230 Risk response
become well established, with very large departments being set up in many energy companies.
However, the practice of ERM in energy companies still remains very closely related to the
management of treasury risks.
One of the drivers for risk management in the fi nance sector is the regulatory environment.
Banks have been subjected to Basel II for some time, and the insurance sector in Europe is
about to be subjected to similar requirements set out in the Solvency II Directive. This gives
rise to the obligation on fi nancial institutions to measure their exposure to operational risk.
The output of operational risk management (ORM) activities in fi nancial institutions is the
ability to calculate the capital that should be held in reserve to cover the consequences of the
identifi ed risks materializing. The impact of these ORM activities is that risks will be better
identifi ed and managed, so that the capital required to meet the consequences of the risks
materializing is lowered. ORM within fi nancial institutions can be seen as a particular applica-
tion of the ERM approach.
The failure of the world banking system called into question the effectiveness of risk manage-
ment activities in banks and, in particular, the effectiveness of operational risk management.
One of the consequences of the world fi nancial crisis is that the news reports now routinely
state that: 1) risk is bad; and 2) risk management has failed. In fact, taking risk is essential for
the success of organizations.
The statement that risk management has failed in banks is more diffi cult to contradict.
However, the reality is that it was not the failure of risk management principles that caused the
banking crisis. It was the failure to correctly apply those principles. Many banks made two
simultaneous mistakes:
An accurate risk and reward analysis was not undertaken, so that banks made decisions •
on the basis of the rewards available, rather than taking a more balanced view of the
risks involved in seeking those higher rewards.
Quantifi
cation of the level of risk involved was not accurate, because the banks were •
taking such a risk-aggressive approach that certain events were considered to be so
unlikely that they could be ignored.
Detailed analysis of the banking crisis in 2008 is outside the scope of this text. However, it
appears that the crisis was caused by the failure of two different sets of risk analysis models.
Firstly, the banks had assumed that re-packaged debts, including sub-prime mortgages, would
continue to be tradable commodities in the market, but this proved not to be the case.
Secondly, the banks assumed that short-term borrowing on the wholesale money markets
would continue to be available. This short-term money is used by banks so that they can con-
tinue to lend money on a long-term basis, at a more profi
table rate. The collapse of the whole-
sale money markets was not anticipated by the credit models used by most banks.