Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
page_414
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_414.html[1/17/2011 2:27:55 PM]
< previous page page_414 next page >
Page 414
into New York harbour. On 14 August de Grasse's reply arrived. It was precise and encouraging. He would bring
his whole fleet and 3,000 troops; would sail on 13 August from San Domingo for the Chesapeake; and would stay
till 13 October, when he must return to the Caribbean to support the Spaniards. Within that period Washington
must complete his operations.
About the time when this letter arrived, news was received which decisively ruled out an attack on New York. The
2,400 German reinforcements which had slipped round the north of Scotland in May had joined Clinton.
Washington had long been alarmed for Virginia, where Lafayette and his little force were in constant danger of
being trapped by Cornwallis and annihilated; and he now resolved to turn his back on Clinton and strike at
Cornwallis. It was a brave decision. He would leave half his American force to guard the Highlands, but they were
only 2,500 men. Admiral Barras, who wanted to take his squadron on a separate expedition to Newfoundland, had
to be persuaded to come to the Chesapeake and bring the French siegetrain, which was too heavy to be moved by
land. Under pressure from Rochambeau he agreed, with a justifiable warning that he might be intercepted by the
British at sea. Thus every resource was gathered for a decisive concentration; and two days after the receipt of de
Grasse's letter 7,000 French and American regulars marched for the Chesapeake.
The northern regiments showed visible discontent at being removed so far from their homes, but were pacified as
they passed through Philadelphia by an overdue issue of hard cash borrowed from the French. The army moved
rapidly. In fifteen days the Americans covered 200 miles. It was a period of great anxiety for Washington. He had
no word of de Grasse, and was racked by fear that the British fleet would ruin his hopes by occupying the
Chesapeake. But as he rode south from Philadelphia on 5 September an express came up the road with despatches
which set his mind at rest: de Grasse and his fleet were inside the Chesapeake. 'I have never seen a man moved by
greater or more sincere joy', said the Duc de Lauzun. The French troops had already disembarked; and their
commander, General St Clair, had placed himself under the orders of the young Lafayette till Rochambeau should
arrive. It was an act of significant generosity. For it was by such good feeling and willingness to take the wider
view that the French had achieved the coup which Germain had always expected of the British forces. In the short
season when operations in the West Indies were dormant, they had switched their land and sea forces northwards
to achieve a decisive concentration. Its success would depend on the British commanders' response; and to
understand what followed we must turn back to the spring operations in the Caribbean.
< previous page page_414 next page >
page_415
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_415.html[1/17/2011 2:27:55 PM]
< previous page page_415 next page >
Page 415
2
Rodney and de Grasse
Rodney had returned from his foray to America in December 1780 to the devastation of the great hurricane. He
appealed in strong terms to Germain for reinforcements, for he was certain that in the coming year his own theatre
would be the decisive one. 'Here and here only the French expect a much superior fleet than they had last year, and
by intercepted letters they will certainly have one' 'Jamaica, my Lord, can be in no danger while I command to
leeward' 'Depend upon it, my Lord, here will be the war.' He suggested a single Commander-in-Chief for the West
Indies and America; and his own choice for the appointment is not hard to guess.1
Reinforcements, of course, were on their way. In January Hood's squadron arrived from England to make good the
wastage, and with them the three battalions which were intended to go on to Clinton in the summer. Sir Samuel
Hood had been obtained from the Captains' List by a special promotion when Darby and William Drake had
refused the offer to be second-in-command to Rodney. He had been Commissioner at Portsmouth since the
beginning of the French war, an appointment due both to his ability and to his connections.2 Though this
appointment did not usually lead to further service at sea, he had been dissatisfied for some time that his juniors
were flying commodores' pennants, and had been asking to have his flag and go to sea. As soon as it was decided
to reinforce the Leeward Islands, Sandwich obtained Cabinet authority to send him. There followed the special
promotion of captains, with the usual stretching to oblige other connections; and thus the future Lord Hood
obtained his flag.3
Though Hood's arrival gave Rodney the temporary command of the sea, the enemy islands were believed to be
strongly garrisoned, and General Vaughan saw no hope of capturing them. Rodney had asked Clinton to lend him
troops for the winter when he was at New York; but with Cornwallis's winter offensive building up in the Carolinas
Clinton had felt unable to spare any. 'What could we not have done', Rodney asked rhetorically in March, 'had
Clinton sent an army with me?'4 It was a kind of cry heard all too often in every quarter, not least from Clinton
himself.
Rodney's confidence in the security of the Jamaica command was not well conceived. The island itself might be
secure against a sudden blow, but Sir Peter Parker had other responsibilities for which he was ill provided. His
1 Sackville, II, 1945.
2 Hood was married to the daughter of Edward Linzee, mayor of Portsmouth, who wrote to Sandwich that his
appointment gratified 'all our political friends' (Williams Transcripts).
3 Sandwich, III, 232; G 3137, 3152.
4 Mundy, II, 58.
< previous page page_415 next page >
page_416
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_416.html[1/17/2011 2:27:56 PM]
< previous page page_416 next page >
Page 416
force, after the first convoy of the year went home, was little more than equal to the four French ships of the line at
San Domingo, to say nothing of the eight sound Spaniards at Havana.1 The government at home relied on him to
protect West Florida; but when the French and Spanish squadrons sailed from Havana in April to support an attack
on Pensacola he was powerless to stop them. The navy, it is true had used less than its most honest endeavours to
reinforce the garrison. When the Spanish Governor of Louisiana opened the attack, Governor Dalling had sent a
regiment recruited from American rebel prisoners to General Campbell's assistance, but the two warships in which
they sailed returned without landing them. One had spoken a sloop which reported that Pensacola had fallen, and
instead of checking the intelligence she captured a French frigate and returned to Jamaica with her prize. The
second ship took some prizes, commandeered twenty-three of the soldiers to work them, and after standing by to
see them clear of danger, she bore away on 29 March for Jamaica without attempting to reconnoitre Pensacola, and
chased and took two more prizes as she returned. After a leisurely concentration, the Spaniards broke ground at the
end of April, and a few days later their batteries opened. After a week's firing they had nearly exhausted their
efforts when one of their shells rolled in at the open door of a bomb-proof magazine. The explosion caused a
hundred casualties and demolished a redoubt, and the Spaniards stormed in and after one repulse gained a footing
within the works. Under their close fire Campbell's men could not work their guns, and on 9 May he surrendered.
West Florida was gone.2
Rodney opened his own campaign with an easier task, for at the end of January he received the Cabinet's order to
attack St Eustatius. Vaughan and Rodney moved at once, The defenceless island capitulated without resistance, and
a convoy of thirty merchantmen with a Dutch sixty-gun ship which had just cleared the harbour was pursued and
captured. The booty in the island was immense. For years it had been supplying the enemy islands and the
Americans. Ships had cleared openly for St Eustatius from British ports, or detached themselves from convoys
bound for St Kitts. Naval officers had long complained of the breach in the blockade, which they were powerless
to prevent; and Rodney found ample evidence in the Dutch warehouses that British subjects had been
systematically supplying the enemy. He retaliated with wholesale confiscations, to the benefit of his pocket.
1 The Spaniards were reported to be able to send seven ships of the line and one of fifty guns to sea. But
both Monteil and Solano were reported to be old and cautious (CO 137/80, f. 83).
2 CO 137/80, ff. 223 et seq.; Add. MSS. 38216, f. 332; Royal Institution MSS., II, 286; Sandwich, IV, 127.
< previous page page_416 next page >
page_417
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_417.html[1/17/2011 2:27:56 PM]
< previous page page_417 next page >
Page 417
Horace Walpole condemned the giving of the captured property to the captors as a 'savage and dangerous
precedent'. Though the naval blockade was useless as long as British merchants supplied the enemy with impunity,
the merchants knew their Locke, and based their case on a higher law than mere necessity of war. The confiscation
ordinances tended 'to injure civil contracts, which are founded on the Law of Nature, and which form the most
sacred bond of society'. Rodney and Vaughan were to pay dearly for their sacrilege. The Duke of Wellington
expressed the matter with his usual dry relevance: 'at St Eustatius . . . was found a vast quantity of British property,
which was certainly contraband, and, moreover, was intended for the supply of the public enemies of the state. The
captors claimed this property as prize; there was a long law-suit upon the subject, which was decided against
them.'1
The plunder so vainly appropriated held Rodney like a magnet. He virtually handed over the operational command
to Hood, cancelled attacks on the Dutch colonies of Surinam and Curaçao, and remained for three months at St
Eustatius with Vaughan collecting and despatching the treasure, much of which was to fall into the hands of la
Motte-Picquet. The Admiral and General appointed agents for the plunder without any authority, which lay in the
hands of the officers and ships' companies of the fleet in conjunction with the army. When Germain heard of his
stay at St Eustatius he feared that de Grasse would not be intercepted before he reached Martinique; and he was
right. Though warning of a French reinforcement reached Rodney in February, he detached Hood with only
eighteen sail of the line to intercept it, keeping another ship cruising and three with his flag at St Eustatius. At first
Hood was stationed out at sea to the eastward of Martinique to meet de Grasse as he approached; but when the
enemy did not appear, Rodney ordered him to close in and blockade the four French ships of the line in Martinique
to cover the sailing of his convoy from St Eustatius. Hood remonstrated, but in vain; and instead of meeting de
Grasse to windward in the open sea the British fleet was in the close waters off Fort Royal. The French were able
to manoeuvre their transports into safety along the shore of the island, and the four ships in Fort Royal joined de
Grasse's twenty, giving him a superiority of six. Short of seamen, and with four ships damaged and leaking, Hood
finally despaired of a close action and withdrew to St Lucia.
Thus was disappointed the Cabinet's hope of intercepting de Grasse.
1 G 2776; Sackville, II, 2789, 2912, 2025; CL, Germain, Thoughts on the Caribbean Station; Petition of
West India Planters and Merchants (printed copy in CL, Shelburne, Vol. 79, p. 173); CO 318/7, ff. 11011,
11718; Walpole, Last Journals, II, 455; Gurwood, Selections from Despatches of Wellington, 115.
27
< previous page page_417 next page >
page_418
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_418.html[1/17/2011 2:27:57 PM]
< previous page page_418 next page >
Page 418
Germain still thought that the advanced season would prevent him from attacking the British islands, and the
danger now appeared to lie in America; for there intelligence indicated that de Grasse would sail with most of his
force, including Monteil's ships at San Domingo. On 4 July he was still confident that Rodney's pursuit and the
arrival of Digby's three ships from England would produce a superiority in American waters, and that the longed-
for naval victory would pave the way for a West Indian offensive in the winter. But it will be remembered that
Digby's reinforcement was held up at home till the 19th awaiting the protection of the Channel fleet; and before
then Germain received from Clinton the intercepted despatches on the Wethersfield conference, confirming the
enemy's expectations of ships and troops from the West Indies, and revealing the extent of their hopes. Germain
was unwell, and the despatches made him feel worse. Extracts from the letters were sent to Rodney, with a firm
order to watch and follow de Grasse, leaving 'a sufficient force for the protection of the islands'. But it was now too
late to influence the campaign from London, and the order did not reach the Leeward Islands till the crisis had
come. The Ministry could only trust that Rodney would obey his standing orders to support the American station,
of which he had recently been reminded. It remains to be seen how far he fulfilled the Cabinet's hopes.1
Germain had underestimated de Grasse's enterprise. He had assumed that he would not have the time or the force
to attack the British islands. But de Grasse had counted Hood's fleet, and he lost not a moment. Within three days
of anchoring at Fort Royal he was off with 1,200 troops to attack St Lucia, while a second force assailed Tobago.
Brigadier St Leger's defences on St Lucia proved strong and resolutely manned, and the whole French force was
switched to support the Tobago landing, where the insignificant garrison capitulated two days before Rodney made
his leisurely appearance on 4 June. On the following day he met the French fleet. He had the weather gauge and
twenty ships against twenty-four, and Hood thought he might have fought with advantage. But with night coming
on Rodney feared that the French would entangle his fleet among the Grenadines or decoy it into the westerly
current between Grenada and the mainland. Yet Grenada was still far to leeward, the Grenadines were more than
twenty miles away on the following morning, and he had the moonlight he had used against Langara. Thus he
missed his second chance to bring de Grasse to battle. Rodney was
1 CO 318/8, f. 114; CO 5/102, ff. 154, 197; Knox, 178; Sandwich, IV, 138; Adm. 2/1340, 14 July to
Rodney and Digby. On July 29th the Cabinet resolved to send at least five more ships of the line to the
West Indies, a decision which merged into the autumn planning which followed (G 3379).
< previous page page_418 next page >
page_419
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_419.html[1/17/2011 2:27:57 PM]
< previous page page_419 next page >
Page 419
tired and ill after eighteen months abroad. If the fresher and younger Hood had commanded, the French fleet might
have been dealt a blow to spoil its American operations.
De Grasse's primary task was to support the Spaniards if they had a plan; but he found that Don Solano was
preparing a winter attack on Florida and had no immediate intention of taking the offensive. The French fleet was
therefore free for several months to pursue its secondary object, and intervene on the American coast. On 5 July it
sailed from Martinique for San Domingo, where it joined Monteil's squadron on the 16th. Here de Grasse found
appeals from Rochambeau and Luzerne which told him of the critical situation in Virginia. He responded
generously. At San Domingo were French troops brought out by Guichen in 1780, at the Spaniards' disposal for
their winter campaign, and he borrowed 3,000 under promise to return them by the end of October. From the
Spaniards at Cuba he obtained a loan of money. And taking his courage in his hands, he gathered his whole fleet
for the enterprise. Ten of his ships of the line had served a long time in the West Indies, and his government had
ordered them home for repair; but he swept them up. Nothing was left to convoy the trade to France, and it stayed
at San Domingo for the rest of the year. There may be truth in Captain White's remark1: 'If the British government
had sanctioned or a British admiral had adopted such a measure, however necessary to carry an important political
operation, the one would have been turned out and the other would have been hung. No wonder they succeeded
and we failed.' In America eight French ships of the line faced seven British; and on 5 August twenty-seven French
ships of the line and a fifty-gun ship were standing northward from San Domingo to join them. The fate of the
British forces scattered along the American seaboard would depend on Rodney.
Rodney had long expected de Grasse to go north to America, and as early as the beginning of May he had warned
the Admiral at New York to expect them. But when a frigate reported in the second week of July that the enemy
had sailed from Martinique, his latest intelligence from home was that only fourteen French ships of the line would
go to America, while de Grasse himself would return to Europe with the trade. It did not occur to either Rodney or
Hood that the French Admiral might hold up his convoys, and Rodney prepared to disperse his own Leeward
Islands trade to its destinations in Britain and Jamaica. The fleet sailed to Antigua for stores, and proceeded north
to St Eustatius to despatch the convoys. On 31 July the Jamaica convoy sailed under escort of the Sandwich, which
was
1 Quoted in Sandwich, IV, 134.
< previous page page_419 next page >
page_420
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_420.html[1/17/2011 2:27:57 PM]
< previous page page_420 next page >
Page 420
destined for the Port Royal yard as she was too crazy for the voyage to England. With her went the Torbay and
Prince William, under strict orders to leave the convoy off the end of Jamaica and proceed to America. On the
following day the homeward-bound convoy sailed with two ships of the line, one an old-fashioned sixty and the
other due for repairs.
Rodney himself sailed with the homeward convoy in the Gibraltar. She too required a refit, and Rodney thought
that the composition bolts and fastenings which she needed could be fitted quicker in England than at Jamaica or
Halifax. Moreover, he argued that her great draught of twenty seven feet made her unsuitable for the American
station as she could not cross the bar at Sandy Hook. Yet she would have gone there if Rodney had not taken her to
ferry him home. He felt very ill and exhausted; but if his health had improved at sea he had intended to steer for
America. In the latitude of Bermuda he left the convoy and stood to the northward, hoping that he would recover in
the cooler weather; but he felt no better and turned for England. On reaching Plymouth he judged the Gibraltar
sound enough to go out and join the out-numbered Channel fleet. About the crisis beyond the Atlantic he
confessed no fears. 'I have not a doubt', he wrote to Germain, 'but his Majesty's fleet will be superior on the coast
and prevent the enemy's designs, provided the officers who command will do their duty.'1
The departure of Rodney and the convoys left Hood with fourteen ships of the line. But another ten days passed
before he sailed for America, for he was held back by intelligence that la Motte-Picquet had reached Martinique
from Europe and then that the enemy had left some ships of force in the islands. These reports proved false, and at
dawn on 10 August he sailed from Antigua. The fleet on which the safety of Clinton's army depended had only
fourteen of the twenty ships of the line which had been in the Leeward Islands at the end of July; and only one
regiment of the three which General Vaughan had been ordered to send to Clinton. Vaughan, somewhat like his
predecessor Grant, had gone home leaving no instructions to send troops to America; but his temporary successor,
Brigadier Christie, grasped the importance of the crisis and embarked the Fortieth Regiment in the fleet. The
pattern of the British movement was not unlike the French: it was the proportion and timing which were different.2
3
The Fight for the Chesapeake
In American waters Arbuthnot had at last handed over his command and departed. Throughout the first half of the
year all concert between the
1 G 3318; Sandwich, IV, 134; Mundy, II, 144, 153; CL, Germain, 15 Sept. from Rodney.
2 CO 318/7, f. 128. cf. above, p. 329.
< previous page page_420 next page >
page_421
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_421.html[1/17/2011 2:27:58 PM]
< previous page page_421 next page >
Page 421
army and navy in America had been disrupted by his quarrels with Clinton, who continued to tell his friends that
one or other of them must go, but showed no willingness that it should be himself. But the old Admiral had for
some time past been asking for relief. Digby was on his way to replace him, and the Admiralty intended that he
should relieve Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica. But Arbuthnot no longer had the health for active service. He had been
having fits which resulted in prolonged unconsciousness, loss of sight in one eye, and impaired memory. After
fifty-five years in the service, he felt that he could be of no more use; and on 4 July he handed over his command
to Thomas Graves, and sailed for England without waiting for his relief.1
Graves was the officer whom Ternay had outpaced to America in 1780. Though he had made an unusually fast
passage, his alleged delay with a prize was under enquiry; and though he was backed by his friend Lord North, the
Admiralty did not intend him to succeed Arbuthnot as Commander-in-Chief. Of this he was unaware, and the First
Lord's correspondence suggests double-dealing. He had assured Graves that the purpose of the enquiry was to clear
him, and that he would personally silence criticism; so that Graves's confidence in his word was shattered in
September when he learnt that he was to be superseded by a junior officer and friend of Sandwich, and was to
serve as third in command at Jamaica. North had protested feebly. 'It will not be enough for me to say that this
disgrace must have been the lot of somebody', he wrote to Sandwich. 'I shall lose all political honour and
consequence if, when a disgrace is to be suffered, my friend is chosen as the proper object of it.' The reader may
decide which politician the transaction reveals in the more curious light.2
As yet in ignorance of his fall, Graves applied himself to the difficult task of obtaining Clinton's co-operation.
When Rochambeau's troops marched to join Washington, there seemed to be a chance of remounting the attack on
Rhode Island which had broken down in 1780.3 The French squadron lay at Newport with only 450 troops and
some militia to protect it, and their siege train at Providence; and Mackenzie, who knew Rhode Island intimately,
had no doubt that the new plan would succeed. Arbuthnot had feared that de Grasse would fall on him if he
lingered off Rhode Island, and wanted to shelter the whole squadron in New York. But Graves took the threat from
the Caribbean more lightly, and agreed to make the attempt. The attack, however, was postponed by Cornwallis's
retention of his whole force in Virginia; and in the meantime Graves received instructions
1 Sandwich, III, 250, 2657; Sackville, II, 191.
2 Sandwich, III, 270; IV, 2078; Adm. 1/489, Graves's of 24 Sept. 1781.
3 What follows relies on Willcox's study in J.M.H., 1945.
< previous page page_421 next page >
page_422
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_422.html[1/17/2011 2:27:58 PM]
< previous page page_422 next page >
Page 422
by the Hornet sloop to watch for a rebel convoy on its way from France to Boston. 'There is every reason', Lord
Stormont had informed Sandwich, 'to believe that it is one of the most important supplies the French have ever
sent the rebels', and that it was 'considered by the rebels themselves as furnishing them with the only possible
means of carrying on the war'.1
To go off Boston when de Grasse was expected from the West Indies was a serious risk; yet when the fortunes of
the rebellion were so desperate an important stroke against their supplies might be decisive. Graves took the
chance, and on 21 July his whole fleet rounded Cape Cod and stood in towards Boston. By this decision still more
ships were whittled away from the force which would face de Grasse.
Thick fog blanketed Boston Bay. The ships groped cautiously in fear of collision, and the fog guns boomed out
their warnings to friend and foe. To search for shipping in these conditions was useless, and on 16 August Graves
returned to Sandy Hook to resume the discussion of the attack on Newport. There was probably a week in hand
before de Grasse's arrival, and the arrival of the German reinforcements enabled Clinton to play his part. But the
fleet had suffered in Boston Bay and was not fit for immediate action. Two of Graves's six ships of the line had
already been damaged during the French sortie in the spring, and their refitting had been delayed and their defects
aggravated by the cruise off Boston. They could only now begin their long delayed repairs; and though another
ship returned from the Halifax yard Graves had only five ready for service.
In Graves's absence a sloop from Rodney had reached New York with the news of de Grasse's departure from the
Leeward Islands; but her captain, instead of seeking Graves out, had chased and captured a privateer, only to be
taken in turn by three others.2 Graves now learnt the news from a duplicate despatch; and on the following day
Clinton, who was preparing to cross the Harlem River and interrupt Washington's foraging, learnt that the enemy
had left White Plains. As August crept on he watched their progress across the Hudson and through New Jersey.
His only hope of stopping them was a swift pursuit to fasten on Washington before he crossed the Delaware; but
still he clung to New York, imagining that Washington had turned his attack from Manhattan to Staten Island, and
continuing with his own plans against Newport. On the 20th he reported to Germain that Cornwallis was making
progress with his entrenchments at Yorktown, and could be expected to send reinforcements to New York.3 There
was intelligence from Philadelphia that de Grasse was bringing his whole fleet and a large military force,
1 Sandwich, IV, 141; Adm. 2/1338, f. 77.
2 James, 284.
3 CO 5/103, ff. 97, 124. Mackenzie, pp. 606, 639, outlines a ruthless advance into the Jerseys for which he
thought 9,000 men could be spared.
< previous page page_422 next page >
page_423
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_423.html[1/17/2011 2:27:59 PM]
< previous page page_423 next page >
Page 423
and from Newport that Barras's squadron was preparing for sea. But Clinton and Graves believed that this was
mostly talk. On 28 August Sir Samuel Hood arrived off Sandy Hook with his fourteen ships of the line from
Antigua; but still there was no news of de Grasse, and Graves was convinced that the mountain would bring forth a
mouse.
Hood suspected no more than Graves the full magnitude of the crisis. But he knew that time was vital. He refused
to bring his fleet in over the bar. Going in by boat he found Graves and Clinton discussing the attack on Rhode
Island, and persuaded the Admiral to bring his ships out of the harbour. On the 31st the fleet of nineteen sail of the
line and one of fifty guns united off Sandy Hook. They should have been more. Graves's two absent ships of the
line were still refitting, and two fifties were cruising or conducting convoys. The two ships which Rodney had sent
by way of Jamaica had gone into harbour contrary to his orders, and had been ordered by Sir Peter Parker to
strengthen the homeward-bound convoy as far as their ways lay together.1 Parker had been begged by Rodney to
detach every ship of his own which he could spare to America; but Rodney's own example must excuse him for
sending home with the convoy three ships, all of which had been out of English yards for three years or more. This
left him a single ship to face the Spaniards at Cuba, and he kept her.
As the fleet gathered off Sandy Hook Graves learnt that Barras had sailed from Newport. To attack Rhode Island
now would be useless, and he weighed at once for the Chesapeake, confident that Barras was bound for the south
and hoping to fall on him with his overwhelming superiority. On 5 September he sighted the Capes of Virginia.
Out of Lynnhaven Bay a great French fleet was beating: it was not Barras's ships from Rhode Island, but de
Grasse's from the West Indies. Three of his ships of the line and a fifty were supporting the army in the mouth of
the James River; but even without them he had twenty-four ships against nineteen, and ranged 1,800 guns against
1,400. He did not need victory, but only the control of the Chesapeake. An indecisive battle would serve his
purpose: it was a situation well adapted to French doctrine.
The battle for the Chesapeake followed the typical eighteenth century pattern. When the British had superior
numbers they often beat the French: when they did not, they drew. Graves's fight against superior numbers was a
tactical draw and a strategic defeat with every usual feature: a missed opportunity at the outset, signalling
confusion, poor support from the subordinate Admirals, the British ships shattered aloft at the end of the action.
1 The two ships were off the east end of Jamaica on 8 August, and might well have joined Graves in time.
They regained this position on the 28th, and did not leave the convoy till 22 September, off San Salvador in
the Bahamas (Adm. 51/740).
< previous page page_423 next page >