Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
page_404
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_404.html[1/17/2011 2:27:50 PM]
< previous page page_404 next page >
Page 404
a normal precaution that the command should not devolve on a German general.1
2
The Bankruptcy of the Southern Offensive
Cornwallis had left America at the end of 1778 because of the illness of his wife. He returned in 1779 because her
death had made England unendurable to him. He did not expect any brilliant developments in the theatre, but
wished to rejoin his friends on active service: 'I love that army, and flatter myself that I am not quite indifferent to
them.' His courage and integrity won him the devotion of officers and men. 'A good officer', wrote the uncharitable
Wemyss, who served under him in the south, 'devoted to the service of his country . . . beloved by the army.'
'Deservedly the favourite of every person of every rank under his command', Germain's nephew George Damer
reported. To General William Amherst in England there was a refreshing momentum about his campaign of 1780
which provided, he said, a rare exception to the system established in America of showing vigour in money-
making alone.2
In Cornwallis Germain had a General who believed wholeheartedly in the advance on Virginia. He had long been
convinced that the only way to protect South Carolina was to push northwards. As long as the enemy had a nucleus
of regular troops the occupied areas could never be properly garrisoned or pacified. Around the Continentals
gathered the hordes of militiamen, to be defeated and dispersed at great cost in British lives, only to assemble
again as soon as the Continentals rallied. Haldimand was to expound the problem a year later, when he explained
the impossibility of penetrating New England with the force in Canada.
It is not the number of troops Mr Washington can spare from his army that is to be apprehended, it is the
multitude of militia and men in arms ready to turn out at an hour's notice at the shew of a single regiment
of Continental Troops that will oppose this attempt.3
The British situation in the Carolinas was not unlike that of the Napoleonic armies in Spain when Wellington
hovered on the Portuguese frontier. As long as they were able to disperse, they could check the guerrillas and
secure their supplies, and eventually would bring the population to acquiesce in their rule. But whenever they had
to concentrate against a regular force
1 A dormant commission for Vaughan had actually been signed when Cornwallis offered to return to
America in April 1779.
2 Cornwallis Wykeham-Martin, 319; Harvard, Sparks MSS., Vol. 22, p. 215; Sackville, II, 211; Add. MSS.
38215, f. 42 (17 Dec. 1780, Gen. William Amherst to Jenkinson).
3 CO 5/106, p. 356.
< previous page page_404 next page >
page_405
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_405.html[1/17/2011 2:27:51 PM]
< previous page page_405 next page >
Page 405
they released their hold on the countryside, and the flames of civil war burst forth. If Cornwallis could have
destroyed Greene's Continentals and overrun their base in Virginia, the pacification of the south might have
proceeded with system and success.
The advance to the north would expose South Carolina to a bold and swift-moving enemy. Cornwallis and
Germain were both aware of the risk, but they believed that if Clinton would threaten Virginia and Maryland from
the north, the enemy would be forced to pull back their southern army.1 Cornwallis only waited for the arrival of
Leslie's reinforcement from the Chesapeake to resume his offensive. It reached Charleston in the middle of
December; and while it was marching up country to join him, Cornwallis made his final arrangements. A small
force was sent by sea to occupy Wilmington on the North Carolina coast, where it would hold a new supply base
on the flank of the coming advance; and contrary to Clinton's instructions orders were given to destroy the
fortifications of Charleston. On 7 January Cornwallis marched with only 4,000 men. Of this intention he had sent
no word to Clinton.
Nathanael Greene, who had replaced Gates in command of the American southern army after its defeat at Camden,
was too weak to stand and fight. But he was a bold and resourceful commander in adversity, and believed that with
the help of the militia and guerrillas he could absorb the blow and ruin Cornwallis's army. Without hesitation he
seized the initiative and struck at the British communications. Dividing his force, he joined hands with the
guerrillas and took the offensive against Cornwallis's strategic flanks. He could not be disregarded. To save the
posts at Ninety-six and Augusta, Cornwallis split his own force, and sent Tarleton in pursuit of Greene's western
detachment. Tarleton quickly gained contact with the enemy and attacked them impetuously at Cowpens. But the
American commander, Morgan, handled his Continentals and militia with skill, and Tarleton was routed with the
loss of most of his infantry. It was one of the few tactical defeats suffered by British regulars in the course of the
war; and the 800 casualties were a disastrous loss to Cornwallis.
Cornwallis rushed forward to cut off the Americans, destroying his baggage to speed his pursuit. But Greene had
taken control of Morgan's force and slipped away behind the flooded Catawba. Leaving rearguards of militia to
dispute the passage of the river, he fell back with his regulars on Guilford to draw Cornwallis deep into the heart of
the rebel country. Thus started the great retreat to the River Dan. Greene hoped to make a second Saratoga by
drawing the weakened British force onto his own
1 Cornwallis Corr., I, 111; CL, Germain, 4 Oct. 1780 to Clinton.
< previous page page_405 next page >
page_406
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_406.html[1/17/2011 2:27:51 PM]
< previous page page_406 next page >
Page 406
reserves. He failed, but he made something like a second Trenton instead. Over winter roads, swollen creeks and
unbridged rivers Cornwallis followed him, marching sometimes thirty miles in a day, losing men through sickness,
skirmishes and desertions, but with Greene always slipping across the next river just ahead of him. The rearmost
American troops marched forty miles in sixteen hours to cross the Dan in time. Cornwallis had gained 200 miles of
ground and reached the Virginia border, only to place himself in a position of the utmost difficulty. His force was
depleted, provisions were short, the country unsecured, the enemy intact. There was no question of crossing the
river.
It was a classic instance of the arrested offensive. The British fell back to a position between Hillsborough and
Salisbury where Cornwallis hoped to collect the loyalists and command the road system. Greene let him go, for his
own reinforcements had not reached him; but his light troops crossed the Dan to hang on Cornwallis's flanks. Few
loyalists could make their way through to the British army; and one party which tried it was caught and massacred
on the road by Harry Lee.
Early in March Greene was ready to advance. Cornwallis still had 1,900 men; but though Greene had only 1,490
Continental infantry, of whom less than half had been in action, militia and volunteers swelled his army to 4,400.
They were of varying merit; but all could inflict casualties, and they could be replaced if they fell. From Morgan's
success at Cowpens Greene had learnt to use his militia as a screen of marksmen rather than in the regular order of
battle. With this force, unsure in quality but overwhelming in numbers, Greene awaited the British at Guilford
Court House. There Cornwallis fought one of the most remarkable actions of the war. Sharing their hardships, he
led his 1,900 tired and hungry men against 4,400 Americans, with no information to guide him except that he was
overwhelmingly outnumbered; and after a desperate struggle with the best of the Continentals he dislodged the
enemy and took their guns. Yet this brilliant feat of arms was no real victory. It cost more than 500 casualties.
These losses, with the exhaustion of the troops and the lack of provisions, prevented a pursuit. In vain he had
expended more than a quarter of his force. He no longer had the men to pursue his conquests.
In search of provisions the British fell back towards the Cape Fear River to gain touch with Wilmington. But the
enemy commanded the steep banks of the river, and no supplies came through. Greene himself now turned from
Cornwallis and struck deep in his rear towards South Carolina. But Cornwallis hesitated to follow. Supplies would
be difficult, and he feared the prospect of opposed river crossings on the march: another Guilford would destroy
him. Sending a warning of Greene's approach to Lord
< previous page page_406 next page >
page_407
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_407.html[1/17/2011 2:27:52 PM]
< previous page page_407 next page >
Page 407
Rawdon in South Carolina, he led his own force down to the coast at Wilmington, which he reached with 1,435
rank and file. His officer casualties had been particularly severe, and the two battalions of the Guards Brigade had
only a captain and five subalterns fit for duty.1
Thus was proclaimed the bankruptcy of the policy of reconquest from the south, and the situation foretold so long
ago by General Murray and General Harvey had come to pass. Again and again the Americans came forward to
accept defeat. The Continental army's power of recuperation was astounding, and in defeat it had nothing vital to
yield. 'Greene', said Mackenzie, 'is . . .entitled to great praise for his wonderful exertions; the more he is beaten, the
further he advances in the end. He has been indefatigable in collecting troops, and leading them to be defeated.'
As long as Greene's army survived, a seemingly inexhaustible supply of militia rallied to it on the battlefield, while
irregulars roamed the British foraging areas and terrorised the loyalists. Decisive victory could have broken the
cycle. So might the weariness and exhaustion of the rebel militia, if the British army remained in being. But from
indecisive victories the British regiments could never recover. Nearly six years earlier Murray had prophesied the
danger: 'if the business is to be decided by numbers, the enemy's plan should be to lose a battle with you every
week, until you are reduced to nothing'. And General Harvey's words echoed down the years: 'our army will be
destroyed by damned driblets'.2
3
The March to Yorktown
The great adventure was over. No longer could Cornwallis's depleted force expect to sweep the rebellion from
North Carolina and Virginia. But though the campaign had been lost the war was not. If the British could hold on
to what they held and avoid defeats, the enemy might yet disintegrate under their difficulties. Cornwallis might
have returned to save South Carolina from Greene, and played out the game to the end. What that end might have
been no one can be sure.
To enable Cornwallis to return, the commandant at Charleston had prepared a flotilla to carry his force from
Wilmington along the Waccamaw River and so to Charleston. But Cornwallis would not accept the delay of
waiting for transports, the loss of his cavalry horses, and the humiliation of a retreat. He still clung to the grander
vision. At Wilmington he learnt that
1 Duke University MSS., XVIII-F (20 April, O'Hara to Duke of Gloucester).
2 Mackenzie, 673; CL, Germain, encl. in Murray's of 27 Aug. 1776; above, p. 85. A recent vindication of the
southern militia is Robert C. Pugh's 'The Revolutionary Militia's Role in the Southern Campaign, 17801.'
(William and Mary Quarterly, 1957).
< previous page page_407 next page >
page_408
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_408.html[1/17/2011 2:27:52 PM]
< previous page page_408 next page >
Page 408
General Phillips had joined Arnold in Virginia with a reinforcement, and on 10 April he wrote to him about future
plans.
Now, my dear friend, what is our plan? Without one we cannot succeed, and I assure you that I am quite
tired of marching about the country in quest of adventures. If we mean an offensive war in America, we
must abandon New York, and bring our whole force into Virginia. . . .If our plan is defensive, mixed with
desultory expeditions, let us quit the Carolinas (which cannot be held defensively while Virginia can be so
easily armed against us) and stick to our salt pork at New York, sending now and then a detachment to
steal tobacco.1
This letter at least contained a general plan for subduing the rebellion, which was more than any commander had
produced since the collapse of the Hudson Valley strategy at Saratoga. Through it filter gleams of impatience with
Clinton's direction of the war. But there is also a hint of a gambler's desperation. He still clung to the belief that
Virginia was the key, and to get it he would risk South Carolina and abandon New York, giving up all that had
been gained for the sake of a new start. He showed no recognition of New York's importance: of the security it
gave to Canada, its position in relation to the separatist movement in Vermont, its role as a naval base. He did not
believe that Greene would follow him; but at least Greene had uncovered Virginia by his advance on Camden, and
on 25 April Cornwallis and his little army marched for the Chesapeake.
His departure sealed the fate of South Carolina and Georgia. For though the British forces in the deep South still
outnumbered Greene, they were scattered in ten garrisons to control the countryside. Greene advanced against
Camden. Lord Rawdon marched out with 800 men against 1,200 and at the age of twenty-six won the first victory
of his distinguished career. But Hobkirk's Hill was no more than a costly breathing space to secure his withdrawal.
Now the outlying posts fell rapidly. Augusta surrendered, and Ninety-Six was evacuated with difficulty. The
British were pressed rapidly back till nothing remained of their southern conquests beyond the neighbourhoods of
Charleston and Savannah. These they held till the peace.
Though Clinton had not been told of Cornwallis's intention to advance into North Carolina, it would be wrong to
suppose that he had disapproved of it. On the contrary, from the swiftness of the advance and his knowledge of
Greene's weakness he expected that Cornwallis would soon consolidate his hold on North Carolina. He should then
be able to spare troops to enable the New York army to take the offensive. Arnold had tried to persuade him
1 Cornwallis Corr., II, 87.
< previous page page_408 next page >
page_409
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_409.html[1/17/2011 2:27:53 PM]
< previous page page_409 next page >
Page 409
that an attack up the Hudson would capture the forts of the Highlands by a few days' siege; but Clinton was
unconvinced, and intended to operate in the northern end of Chesapeake Bay towards Philadelphia, and clear the
Delaware peninsula. He was convinced that the necessary loyalist support to establish royal government did not
exist in Virginia, and that if the British cause had numerous friends anywhere outside the Carolinas and Georgia,
they would probably be found at the head of the Chesapeake, in Pennsylvania.1
The only obstacle he saw was his shortage of troops, and he characteristically wrote that with the 10,000
reinforcements he had asked for he would have no doubt of success. The first shock came in the second half of
April when he learnt how much Cornwallis's force had been whittled away. It was clear that he could expect no
reinforcements from there; but it was another month before Cornwallis's announcement that he intended to cast
loose from South Carolina and march for Virginia gave him real cause for uneasiness about the south. He guessed
that Greene would not be drawn after Cornwallis, and that the loss of South Carolina would follow.2 If Germain
was deluded about the situation in the southern colonies, the generals in the theatre had shared his errors.
The widening gulf of misunderstanding between Clinton and Cornwallis was due in part to the difficulties of
communication; but it was due much more to Clinton's failure to exercise control. Throughout the three years of his
command he had never laid down broad lines of policy or imposed a master-plan: instead he had criticised the
government's suggestions and grumbled at the size of his force. His failure to dominate the theatre is measured in a
letter he wrote to Cornwallis at the beginning of August. He said that from his high opinion of Cornwallis's talents
he had left him full liberty to act as he judged best, while Clinton confined himself to supplying his wants from
New York, restricted to the defensive by the reinforcements which he had sent to the south.3 Thus by his own
confession he had resigned not only the most active field command but much of the strategic initiative in the
theatre to his subordinate, contenting himself with the comfortable passivity of New York. It is scarcely surprising
that his efforts to take up the reins again would be neither confident nor effective.
Cornwallis's march to Virginia was not opposed, and on 20 May he joined hands with Arnold near Richmond, to
learn that General Phillips had died a week earlier. The only enemy regular troops in the area were a small force
1 CO 5/102, ff. 13, 20, 171.
2Ibid., ff. 42, 130.
3 CO 5/103, f. 77.
< previous page page_409 next page >
page_410
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_410.html[1/17/2011 2:27:53 PM]
< previous page page_410 next page >
Page 410
under Lafayette, and having failed to bring these to battle Cornwallis made eastwards for Williamsburg in the
Virginian Tidewater to await word from Clinton. The Commander-in-Chief had already suggested an incursion by
water towards Philadelphia to destroy magazines and stores. This Cornwallis opposed, still insisting that if the war
was to be waged offensively Virginia was the only province worth the effort. When, however, Clinton's
instructions arrived on the 26th they revealed how diametrically opposed the views of the two Generals had
become. He would have no truck with an offensive in Virginia; and unless Cornwallis was prepared to try the area
at the head of the Chesapeake, he was ordered to choose a safe defensive post at Williamsburg or Yorktown, retain
enough troops for Clinton's favourite desultory water movements, and send back the balance of his force to New
York.
Clinton's lack of intellectual honesty appears in this despatch. To prove that Cornwallis had troops to spare he
calculated his numbers in effectives, instead of in men present and fit for duty, the method of reckoning which he
demanded that Germain should use. Though he rejected Virginia as too tough a nut to crack, he described the
militia opposing Cornwallis as ill-armed, inexperienced, and 'full as spiritless as the militia of the southern
provinces': yet two days earlier, describing the dangers of his own position at New York to the Secretary of State,
he had referred to the surrounding militia as 'warlike, inveterate and numerous'.1
Clinton's wish for the return of troops to New York was no longer dictated by a desire to take the offensive. For a
new and menacing picture was taking shape. From intercepted despatches he had learnt that Washington and
Rochambeau intended a great effort against the city, and that they would probably be supported by a fleet and
troops from the West Indies.2 His force in New York and Long Island had been reduced to fewer than 10,000 rank
and file present and fit (the method of reckoning which suited him in this instance), a force well below the
accepted margin of safety if the enemy should control the surrounding water. Though no effort by the Americans
alone could dislodge the British from the colonies, the intervention of a French fleet and army might enable them
to inflict such irreparable loss as would destroy the country's will to fight on.
It is odd that when he realised the precariousness of the naval situation, he thought first of New York with its large
garrison and powerful entrenchments. For Cornwallis, perched precariously on the threshold of Virginia with no
fortress of refuge, offered an easier target. Of this Clinton had already had warning. In March the French squadron
at Rhode Island had
1 CO 5/102, ff. 154, 171.
2 CO 318/7, f. 135.
< previous page page_410 next page >
page_411
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_411.html[1/17/2011 2:27:54 PM]
< previous page page_411 next page >
Page 411
attempted to land troops in the Chesapeake to attack Arnold's detachment. Arbuthnot had brought the enemy to
action at sea, and frustrated them; but if they obtained a naval force strong enough to seal the Chesapeake, the
position of the army in Virginia would be precarious indeed.
When Cornwallis received the order to fortify Williamsburg or Yorktown, he replied that neither place could be
held by the reduced force which would remain with him when he had sent troops to New York. In any case he
questioned the wisdom of holding Yorktown (which he called sickly and Clinton healthy). It would always be
exposed to a French attack, and experience had shown that it could make no diversion in favour of the Carolinas.
While this letter was on its way, he acted on the views it expressed. He abandoned the Williamsburg peninsula on
which Yorktown stood, and crossed the James River to Arnold's former post at Portsmouth, which a small force
could hold. Here he prepared to send back a detachment to New York.1
Thus the army sheered away from the Yorktown trap. But when Clinton received Cornwallis's letter he had second
thoughts. Cornwallis's post in Virginia was intended not only to form a springboard for a future offensive in the
Chesapeake, but to protect a fleet anchorage in the York River or Hampton Roads. For this the possession of the
Williamsburg peninsula was vital, and Clinton was prepared to forego the reinforcement of New York to hold it.
Accordingly he ordered Cornwallis to retain the whole of his force if he needed it; to fortify Old Point Comfort at
the tip of the Williamsburg peninsula, which commanded Hampton Roads from the north; and to hold Yorktown
too if he thought it necessary to the security of Old Point Comfort.2
This was the first that Cornwallis had heard of a harbour for ships of the line. He cancelled the reinforcements for
New York, and ordered his Engineer to reconnoitre Old Point Comfort with some naval officers. But their report
was adverse. The Point would be very difficult to fortify, it would not close the channel to the enemy, and because
of the conformation of the shore line and the deep water close in, it would not protect British ships from attack.
Cornwallis thereon took a decision for which he afterwards pleaded a positive order from Clinton: instead of Old
Point Comfort he would
1 Cornwallis Corr., I, 103, 105, 108.
2 CO 5/102, ff. 248, 272. Fortescue (III, 396) states that Clinton was induced to rescind his first orders by the
receipt of Germain's letter of 2 May, with 'positive commands . . . that not a man was to be withdrawn from the
Chesapeake'. Germain's letter, quoted on p. 403 above, does not support this interpretation. Its intention was to
urge Clinton to pursue a settled and permanent plan of conquest, and gave him full liberty to act as changing
circumstances might require. As Clinton knew, it had been written without the knowledge of French intentions
which Clinton now possessed.
< previous page page_411 next page >
page_412
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_412.html[1/17/2011 2:27:54 PM]
< previous page page_412 next page >
Page 412
fortify Yorktown, with a post at Gloucester on the opposite shore of the York River, to protect the only anchorage
where ships of the line could lie in safety.
A French ship of the line had wintered at Yorktown in 177980, and works had been raised to protect her against
attack from the sea. But against a landward attack the position was very weak. Cornwallis warned Clinton that it
commanded no country and he would need a superiority in the field to enable him to obtain forage and supplies.
What he failed to make clear was that Yorktown was bad defensive ground in itself: he had indeed said so, but
with reference to his earlier situation when he had expected to be deprived of more than half his force for New
York.
Cornwallis reckoned that he would need six weeks to fortify the ground without ruining his troops' health in the
heat; and he was very short of entrenching tools, though more than 3,000 had been sent to the Chesapeake from
New York. Through the hot August days his men toiled at the field works, which, their commander wrote to
Clinton on 27 August, 'will be a work of great time and labour, and after all, I fear, [will] not be very strong'. Four
days later a French ship of the line and two frigates appeared in the mouth of the river. A naval lieutenant rode
down to the end of the peninsula with an escort of dragoons; and from Old Point Comfort he counted thirty or
forty enemy ships within the Capes. The trap had sprung.1
1 Cornwallis Corr., I, 10712, 1167; CO 5/103, ff. 69, 130.
< previous page page_412 next page >
page_413
file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_413.html[1/17/2011 2:27:54 PM]
< previous page page_413 next page >
Page 413
Chapter XXIV
The Anatomy of Disaster
1
Washington and Clinton
It was on 8 May that the Comte de Rochambeau learnt that his son and Admiral Barras had landed at Boston with
the instructions for the year from France. Barras had come to assume the command of the squadron at Rhode
Island, for Ternay had died in the winter. The two commanders could now look forward to the arrival of a superior
fleet from the West Indies to wrest the initiative from the British. It was not before time. For the past two years the
war in the north had been sunk in torpor. Washington had few men and no funds; and indifference and war-
weariness were spreading. A victory was wanted; but as Washington had said, 'no land force can act decisively
unless accompanied by a maritime superiority'.
On 21 May Rochambeau conferred with Washington at Wethersfield in Connecticut. They had before them
intercepted despatches which revealed the British government's intention to consolidate from the south and drive
Washington behind the Hudson. Rochambeau favoured a campaign in the south; but Washington held to his view
that New York was still the place to strike, and obtained agreement. The French troops would march for the
Hudson to serve under his command. Washington hesitated to leave the fleet at Newport without the troops'
protection, and wanted it to retire to the safety of Boston; but with some difficulty Barras persuaded him that it
should remain at the strategic point at Rhode Island from which it could swoop on the English lodgments.
Rochambeau's corps set out on its march through the hills of western Connecticut, and joined Washington near
New York early in July. But it was soon plain that the British position was too strong to be carried. On the 21st
Washington threw forward a strong screen of troops and made a thorough reconnaissance with the French generals.
What they saw was discouraging. The defences looked strong, and Clinton had as many men in them as the
combined forces of Washington and Rochambeau. Without command of the sea they could do nothing: the course
of the campaign must depend on de Grasse's fleet. To him Rochambeau appealed after the Wethersfield
Conference. The Americans, he wrote, were at the end of their resources, and de Grasse must bring four or five
thousand troops from the West Indies to operate in the Chesapeake or force a passage
< previous page page_413 next page >