PART ONE
Introduction to Economics and the Economy
38
The Demise of the Command
Systems
Our discussion of how a market system answers the five
fundamental questions provides insights on why command
systems of the Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and China
(prior to its market reforms) failed. Those systems en-
countered two insurmountable problems.
The Coordination Problem
The first difficulty was the coordination problem. The
central planners had to coordinate the millions of individ-
ual decisions by consumers, resource suppliers, and busi-
nesses. Consider the setting up of a factory to produce
tractors. The central planners had to establish a realistic
annual production target, for example, 1000 tractors. They
then had to make available all the necessary inputs—labor,
machinery, electric power, steel, tires, glass, paint, trans-
portation—for the production and delivery of those 1000
tractors.
Because the outputs of many industries serve as inputs
to other industries, the failure of any single industry to
achieve its output target caused a chain reaction of reper-
cussions. For example, if iron mines, for want of machinery
or labor or transportation, did not supply the steel industry
with the required inputs of iron ore, the steel mills were
unable to fulfill the input needs of the many industries that
depended on steel. Those steel-using industries (such as
tractor, automobile, and transportation) were unable to ful-
fill their planned production goals. Eventually the chain
reaction spread to all firms that used steel as an input and
from there to other input buyers or final consumers.
The coordination problem became more difficult as
the economies expanded. Products and production pro-
cesses grew more sophisticated, and the number of indus-
tries requiring planning increased. Planning techniques
that worked for the simpler economy proved highly
inadequate and inefficient for the larger economy. Bottle-
necks and production stoppages became the norm, not the
exception. In trying to cope, planners further suppressed
product variety, focusing on one or two products in each
product category.
A lack of a reliable success indicator added to the co-
ordination problem in the Soviet Union and China (prior
to its market reforms). We have seen that market econo-
mies rely on profit as a success indicator. Profit depends
on consumer demand, production efficiency, and product
quality. In contrast, the major success indicator for the
command economies usually was a quantitative produc-
tion target that the central planners assigned. Production
costs, product quality, and product mix were secondary
considerations. Managers and workers often sacrificed
product quality and variety because they were being
awarded bonuses for meeting quantitative, not qualitative,
targets. If meeting production goals meant sloppy assem-
bly work and little product variety, so be it.
It was difficult at best for planners to assign quantita-
tive production targets without unintentionally producing
distortions in output. If the plan specified a production tar-
get for producing nails in terms of weight (tons of nails),
the enterprise made only large nails. But if it specified the
target as a quantity (thousands of nails), the firm made all
small nails, and lots of them! That is precisely what hap-
pened in the centrally planned economies.
The Incentive Problem
The command economies also faced an incentive prob-
lem. Central planners determined the output mix. When
they misjudged how many automobiles, shoes, shirts, and
chickens were wanted at the government-determined
prices, persistent shortages and surpluses of those prod-
ucts arose. But as long as the managers who oversaw the
production of those goods were rewarded for meeting
their assigned production goals, they had no incentive to
adjust production in response to the shortages and sur-
pluses. And there were no fluctuations in prices and prof-
itability to signal that more or less of certain products was
desired. Thus, many products were unavailable or in short
supply, while other products were overproduced and sat
for months or years in warehouses.
The command systems of the Soviet Union and China
before its market reforms also lacked entrepreneurship. Cen-
tral planning did not trigger the profit motive, nor did it re-
ward innovation and enterprise. The route for getting ahead
was through participation in the political hierarchy of the
Communist Party. Moving up the hierarchy meant better
housing, better access to health care, and the right to shop in
special stores. Meeting production targets and maneuvering
through the minefields of party politics were measures of
success in “business.” But a definition of business success
based solely on political savvy was not conducive to techno-
logical advance, which is often disruptive to existing prod-
ucts, production methods, and organizational structures.
The Circular Flow
Model
The dynamic market economy creates con-
tinuous, repetitive flows of goods and ser-
vices, resources, and money. The circular
flow diagram, shown in Figure 2.2 (Key
O 2.4
Circular flow
diagram
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