Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783

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good soldiers. He had been Secretary to Stormont in Paris, and Lord Shelburne described him in the House of

Lords as 'commis and clerk'. At the instigation of Shelburne's pensioner Barré a duel resulted, and Shelburne was

slightly wounded.1

But soon larger possibilities than mere buccaneering opened up in the Pacific. On 17 July 1780 came news of the

reduction of Fort St Juan, which in Dalling's phrase promised to burst open the door to the South Sea. With the

prospect of a Pacific base in Central America the government hoped for nothing less than to revolutionise the

western coast of Spanish America from Chile to Mexico. The East India Company was interested; not because they

believed in the American scheme for they doubted if the areas could be held but to serve their own purposes in the

East Indies. The Company's genuine trading activities were by now mainly in China, with India as a source of

goods for barter. But importing from China was a deficit trade; and to balance the account and stop the drain of

silver the Company needed a market in the East Indian archipelago. Here were the gold and spices which were

wanted in China. They had tried before to win a foothold. Manila had been captured in the Seven Years War, but

too late to be retained at the peace; and between 1768 and 1775 a lodgment had been held in North Borneo, about

the time of the attempt to secure the Falkland Islands base on the western route to the Pacific.

A plan for a joint Pacific expedition was approved by the Cabinet on 3 August. It was to consist of a ship of the

line, the Ninety-eighth and Hundredth Regiments augmented to 1,000 men each, and 2,000 Company sepoys. The

Company suggested as an initial step the seizure of the Dutch Spice Islands and of bases in the Spanish

Philippines. Lord Hillsborough, who handled the negotiations as Secretary of State for the Southern Department,

gave them a short answer on the Dutch islands, for bad as the country's relations with the United Provinces had

become he still hoped to keep them out of the war; but by the end of September agreement was reached on the

Spanish islands. Celebes would be taken by Company troops; Mindanao by the Crown regiments, to be handed

over to the Company when the Pacific operations were completed, The augmentation of Fullarton's and

Humberston's regiments began; troopships were ordered; and the sailing date was fixed for December 1780.2

In the course of September a privateer brought a Spanish frigate into Glasgow, with accounts of a rebellion in

Spanish America and a treasure fleet in the River Plate which was to sail for Europe in December. Commodore

Johnstone suggested a small expedition to capture the treasure, to

1 Sackville, II, 282; WO 34/232, p. 386; Walpole, Last Journals, II, 385.

2 G 3115; Harlow, 1056, 136; WO 34/235, pp. 78, 85.

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which the Cabinet agreed on 2 November; and it was decided three weeks later to unite the two forces for the initial

operation in the River Plate. The South Sea expedition would then proceed on its way round the Cape of Good

Hope.1

The Gathering Storm

The offensive for 1781 was planned to strike at the Spanish Empire, and with modest means. But it was never

doubted that the main effort would be a defensive one against the French in the West Indies.2 To this the main

resources of England would have to be devoted, while in America Clinton hung on and exploited Cornwallis's

successes with the resources he already had. Long before the final plan was settled for the South Sea expedition,

the naval situation had begun to undergo profound changes, and offensive plans to give way before the pressure of

events. The Cabinet was soon being shepherded into piecemeal improvisation, hampered at every turn by the

shortage of men and ships.

The first alarm was the loss of the Ramillies convoy. The lost storeships for Rodney's fleet had to be replaced

without waiting for the next general convoy at the end of October, and the remainder of a regiment of which seven

companies had been taken had to be hurried out to Jamaica. So tight was the shipping shortage that Germain

arranged with the Jamaica merchants to cram the troops into their ships in the next convoy.3 Scarcely were these

arrangements in hand when more alarming news arrived from the West Indies themselves. Rodney's fleet was in a

deplorable condition, and Solano's squadron had joined the French. Though it was soon learnt that the French and

Spaniards had separated, and that Walsingham had joined Rodney with his reinforcements, the enemy were in great

strength and it was clear that the West Indies were still the main naval theatre.

It was the middle of September: the season which in other years had brought hopeful plans to wrest the initiative

from the enemy. Now it had become a question of holding out against the swelling pressure. The urgent need was

to replace Rodney's useless ships and get them home for major repairs and coppering. Sandwich came up to

London, and with Middleton's advice and some pressure from the King it was resolved to bring in selected

1 Harlow, 10910; G 3170, 3190. If the whole Pacific scheme and its link with Jamaica is thought to be a

wild aberration of a distracted government, it should be remembered that it was reconsidered in 1806, when

Lord Grenville called in Sir John Dalrymple to expound the earlier plan. (Huntington Library, Stowe MSS.,

Admiralty Box 37).

2 CO 318/6, f. 168 (4 July, Germain to Vaughan).

3 Sandwich, III, 302; WO 34/127, f. 28; CO 318/6, f. 174.

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ships from the Channel for docking, and from them to provide ten sail of the line for Rodney. In addition

Arbuthnot should send him five from America in the winter even if Ternay wintered at Rhode Island. With these

replacements Rodney could send home fourteen of his worst ships; and in the spring a force should be available at

home to reinforce Arbuthnot.1

Troops were also needed. Thanks to the despatch of Garth's four battalions in the spring, Jamaica should be

reasonably strong; but in the Leeward Islands Vaughan reported his force to be very weak and dispersed as a result

of wastage and sickness. Germain promised him any help that could be spared from the unequal struggle in which

the country was engaged.2 But America too was clamouring. On 25 September Brigadier Dalrymple arrived with

Clinton's report of the fiasco at Rhode Island and the flare-up in South Carolina. His tone was very gloomy, and he

demanded 10,000 reinforcements.

This was out of the question. But with great difficulty three battalions were found in England, and to the alarm of

the Dublin Castle executive three more were wrested from Ireland and replaced by the cadres of the drafted

regiments from the Leeward Islands. Of these six battalions three were to go to Vaughan, with orders that they

should be sent north to Clinton in the summer. It was too late in the year to send troops direct to New York; but

the remaining three battalions were ordered by the southern route to Charleston. They were the first fresh regiments

which Clinton had been sent for two years, and together with 1,000 recruits which were to sail with them and

2,800 Germain recruits who would sail in the spring they gave Clinton the promise of 6,000 reinforcements for the

next campaign. At the very least this help should enable him to hold on and sustain Cornwallis. The Americans

were certainly in great distress, and Rochambeau's men might not stand up well to the winter cold. No one could

foretell what change of fortune might come with the spring. They could only wait and hope.3

The decision to send these troops swamped the resources of the Navy Board. The three regiments for the West

Indies were found passages by the Jamaica merchants; but if troopships were allotted to the American

reinforcement it would be impossible to lift the expedition which was being assembled for the River Plate and the

South Sea. A choice was necessary. The Board was ordered to give priority to the reinforcements, and the sailing

of the South Sea expedition was postponed.4

1 Sandwich, III, 228, 233, 302; CL, Germain, 15 Sept. to Admiralty and 22 Sept. to Clinton; Adm. 2/1338,

ff. 56, 66; G 3135; Adm. 1/311, passim.

2 CO 318/6, f. 196.

3 Lothian, 374; G 31556; CL, Germain, 6 Oct. to Admiralty; CO 318/6, f. 250.

4 Adm. 2/1338, ff. 62, 70, 74, 78; WO 34/235, p. 546.

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The forces for the westward got away gradually as shipping was scraped together.1 Sir Samuel Hood, newly

promoted from his Commissionership to flag rank, sailed with the troops and squadron for the Leeward Islands at

the end of November, and the regiments for Charleston left in January. But throughout the autumn the sense of

mounting pressure continued. There was intelligence from Paris of a squadron and military reinforcements

preparing to sail for America, and Arbuthnot's orders to reinforce Rodney in the winter had to be made

discretionary.2 And more ominous than the movements of the enemy was the international scene.

The diplomatic offensive which had been opened in the autumn of 1779 had come to a halt. The Spanish

negotiations had borne no direct fruit; and after a winter of hope the approach to Russia had collapsed. The policy

of Catherine the Great seemed bewildering and irresolute; but by March 1780 she had equipped a fleet which was

expected to come to the aid of the British. Then came the awakening. On 1 April 1780 the Russian Ambassador

presented a declaration on neutral rights whose acceptance would have destroyed the British weapon of blockade.

Far from finding help, England faced the hostility of a vast though shadowy combination of neutrals.3

In the summer of 1780 the Northern Powers began to band in a League of Armed Neutrality to open French and

Spanish ports to the naval stores of the Baltic. Within a year of the Russian declaration, Russia, Sweden and

Denmark would have 84 warships in commission to back their policy, and the League expanded swiftly. The

Netherlands and the Empire adhered in 1781, Prussia and Portugal in 1782. For England the vital element in the

Neutrality was Holland. Russian shipping was insignificant; Denmark would compromise; but if Holland obtained

free access to enemy ports the blockade of naval stores would be torn to shreds. Friction with the Dutch had been

mounting for some time. In the West Indies they were using St Eustatius as a contraband depot for the French

islands and the rebel American colonies; and contrary to their own past practice as belligerents they adopted the

doctrine that all trade in neutral bottoms was free from capture. The British government took its stand solely on the

question of naval stores: it was willing to allow Dutch carrying in the French West Indies to continue

uninterrupted, and to waive the Treaty of Alliance of 1678 if the Dutch would only stop this strategic traffic to

French ports. When the Dutch refused to discuss the question in 1779 the British

1 Adm. 2/1338, ff. 1035.

2 CL, Germain, 7 Oct. (intelligence) and 13 Oct. to Admiralty; Mundy, I, 402.

3 The misunderstanding of Catherine's intentions was chiefly caused by Harris's reports from St Petersburg.

The story is revealed in Madariaga, especially pp. 96, 171, 182, 1978, 21415.

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government had announced that naval stores would not be allowed to pass through the Channel in Dutch bottoms.

The Dutch reply was to pass contraband down the Channel in their general convoys. Tension was increased in the

autumn of 1779 by the aid and comfort they gave to the American raider Paul Jones; and on this provocation a

British force stopped and searched the second of their Channel convoys. Shots were exchanged and a few ships

seized. No satisfaction being given by Holland about either Paul Jones or naval stores, the British government in

April 1780 suspended their commercial treaty privileges and subjected their shipping to the full rigour of the

blockade. If the Dutch resisted the searching of their convoys, England would have to choose between abandoning

this important strategic weapon and adding another naval power to their enemies. And war with Holland would be

more dangerous if she adhered to the Armed Neutrality and invoked its aid. For a long time the Dutch hesitated to

join the League, but in the second half of November 1780 the States-General voted to do so.

The British Ministers had read the signs and framed their policy.1 They intended to fight the Dutch rather than let

them carry for the enemy; and to prevent the quarrel from drawing in the Armed Neutrality, war had to be forced

on Holland before her adhesion was ratified, and the real issue of neutral rights obscured. The Dutch had provided

a pretext. Henry Laurens had recently been captured at sea on his way from America to Holland, carrying papers

which revealed a negotiation between Congress and the Magistracy of Amsterdam. The opportunity was seized.

Stormont demanded the disavowal and punishment of those concerned. No satisfactory reply was made, and an

ultimatum followed. But on 15 December, before it expired, Stormont learnt from the British Minister at the Hague

that Holland was hastening her accession to the Armed Neutrality. There was not a moment to lose. Stormont

obtained the Cabinet's assent to the immediate withdrawal of the British Minister. The breach was final, and the

method as planned. The ostensible issue was not neutral rights, and the League refused its help to the Dutch.

The breach was calculated: but was it wise? Not in the view of William Knox. France and Spain would have to pay

more for their naval stores, but England would have to bear the far greater cost of a Dutch war, and had added

twenty sail of the line to her enemies. An Austrian mediation was in the air, and Knox maintained that the Cabinet

should have temporised till they knew what might come of it. Nor did he feel that the coercion of Holland had

been properly discussed. He gives a description, which he must have had from Germain, of the Cabinet meeting

which approved the ultimatum. North and Bathurst fell asleep at once, Hillsborough nodded and dropped

1 G 3171, 3181.

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his hat. Sandwich was overcome at first, but then rubbed his eyes and looked attentive. Stormont read the papers

aloud and discussed them with Thurlow and Germain, while Amherst sat awake but as usual silent. The others then

woke up and approved the proceedings.

This may indict the business methods of the North Ministry and the general habit of taking important decisions as

an appendix to dinner. Yet the decision itself can be defended. 'It is allowed on all hands', an observer had recently

remarked, 'that it will be impossible for France to fit out her fleets if she is prevented from carrying naval stores in

Dutch bottoms from the Baltic.'1 We have seen the stress which Middleton laid on stopping the Dutch supply of

copper to the French dockyards; and Stormont shared the Admiralty's conviction that to stop the carriage of naval

stores was vital. And although the Dutch navy was a serious embarrassment in the course of 1781 it is impossible,

when one reflects on the favourable turn which the naval war was taking eighteen months later, to be sure that

Stormont was wrong. Immediate steps were taken to reap the benefits of the breach. A total embargo was laid on

the export of salt provisions to foreign ports in the West Indies, and Rodney was ordered to seize St Eustatius, the

neutral warehouse of the French Leeward Islands. Two hours after the Cabinet resolution had been reported and

approved by the King, the orders for the General and Admiral were on their way to Portsmouth, those for the

Admiral being a transcript of the Secretary of State's letter to the Board of Admiralty. To the speed with which the

Ministry had acted, Knox attributed the overhauling of a rich Dutch convoy which had left St Eustatius two days

before the British forces arrived. Once more we find respect for the British effort on the far side of the Channel.

Reflecting on the prompt and ubiquitous measures against the Dutch, the diplomatic historian Doniol wonders at

'the marvellous vigour which characterised that government throughout the struggle'.2

The End of the Initiative

The breach with Holland was the end of the South Sea expedition: and the decision to abandon it on 29 December

1780, marks the end of Britain's long struggle to retain a share of the strategic initiative against the odds which

were massed against her. The reason for the decision was the East

1 Dartmouth, III, 246.

2 Knox, 2712; Knox, Extra-official State Papers, I, 16; G 3222; Mundy, II, 6; Doniol, IV, 516. A lucid account

of the intricate Anglo-Dutch negotiations is to be found in Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution,

showing how internal pressures and the skilful manipulation of trade regulations by France prevented the

Dutch government from acceding to a compromise.

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India Company's withdrawal of its contingent. The sepoys would be needed to secure India against attack from the

Dutch bases in Ceylon and Sumatra. Instead of attacking the Spaniards in the Pacific, the British Cabinet resolved

to turn what remained of the original force against the Dutch. For Holland held the keys to the east.

Hitherto the war had involved little fighting between the British and French in India. At the outset each side had

only a single small ship of the line; and after one battle with Admiral Vernon the French squadron had withdrawn

to its distant base at Mauritius, leaving the trading posts at Mahé and Pondicherry to be snapped up by the British.

The balance of power in India depended utterly on the command of the sea: the British at Calcutta, Madras and

Bombay were as dependent on the sea for supplies and mutual support as were Clinton's forces stretched between

Nova Scotia and Florida. The reinforcement which Admiral Hughes brought out in 1779 was able to retain the

British superiority at sea. But when the Dutch entered the war internal events in India were undermining the British

position. By errors of policy which Hughes deplored, the Madras Presidency became engaged in simultaneous

warfare with the Mahrattas and with Hyder Ali, the Sultan of Mysore. In June 1780 Hyder burst into the Carnatic

with a vast and well-drilled army.

The war with Holland gave a new significance to Hyder's attack. For it gave France what she had lacked: an all-

weather base in the Dutch island of Ceylon, which commanded both the coasts of India. The Dutch also held the

Cape of Good Hope, a watering and provisioning station for fleets on passage, and the source of provisions for the

French base at Mauritius. 'Whichever of these powers [England and France] shall possess the Cape, the same may

govern India': the East India Company's contention was decisive. From this time a new principle appears in British

strategy: to ensure that France did not become the successor in the Indian Ocean to the decaying power of Holland.

Twice in the next twenty-five years Ceylon was occupied; three times expeditions were sent to seize the Cape of

Good Hope. And the first of these Cape expeditions was launched at once. The 3,000 troops who had been gathered

for the River Plate and the South Sea were switched to this new objective: a mission tactically offensive but

strategically defensive. If the attack should fail, the 2,000 men of Humberston's and Fullarton's regiments

originally intended for the Pacific should proceed to the defence of India.1

Scarcely had the British government committed the country to war with Holland when dreadful news arrived from

St Lucia. A hurricane of

1 Harlow, 108, 110; Richmond, Navy in India, 1246; G 3223.

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appalling violence had swept the Caribbean. A tidal wave had inundated part of Jamaica with great loss of human

life and stock; and the Lesser Antilles were hit still harder. Every battery was destroyed on Barbados, which was

outside the usual hurricane zone, and 4,000 lives were said to have been lost. On St Lucia every building was

unroofed. General Vaughan's secretary and seven others were killed when his house collapsed, and he escaped in

his nighshirt to exist for several days in negro clothing. The sick were lying in pools of water, and most of the

ammunition was ruined. Every transport was driven ashore. Rodney, with his usual luck, was away at New York:

but of the ships which remained in the islands, two of the line and ten cruisers were cast away or foundered, eight

of the line and a fifty-gun ship were severely damaged, and one of the line bore away dismasted for England. The

stores were destroyed, and the damage could not be repaired.

The Ministers could only hope that the enemy had suffered too, though since most of their force had left the

Leeward Islands it could not be in the same degree. To reinforce the devastated islands was out of the question.

The Dutch war and the Cape expedition absorbed too many ships, and as the year expired Gibraltar called again for

assistance. On New Year's Day the Cabinet resolved that the home fleet should relieve the fortress for the second

time, and pass a frigate convoy through the Straits to victual Minorca.

Here, again, the Ministry was responding to the pressure of events. The Spanish fixation on Gibraltar and Minorca

may have drawn their forces away from operations which offered a more decisive effect on the war; yet now, as in

the previous winter it diverted the Royal Navy to a defensive winter operation with serious consequences for its

strength in the spring. The Opposition asserted, as Keppel had done when Gibraltar had last been relieved, that it

was an unnecessary operation which ruled out a blockade of Brest. Amongst those who retrospectively clamoured

for blockading Brest was Lord Howe, who not long before had rejected the station off Ushant as totally

impracticable: so much for the motives of the Opposition's naval experts. Sandwich answered that Gibraltar would

have fallen if it had not been relieved, and that the operation in itself gave a good chance of bringing a Spanish

fleet to battle. 'What would have been said if Admiral Darby had been employed in watching the motions of the

French fleet in the harbour of Brest, and Gibraltar had been taken?'1

Whether Gibraltar at that time was worth the effort is an open question. Some argued that it was not. Sea power in

the Mediterranean did not yet involve the security of India, as it was to do from the time of Napoleon's Egyptian

expedition; and the argument could be heard that Gibraltar's

1 Sandwich, IV, 318, 353, 357.

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function of keeping open England's moderate volume of Mediterranean trade was of marginal importance.1

Throughout the eighty odd years since its capture, Ministers and Ambassadors had shown a remarkable willingness

to bargain it away; and as recently as September Stormont and Hillsborough had thought it a cheap price to pay for

peace with Spain.2 The obstacle to the bargain was the prejudice and passion of the people, and Stormont shrank

from advising the government to consider the step. So in the late winter the whole Channel fleet of England was

drawn into operations for the relief of the fortress. The consequences were to be felt throughout the world.

The Two Sides of the Hill

India, the Mediterranean, the West Indies: everywhere the country's resources were being drawn in to hold the tide.

A new naval theatre had been opened in the North Sea by the Dutch fleet lying athwart the Baltic trade route. In

America Arbuthnot's fleet had nearly been called away to the help of Rodney; and if it had gone, the British troops

in the Chesapeake would have fallen to the French at Rhode Island, who sallied out in the late winter to attack

them. Time's hurrying footsteps echoed at the backs of the Ministers. 'The vast extent and enormous expense of the

war will not admit of dilatory or languid movements', Germain warned Governor Dalling of Jamaica. No

reinforcements could be spared from England to feed his offensive against the Spanish colonies; yet the national

finances could not afford to leave any resources inactive, and if sickness and rain had caused Nicaragua to be

abandoned, Dalling was to attack New Orleans with what he had.3

In this precarious situation they feared above all that Russia would enter the war in support of Holland. Towards

the end of November the Cabinet had learnt that Catherine intended to offer her mediation to the belligerents; a

prospect which had strengthened the case for hurrying on the breach with Holland before she joined Russia in the

Armed Neutrality. The mediation could not be rejected, but it might be converted into a joint mediation with

Austria to end the war on favourable terms. Meanwhile Russia had to be dissuaded from supporting the Dutch; and

after witholding Gibraltar from the Spaniards, it was agreed to bribe Catherine with Minorca.

Feelers had been put out some time earlier through the Minister in Peters-

1 See, for example, Mahon, Life of . . . Murray, 390; CL, Shelburne, Vol. 83, Nos. 14, 16, 17 etc. On the

value of Gibraltar at the time, see Stetson Conn, Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century,

pp. 2567, 259, 2667.

2 Above, p. 372.

3 CO 137/78, ff. 266, 270.

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burg. On 28 October 1780, in a final bid for Russian help, Lord Stormont had instructed Sir James Harris to

discover whether the cession of some British colony might tempt Catherine to join us against France and Spain.

This letter crossed with one from Harris, who had independently tested the ground and been told by Prince

Potemkin that nothing but the cession of Minorca would induce Catherine to join us. There were powerful

arguments in favour of paying the price; for Russia had long wanted a Mediterranean base, and as Knox pointed

out in a study which he made of the situation, Russian occupation of the island would give lasting jealousy to

France and Spain, and bind Russia and her northern allies to England. On 3 January the Cabinet decided to make

the offer. It was a difficult choice. But as Stormont explained to the King, everything must be done 'to dispel if

possible the northern storm', and a friendly Russian mediation leading to a favourable peace would be cheap at the

price. In George III, however, the Cabinet encountered an apparently immovable obstacle; for he declared that he

would never cede a possession which had not been conquered by the enemy.

So matters rested for several days; and on the 16th a bulky packet arrived from Harris reporting his further talks

with Potemkin. The Prince had replied to his overture that distant colonies were of no use to Russia; but that for

Minorca he believed Catherine would go to any lengths. The deciphering of the key letter was not completed till

the afternoon of the 17th, when it was forwarded to the King with Stormont's recommendation. Evidently there was

still some delay; for if rumour was correct, it was a memorial delivered two days later by the Russian Minister on

the war with Holland which finally drove home the seriousness of the outlook. The King cancelled his levée and

for the second time since the beginning of the war summoned the Cabinet to his presence. This time his purpose

was not to drive them on, but to hear their views. Seating the Ministers round a table, he invited their opinions.

Someone asked who should speak first; and the King replying that he would not point to anyone, Sandwich said

that it was usual for the youngest to begin. He thus ensured that Thurlow, who was hostile to the cession, should

not have the first word. For three and a half hours they discussed the question, and it was Sandwich who converted

the King. The First Lord knew too well the delicacy of the naval balance. Russia, he argued, intended in any event

to profit from the belligerents' difficulties. If she declared for the enemy England would lose not merely Minorca,

but Gibraltar, Canada, the American colonies and the West Indies. Even if Catherine remained neutral, he asked

what hope there was of ending the war without some equally valuable concession. He turned the King's favourite

argument to his purpose: with Russia against us, 'we shall never again figure as a leading power in Europe, but

think ourselves happy if we can

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