I had kept abreast of general events in Indonesia, through the
35THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
EMPIRE
mainstream media; now I began to dig deeper, researching
information that was available from nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and academics, as well as from the United
Nations, the World Bank, and the other organizations I once had
served. My curiosity deepened as I became more familiar with the
circumstances surrounding the 1997 Asian economic collapse,
also known as the "IMF crisis." This debacle began in Asia,
where it impacted hundreds of millions of people and resulted in
thousands—possibly millions—of deaths from disease, starvation,
and suicides, and then spread across the globe. For those willing
to listen, it sent a strong message about the true intent of the IMF
and the World Bank, a lesson in how not to manage an economy,
unless the goal is to further enrich the corporatocracy at the
expense of everyone else.
On first glance, the official statistics indicated that our work in
the 1970s in Indonesia had produced an admirable economic re-
cord, at least until 1997. Those statistics bragged of low inflation,
foreign exchange reserves totaling more than $20 billion, a trade
surplus of more than $900 million, and a solid banking sector.
Indonesia's economic growth (measured by GDP) averaged nearly
9 percent every year in the 1990s, until 1997—not as spectacular
as the double-digit forecasts I had been paid to produce, but
highly impressive nevertheless. Economists at the World Bank,
IMF, consulting firms, and academic institutions used such
statistics to argue that the development policies promoted by us
EHMs had proven successful.
I soon ascertained, however, that the statistics did not address
the extremely high price the Indonesian people had paid for what
the economists referred to as an "economic miracle." The benefits
were restricted to those at the top of the economic ladder. Rapid