds of thousands

of inmates. Mikoyan recalled that he pressed Khrushchev to denounce Stalin,

saying, ‘There has to be a report on what happened, if not to the party as

a whole, then to delegates to the ﬁrst congress after his death. If we don’t

do that at the congress, and someone else does it sometime before the next

congress, then everyone would have a legal right to hold us fully responsible

for the crimes that occurred.’

On 13 February, the day before the congress

convened, the Presidium as a whole decided that Khrushchev would address

the subject at a closed session.

But Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov

had grave reservations, and Molotov, in particular, later insisted on the

pp. 155, 166. Khrushchev’s remarks in RGANI (Russian State Archive of Recent History),

f. 2,op.1,d.127.

23 Mikoian, Tak bylo,p.591. 24 RGANI, f. 2,op.1,d.181, lines 2, 4–5.

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30 June Central Committee statement that in effectrevised Khrushchev’ssecret

speech.

Early in 1957, Khrushchev himself began taking back what he had said. At

a New Year’s Eve reception for the Soviet elite and the diplomatic corps, he

declared that he and his colleagues were all ‘Stalinists’ in the uncompromis-

ing struggle against the class enemy. After the invasion of Hungary sparked

protests among Soviet students and intellectuals, Khrushchev approved a new

round of arrests.

Sensing that his authority was eroding, he launched a

counter-offensive whichendedup furtherundermining his position. His Febru-

ary move to abolish most national economic ministries and replace them with

regional economic councils antagonised central planners and ministers. His

May pledge that the USSR would soon overtake the United States in per capita

output of meat, butter and milk, made without being cleared with the Presid-

ium, was ill-conceived. His bullying of writers at a gala spring picnic played

into the hands of Kremlin colleagues who had no use for literary liberals but

used Khrushchev’s boorish behaviour to discredit him.

On 18 June 1957, Khrushchev’s colleagues (he later labelled them the ‘anti-

party group’) launched their move to remove him as party leader. Molotov,

Malenkov and Kaganovich led the assault, supported by Bulganin, Voroshilov,

Mikhail Pervukhin, Maksim Saburov and Dmitrii Shepilov. The ﬁrst seven of

these constituted a majority of the Presidium’s full members. They lost when

Khrushchev and Mikoyan, backed by several Presidium candidate members

and Central Committee secretaries, insisted that the Central Committee itself,

in which Khrushchev supporters predominated, decide the issue.

The ‘anti-party group’ (which did not in fact oppose the party and was

so racked by internal divisions as hardly to constitute a group) accused

Khrushchev of erratic and irrational personal behaviour, but its deeper reason

for attacking him was fear that he would use the Stalin issue against them.

He did tar them with Stalinist crimes, both at the June 1957 Presidium meet-

ing, which lasted until 22 June, and the Central Committee plenum, which

stretched seven more days after that. After the plenum, most of the plotters lost

their positions, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov immediately, the

others more slowly so as to obscure how many of them had conspired against

Khrushchev. It was only in 1961 that Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and

25 Nikolai A. Barsukov, ‘Analiticheskaia zapiska: Pozitsiia poslestalinskogo rukovodstva v

otnoshenii politicheskikh repressii 30-x–40-x i nachala 50-x godov’, unpublished article,

pp. 41–6. Barsukov, ‘The Reverse Side of the Thaw’, paper delivered at conference on

‘New Evidence on Cold War History’, Moscow, Jan. 1993,pp.19–20, 32–6.

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Shepilov were expelled from the party, but after 1957 Khrushchev faced no

more top-level opposition until his own prot

es in the Presidium began to

conspire against him in 1964. Until then he was free virtually to dictate domestic

and foreign policy and to undermine himself as the result.

Reforming agriculture

Khrushchev’s ﬁrst priority was agriculture. Yet, in addressing this and other

areas, he quickly encountered the ideological limits of the Soviet system, social

resistance and bureaucratic behaviour that magniﬁed his own errors. At times

Khrushchev sounded like a born-again free marketeer: ‘Excuse me for talking

to you sharply,’ he once told state farm workers, ‘but if a capitalist farmer

used eight kilos of grain to produce one kilo of meat he’d have to go around

without trousers. But around here a state farm director who behaves like that –

his trousers are just ﬁne. Why? Because he doesn’t have to answer for his own

mess; no one even holds it against him.’

Yet Khrushchev was still wedded to

collectivist agriculture. In 1953 he had defended individual material incentives:

‘Only people who do not understand the policy of the party...seeany

danger to the socialist system in the presence of personally owned productive

livestock.’

But he himself saw such a danger, and so preferred to rely on

party mobilisation and exhortation, and on quick ﬁxes of technology and

organisation.

Corn had long been grown in the USSR, but Khrushchev took the United

States as his model. His American guru when it came to corn, Iowa farmer

Roswell Garst, stressed necessary preconditions – hybrid seeds, fertilisa-

tion, irrigation, mechanisation, plus use of insecticides and herbicide – but

Khrushchev pushed on without them, not just in suitable southern regions

but in Siberia and the north as well. Collective farmers resisted planting

corn because its cultivation was particularly labour intensive. That drove

Khrushchev to press his corn campaign all the harder, while zealous bureau-

crats who wanted to please him exacerbated the situation by insisting on

extending corn acreage without adequately preparing peasants ﬁrst.

Despite these and other mistakes (such as the virtually overnight abolition

of machine tractor stations, which provided collective farms with machinery

and the people to run it), agriculture at ﬁrst boasted big gains. Between 1953

26 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Stroitel’stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel’skogo khoziaistva

(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962–4), vol. i,p.170.

27 Speech in Thomas F. Whitney (ed.), Khrushchev Speaks (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-

gan Press, 1963), p. 101.

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and 1959 farm output rose 8.5 per cent annually and 51 per cent overall. But

1960 proved to be the worst year for agriculture since Stalin’s death, and

despite optimistic forecasts in the summer of 1961, that autumn’s harvest

was no better. Khrushchev’s response was to resort to more institutional

tinkering. In 1962 he moved to abolish district party committees, the fabled

raikomy which had overseen agriculture for decades, and to replace them

with ‘territorial production administrations’, which added another layer of

bureaucracy between the countryside and the capital. That same autumn

he proposed dividing the Communist Party into two separate branches, one

specialising on agriculture, the other on industry. Ever since Lenin, the party

had jealously guarded its monopoly of power by centralising its own ranks.

Khrushchev was convinced that local party ofﬁcials shied away from rural

problems, and he was determined to force them to concentrate on feeding the

people.

These panaceas also failed. The 1963 harvest was disastrous: only 107.5

million tons compared to 134.7 in 1958; the Virgin Lands produced their smallest

crop in years, although the sown area was now 10 million hectares larger than

in 1955. As a result Moscow had to buy wheat from the West. ‘Father didn’t

understand what was wrong’, his son, Sergei, remembered. ‘He grew nervous,

became angry, quarreled, looked for culprits and didn’t ﬁnd them. Deep inside

he began subconsciously to understand that the problem was not in the details.

It was the system itself that didn’t work, but he couldn’t change his beliefs.’

Industry and housing

Energising industrial management and rendering it more efﬁcient, another

post-Stalinist task, also encountered systemic obstacles. The centralised Soviet

planning system, which excelled at ‘extensive’ heavy industrial development,

was not suited for ‘intensive’ development of an increasingly complex and

diversiﬁed economy. Yet Soviet leaders of the Khrushchev period were not

inclined to pursue proposals for fundamental, structural reform. Although

the Moscow-based ministries, which Khrushchev abolished in February 1957,

had favoured the narrow needs of their own industries at the expense of local

areas in which their plants were located, the sovnarkhozy which replaced them

fostered localism while losing sight of all-Union interests. That soon led to a

process of recentralisation in which the number of regional economic councils

was reduced, a new agency called the Supreme Economic Council was created

28 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower,pp.700–1.

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to co-ordinate them and a series of state committees was formed to duplicate

the role of the departed ministries. Nor did Khrushchev’s division of the party

produce positive industrial results. Although Soviet GNP grew at a rate of

7.1 per cent until 1958, after that it dipped down to 5.4 per cent in 1964, not

nearly enough to allow the USSR to ‘catch up and overtake’ the United States

which, although it was growing more slowly, had a much larger economic

base.

While the economy did not grow fast enough to satisfy Soviet leaders, the

lives of ordinary citizens improved. Wages rose, meat consumption increased,

consumer goods like televisions, refrigerators and washing machines became

widely available. Stalin’s legacy included a dreadful housing crisis: massive

overcrowding, armies of young workers living in dormitories, multiple families

crowded into communal apartments, with each family occupying one room

and all sharing a single kitchen and bathroom. In the Khrushchev period,

the annual rate of housing construction nearly doubled. Between 1956 and

1965, about 108 million people moved into new apartments, many of them

in standardised ﬁve-storey apartment houses built out of prefabricated mate-

rials in rapid, assembly-line fashion. Millions were grateful, but Khrushchev

encouraged ever higher expectations, particularly by promising, in a speech

presenting a new party programme to the Central Committee in June 1961,

that the communist utopia itself would be ‘just about built’ by 1980.

Culture

Members of the scientiﬁc and artistic intelligentsia were a natural constituency

for reform. Having been singled out for special suffering under Stalin, many of

them enthusiastically welcomed de-Stalinisation. ‘I like [Khrushchev] ever so

much’, gushed Andrei Sakharov in 1956. ‘After all, he so differs from Stalin.’

However, they were also increasingly dismayed – not only by Khrushchev’s

continual retreats from anti-Stalinism, but by the incredibly boorish behaviour

of a man whom artist Ernst Neizvestny described as ‘the most uncultured

man I’ve ever met’.

Anticipating just such condescension from intellectuals,

Khrushchev dreaded encounters with them even as he craved their respect.

They did not realise that their resistance to his calls for ideological discipline

challenged not just the party line but his self-esteem. That is why clashes

29 Speech in Nikolai Barsukov, ‘Mysli vslukh: zamechaniia N. S. Khrushcheva na proekt

tret’ei programmy KPSS’, unpublished article, p. 75.

30 Andrei Sakharov, ‘Vospominaniia’, Znamia 11 (1990): 147.

31 Ernst Neizvestnyi, ‘Moi dialog s Khrushchevym’, Vremia i my 4 (May 1979): 182.

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with recalcitrant intellectuals provoked him into swirls of angry rhetoric,

simultaneously offensive and defensive, lashing out at his audience in a violent

disconnected way.

What has been called the ‘Thaw’ began after Stalin’s death but picked

up momentum after the Twentieth Party Congress. After the long night of

Stalinism, with its pogrom against writers and artists, critic Maya Turovskaya

recalled, ‘the coming of Khrushchev and the Twentieth Congress felt like a

great holiday of the soul’.

Ilya Ehrenburg’s novel The Thaw (Otepel’) included

biting criticism of the ruling elite. In Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not By Bread Alone

(Ne Khlebom edinym), an idealistic engineer is thwarted by mindless, heartless

ofﬁcialdom. Literaturnaia Moskva (Literary Moscow), a literary almanac of prose,

poetry, plays, criticism and social commentary published in 1956, included

works mocking the ofﬁcial image of ‘the new Soviet man’. Mikhail Kalatozov’s

ﬁlm, The Cranes are Flying (Letiat zhuravli), Grigorii Chukhrai’s Ballad of a Soldier

(Ballada o soldate) and Sergei Bondarchuk’s Destiny of a Man (Sud’ba cheloveka)

took a fresh look at the sacred subject of the Russian soldier in the Second

World War (see Plate 22). Concern for the individual, rather than the nation

or the state, began to appear in the work of a new generation of ﬁlm-makers

such as Andrei Tarkovsky.

During the World Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957, thousands of young

people from around the globe ﬂooded the city, singing and dancing late into the

night to the beat of African drums, Scottish bagpipes and jazz bands, cheering

open-air poetry readings and carousing along gaily decorated streets. Masses

of young Muscovites turned out to meet the foreign guests. The jamboree

impressed the world with Moscow’s new openness, but the Soviet young peo-

ple who turned out were even more impressed with Western popular culture.

After the Twenty-Second Congress in October 1961, at which Khrushchev

launched another attack on Stalin, the Thaw gathered more momentum.

Prompted by Khrushchev, the Presidium approved publication of Aleksandr

Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (Odin den’ Ivana Deniso-

vicha), and on 21 October 1962, Pravda published Evgenii Evtushenko’s poem,

‘The Heirs of Stalin’ (Nasledniki Stalina), which had been circulating privately

without hope of publication.

However, Khrushchev recoiled at the very process of liberalisation which

he encouraged. When Boris Pasternak allowed his novel, Doctor Zhivago,to

be published in the West, Khrushchev ordered his Komsomol chief to ‘work

over’ Pasternak, telling him to compare the great poet unfavourably to a pig

32 Author’s interview with Maya Turovskaya, March 1995, Amherst, Massachusetts.

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who ‘never makes a mess where it eats and sleeps’, and to invite ‘this internal

emigrant’ to become ‘a real emigrant and go to his capitalist paradise’.

After

his overthrow in 1964, Khrushchev ﬁnally read Doctor Zhivago. ‘We shouldn’t

have banned it’, he said. ‘I should have read it myself. There’s nothing anti-

Soviet in it.’

As Khrushchev’s troubles mounted, he sought new ways to motivate and

inspire the Soviet people while attacking old traditions like religion, which in

his view was distracting them from the task of building Communism. ‘Within

twenty years’, he told the Central Committee in presenting the new party pro-

gramme in June 1961, the USSR would ‘steadily win victory after victory’ in

economic competition with the United States. The Soviet countryside would

blossom with ‘such an array of appurtenances – apartment houses equipped

with all modern conveniences, enterprises providing consumer services, cul-

tural and medical facilities – that in the end the rural population will enjoy

conditions of life comparable to those found in cities’.

Khrushchev was a true

believer, impatient for the day when his fellow citizens, who had sacriﬁced so

much for so long, would at last enjoy the good life.

Although religion had always been anathema to the Bolsheviks, Stalin had

eased religious persecution, if only to unite the populace for the war effort,

and to impress his wartime Western allies. It was Khrushchev who mounted

an all-out assault that reached its peak in 1961: anti-religious agitation was

intensiﬁed, taxes on religious activity increased, churches and monasteries

closed, with the result that the number of Orthodox parishes dropped from

more than 15,000 in 1951 to less than 8,000 in 1963. Khrushchev’s anti-religion

campaign was a price he paid for de-Stalinisation – in the sense that it was

popular with Stalinist ideologues like Central Committee secretary Mikhail

Suslov – but he may also have seen it as a form of de-Stalinisation, in that

it reversed Stalin’s compromise with religion and returned to Lenin’s more

militant approach.

Khrushchev’s approach to the ‘nationality question’ ﬁtted the pattern of

trying to remove the Stalinist stain from socialism while at the same time

bringing the USSR closer to utopia itself. He allowed small peoples of the North

Caucasus, such as Chechens, Ingush and Balkars, to return from their Stalinist

exile, although he did not invite the Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea. His

33 Vladimir Semichastnyi, ‘Ia by spravilsia s liuboi rabotoi’, interview by K. Svetitskii and

S. Sokolov, Ogonek 24 (1989): 24.

34 Sergei N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the Man and his Era,

trans. William Taubman (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), p. 208.

35 Speech in Barsukov, ‘Mysli vslukh’, pp. 75–7.

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The Khrushchev period, 1953–1964

efforts to decentralise political power by transferring some of it to regional

leaders strengthened the position of non-Russian nationalities, some of whom

were to break away from Russia three decades later. If Khrushchev did not fear

that outcome, that was because he could not imagine it. He counted on the

various peoples of the USSR to fuse together into a single Soviet nation. He

took the borders between Soviet republics so lightly that in 1954 he transferred

the Russian-dominated Crimea from the Russian Federation to Ukraine to

celebrate the 300th anniversary of a treaty linking Ukraine with Russia.

The Soviet bloc

Having had little exposure to the outside world (and almost none to the Great

Powers) during the ﬁrst ﬁfty years of his life, Khrushchev was hardly ready

to direct Soviet foreign policy, but initially at least, he did not have to. With

Beria and Malenkov taking the lead in designing overall strategy, and Molotov

conducting diplomacy, Khrushchev did not attend to world affairs until 1954,at

which point his focus was on relations with other Communist states. Between

1953 and 1956 Moscow agreed to build, or aid in the construction of, some 205

Chinese factories and plants valued at about $2 billion, with a large proportion

of the cost ﬁnanced with Soviet credits, all when the Russians themselves were

suffering shortages. But Khrushchev’s failure to consult the Chinese before

unmasking Stalin, and his handling of the Polish and Hungarian crises later

in 1956, alienated Mao. Khrushchev hoped to play the benevolent tutor to the

Chinese leader, so it was personally devastating when Mao began condescend-

ing to him, not just denying Khrushchev the satisfaction of outdoing Stalin

in Sino-Soviet relations, but returning Khrushchev to his former role of an

upstart mortiﬁed by a new master.

When Mao came to Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the

Bolshevik revolution in the autumn of 1957, Khrushchev showered him with

attention and hospitality. But Mao practically oozed dissatisfaction and con-

descension in return.

The years 1958 and 1959 brought a sharp downturn in

Sino-Soviet relations which two Khrushchev trips to Beijing not only failed to

reverse, but actually deepened. The trigger for the dispute was a Soviet request

for long-wave radio stations, necessary for communicating with Soviet sub-

marines, on Chinese territory, and a proposal for a joint submarine ﬂeet,

both of which, Mao feared, would deepen Chinese dependence on the USSR.

36 See Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 410–11.

37 See Taubman, Khrushchev,pp.341–2.

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william taubman

Sino-Soviet differences extended to Chinese ideological boasting about the

communes they were constructing, the Sino-Indian clash in 1959 and Moscow’s

pursuit of d

etente with the United States, all overlaid with growing personal

animosity between the two leaders. Alone with Soviet colleagues in a Beijing

reception room that must have been bugged, Khrushchev likened Mao in 1959

to old ‘galoshes’, a term that is colloquial for condoms in Chinese as well as

Russian. Mao saw himself as a ‘bullﬁghter’, one of his interpreters recalled,

and ‘Khrushchev as the bull’.

In 1960, Khrushchev suddenly decided to pull all Soviet advisers, of whom

there were more than a thousand, out of China, and to tear up hundreds

of contracts and scrap hundreds of co-operative projects, a radical step that

not only wounded the Chinese but deprived Moscow of the chance to gather

invaluable intelligence. Although the two sides adopted an uneasy truce the

next year, the dispute ﬂared up again when Zhou En-Lai walked out of the

Twenty-Second Party Congress in Moscow, further intensiﬁed when Beijing

characterised Khrushchev’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis as ‘adventur-

ism’ followed by ‘capitulationism’, and deteriorated beyond repair when the

twoparties started exchanging propaganda barrages, involving other Commu-

nist Parties in their conﬂict, and even quarrelling about potentially explosive

Sino-Soviet border disputes.

Khrushchev’s 1955 journey to Belgrade reﬂected a new, post-Stalinist for-

mula for holding together the Soviet bloc: to tolerate a modicum of diver-

sity and domestic autonomy, to emphasise ideological and political bonds

and reinforce economic and political ties, and to weave all this together with

Khrushchev’s own personal involvement. Yugoslav leader Josip Tito was eager

for reconciliation, but on his own terms: his aim was to reform the Communist

camp, not buttress it; to preserve Yugoslav independence, including ties with

the West, not restrict it. Having broken with Stalin before Khrushchev did,

Tito was proud and touchy. Khrushchev needed Yugoslav concessions to prove

he was right to conciliate Belgrade, whereas Tito was determined to postpone

the closer party-to-party ties that Khrushchev sought until Stalinism was dead

and buried in the USSR. As a result, although Soviet–Yugoslav tensions never

again plummeted to their post-1948 depths, they did not become as close as

Khrushchev wanted either.

The year 1955 also marked the post-Stalin leadership’s ﬁrst major venture

into the Third World. For Stalin, who was famous for concentrating on coun-

tries of great geopolitical signiﬁcance, and for cutting his losses in those

38 Recollections of former Soviet and Chinese ofﬁcials and interpreters at 1997 Symposium

on Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War, Beijing, 1997.

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The Khrushchev period, 1953–1964

he could not hope to control, the developing world had been a sideshow.

Khrushchev, in contrast, welcomed the prospect of revolutions that might

bring the USSR new allies, and courted neutrals whom Stalin had disdained.

In October 1955, he and Bulganin undertook a lengthy tour of India, Burma and

Afghanistan. In February 1960, he revisited these three while adding Indonesia

to his itinerary. Egypt received a visit from him in May 1964. In the meantime,

he devoted considerable attention to the Congo, supporting the short-lived,

left-leaning presidency of Patrice Lumumba, and of course Cuba, whose ﬁery

new leader seemed intent on turning his island into a Soviet ally only 150 kilo-

metres from Florida (see Plate 17). None of these ventures, however, brought

anything like the dividends Khrushchev hoped for.

East–West relations

While China and Yugoslavia could challenge the USSR, and the Third World

tempted it, the United States could destroy it. The centrepiece of Khrushchev’s

diplomacy was a campaign for what a later era would label d

etente. As he

saw it, reducing Cold War tensions could undermine Western resistance to

Communist gains, tempt capitalists to increase East–West trade and project a

more appealing image to the world, while at the same time allowing Soviet

energies and resources, which had previously been devoted to the military, to

be shifted to civilian uses.

Khrushchev’s ﬁrst major achievement was the Austrian State Treaty, signed

in May 1955, under which Soviet occupation forces pulled out in return for an

Austrian declaration of neutrality. Next came the four-power Geneva summit

conference in July 1955. The main issues discussed at Geneva (the German

question, European security and disarmament) offered no room for compro-

mise, but Khrushchev’s main impression from the meeting, that ‘our enemies

probably feared us as much as we feared them’, would soon encourage him

to practise nuclear blackmail so as to play on Western fears.

When Israel

attacked Egypt, with British and French support, in October 1956, Premier

Bulganin ominously asked Prime Minister Anthony Eden, ‘What situation

would Britain ﬁnd itself in if she were attacked by stronger states possessing all

kinds of modern destructive weapons?’ Later, after a Suez ceaseﬁre was agreed

to, Khrushchev claimed it was the ‘direct result’ of this Soviet warning.

fact, it was American rather than Soviet pressure that forced Egypt’s attackers

39 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers,p.400.

40 Veljko Mi

cunovi

c, Moscow Diary, trans. David Floyd (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980),

p. 148.

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