Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

page_362

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_362.html[1/17/2011 2:27:32 PM]

< previous page page_362 next page >

Page 362

about pretty freely'. That night every street was patrolled by soldiers with orders to fire on any four persons who

refused to disperse. Amherst estimated the dead and wounded as 458, others as more than 700. Order began to

reappear through the smoke and ruins; and a Member of Parliament felt safe enough to lament 'the two most

detestable extremes, a lawless mob, and a Military Government'.1

The Gordon Riots were to sear the memories of the ruling class for many years, and affected the course of politics

more deeply and lastingly than the invasion panic of the previous year. And hard on the heels of the shooting a

special issue of the London Gazette trumpeted the fall of Charleston. It was a great triumph, and came when the

Opposition was cracking. Rockingham and his followers had rallied to the government against the riots, while the

Catholic-hating Shelburne took an equivocal stand. This followed deeper division on Parliamentary Reform.

Rockingham had wanted to shelve the issue for the sake of unity, while Shelburne favoured the reform of

Parliament and encouraged the radical leaders of the county Associations. The moment seemed ripe for the

Ministry to approach Rockingham for a coalition: if nothing came of it, it would smooth the way for another

manoeuvre.

The Rockingham terms proved impossible: equivocal at the least on American Independence, exacting on

economical reform, and to the King's ears outrageous about men: Secretaryships of State for Fox and Richmond,

places for Portland, Manchester, Townshend and Burke. Fox, the King would swallow in any lucrative but not

ministerial office 'he never having had any principles can certainly act as his interest may guide him' but

Richmond's conduct towards the Court over a long period made him unacceptable in any capacity. Nor was the

King willing to sacrifice Amherst and Sandwich. Amherst was not perfect, but he was better than any possible

alternatives; and as for Sandwich, 'whatever his private failings may be, I know no man so fit for his department,

he has now got out the finest fleet this country ever possessed'.2

The way was clear for the counter-stroke. On 1 July in Cabinet North threw out the idea of a sudden dissolution of

Parliament and a general election. Eighteenth-century parliaments usually ran their full seven-year term; and the

Opposition would be surprised and unbalanced by the

1 G 3047, 3052; Wraxall, I, 347, 3567; Campbell, Lives of the Lord Chancellors, VI, 12830; Add. MSS.

38214, f. 51; WO 34/125, f. 115; Castro, Gordon Riots, VII, 2314, 23940; Wortley, 187; Lothian, 367.

Wedderburn had his reward: Lord Chief Justice de Grey resigned to avoid trying the rioters, and

Wedderburn at last obtained the Chief Justiceship of the Common Pleas.

2 G 3099; Christie, 249. For what follows see Christie, 2938 and 11663.

< previous page page_362 next page >

page_363

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_363.html[1/17/2011 2:27:33 PM]

< previous page page_363 next page >

Page 363

announcement. Sandwich was enthusiastic, believing that the successes at home and abroad would swing the

popular vote to the Ministry. The Treasury experts took a more sober view, for Robinson preferred the orthodox

calculation of seats and members to the doubtful factor of public opinion. His first calculations were not

reassuring; but an optimistic disposal of the doubtful seats transformed the outlook, and his final prediction was a

majority of 128 for the government. On 1 September, in the middle of the Barrington crisis, the Opposition was

stunned by the dissolution.

The election which followed was distinguished in that century by the clear principles which marked the parties, and

there was an unusual number of contested elections. The Court and Ministry stood for the unity of the Empire and

the maintenance of a protectionist control of the American economy; the Opposition, though divided on the terms

of peace with the colonies, were united in their determination to end the war and to attack the executive's influence

in Parliament. But alas for the calculations of psephologists! Far from gaining, the government lost about five

seats. And Sandwich was proved as wrong as Robinson, for even the 'popular' constituencies failed the Ministry.

When the new Parliament assembled, North would be conducting the great war on yet more precarious political

foundations.

< previous page page_363 next page >

page_365

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_365.html[1/17/2011 2:27:33 PM]

< previous page page_365 next page >

Page 365

PART FIVE

CATASTROPHE 1781

< previous page page_365 next page >

page_367

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_367.html[1/17/2011 2:27:34 PM]

< previous page page_367 next page >

Page 367

Chapter XXI

The Shadows Gather

The Strain on Resources

By the autumn of 1780 England had been waging a great war for two and a half years with resources too slender to

meet her commitments. To a remarkable degree, through the insistence of Germain and the King, she had been

able to dispute the initiative with the enemy; and in introducing the army estimates towards the end of the year

Jenkinson could without straining his case paint the past campaign in pleasing colours. The enemy armaments

which were to exploit England's hour of distress had returned to Europe without attempting a single conquest,

while England had recovered South Carolina and was pressing the colony's northern neighbour. Yet this was only

part of the truth. For the despatch of the enemy's expeditions had shown how difficult it was for England to mould

the course of strategy. And in this third September of the general war England's widening strategic commitments

throughout the world were beginning to tell, and she was drifting into a situation which she was to face again

between 1940 and 1942: so much to protect, such dispersion of force, so little prospect of a decisive concentration.

The coming disaster in Virginia was the result of accumulating errors and misfortunes; but war is full of these, and

they would not have proved decisive if Britain had been operating with a reasonable margin for flexibility. If

England could keep afloat she might yet outstay her enemies. But she was on so tight a string that the misdirection

of a single ship might mean disaster.

That the navy was at full stretch has been apparent in the operations of 1780. But the tautness throughout the

system was now appearing in other branches of the war effort. The shipping situation, for one, was restricting the

execution of plans. The old difficulty of supplying the army in America remained. None of the provisions for 1780

reached Clinton till October, and if the army had not been able to save its salt provisions by drawing on the

resources of South Carolina during the siege of Charleston, there might have been a disastrous shortage long before

supplies arrived from home.1 These delays were blamed by Germain on the Navy Board's handling of the

victuallers2; but the shortage went deeper than this, for not only had the year's recruits for Clinton been held up for

transports, but in the autumn an offensive expedition was to yield priority for shipping to reinforcements for

1 See Major Cockburn's memorandum of Dec. 1780 in CL, Germain, II, Suppl.

2 See above, p. 339.

< previous page page_367 next page >

page_368

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_368.html[1/17/2011 2:27:34 PM]

< previous page page_368 next page >

Page 368

existing operations in America and the West Indies.1 The allocation of shipping priorities was a new burden on

Germain's department: a new and ominous restraint on strategy.

The army was also feeling the strain of prolonged war and expanding commitments. Clinton was calling for huge

reinforcements, Canada was weak, and at the end of the year the emergence of Holland as an enemy was to call for

additional garrisons from the Shetlands to India. The constant trickle of trained infantry across the Atlantic had

outstripped recruiting. The wastage of British troops in the western Atlantic between 1777 and 1779 had been

15,664: only 4,786 recruits had been sent out to replace them. Though fresh regiments had been sent out 16,000

strong, the old regiments already in the theatres of war were wasting away.2

Not only had the casualties in the theatres of operations to be met, but new regiments raised and the ordinary

wastage by desertion and disease at home and in overseas garrisons replaced. Yet the harvest of recruits was drying

up. Two years earlier 24,000 men had been raised for the regular army in twelve months; in the next twelve months

only 16,000; in the twelve months to September 1780 15,000. Though new regiments were being raised, the army's

strength was actually shrinking. Three regiments had just been drafted in the West Indies for want of men; even

the infantry in England had lost 100 or so in the past year; and the whole army, including the Irish establishment,

was short of its authorised establishment by 27,000.3

In the first years of the American rebellion, recruits had been drummed up by tested expedients: short-term service,

enlistment of Irish Catholics, and the pardoning of convicted criminals. But the great expansion after Saratoga

outran these methods. Between 1778 and 1781, in addition to fencibles, volunteer corps, and the embodying of

nearly 40,000 militia, there were raised thirty-one new regiments of foot and four of cavalry. To find the men the

bounty was raised, and raised again. Physical requirements were lowered, and age limits widened. Volunteers were

promised exemption from parish service after their discharge, and permission to set up in any trade wherever they

wished. The idle and disorderly were made liable to impressment by the justices. Vain efforts were even made to

obtain the Irish executive's assent to the raising of regiments officered by Irish Catholics.4 Further

1 Below, p. 376.

2 Add. MSS. 38344, ff. 17980; Add. MSS. 38375, ff. 745. These casualty figures do not include the

Convention troops, of which the British component amounted to 2,880 rank and file.

3 Add. MSS. 38344, ff. 1623; WO 34/127, ff. 15261.

4 On this point see CL, Germain, 22 Dec. 1778 to Lord Buckinghamshire; in general Curtis, 5171. For

examples of forced enlistments, see J. of Army Hist. Research, Dec. 1956, p. 186.

< previous page page_368 next page >

page_369

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_369.html[1/17/2011 2:27:34 PM]

< previous page page_369 next page >

Page 369

compulsion, the Secretary at War argued, was wrong and useless: wrong because contrary to British principles of

government, and useless because it would cause disturbances and desertion.1

The new regiments had had little difficulty in raising their men. More than half of the 15,000 recruits raised in the

past twelve months had been for new levies, and the latest regiment to be raised had found its men quickly and

relatively cheaply. It was the 'old' regiments which were failing. The Additional Companies which fed the

battalions abroad were not getting a third of the numbers they had been recruiting when they were first established,

and were failing to replenish the ranks of their regiments. One of their difficulties was the arbitrary drafting of the

men they raised into other regiments, which made the Colonels and officers lose interest and send home bad

N.C.O.s to recruit.2

Jenkinson, as Secretary at War, had protested to Amherst in the past at the raising of new regiments while the old

ones were short of establishment3; and Amherst felt some sympathy, for new regiments were open to jobbery and

led to rapid promotion of officers who had the luck to raise them. Nevertheless the high bounties which their

officers gave to recruits for the sake of promotion tapped a source of men which was not open to the old regiments.

Drawing the logic from this, Jenkinson changed his ground. If the raising of new regiments was unavoidable, the

establishments of the old should be reduced. His objection to uncompleted establishments was purely financial. As

Secretary at War he was responsible for preparing the army estimates and defending them in the House of

Commons. Depleted establishments were wasteful. Certain off-reckonings were swallowed up whatever the real

numbers in the ranks, a loss which Jenkinson estimated at £30,000; and a further £100,000 remained unused in the

hands of the Paymaster and the Regimental Agents to their own profit, while Parliament was asked to vote the

same sums again for new regiments. Faced with the Estimates for 1781, Jenkinson wanted existing establishments

to be cut back to a figure which the regiments could hope to complete.

But to Amherst the issue was not financial but military. The army had too few troops to meet essential

commitments; and to reduce the paper establishments of regiments would not solve the difficulty. It would merely

preclude the possibility of raising the old regiments to efficient strength: a battalion 700 strong was a much better

fighting instrument than one of 560. Moreover he feared that to cut establishments would reveal to the enemy

1 WO 34/127, 24 Oct. 1780, Jenkinson to Amherst.

2 G 3208.

3 Add. MSS. 38212, ff. 30512.

< previous page page_369 next page >

page_370

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_370.html[1/17/2011 2:27:35 PM]

< previous page page_370 next page >

Page 370

how far the army was below its strength on paper. Jenkinson doubted if the enemy was really deceived, and pointed

out that it had never been possible to keep establishments up towards the end of a war: indeed in 1760 on

Amherst's own advice the establishments of regiments in the West Indies and America had been reduced to figures

which they could maintain. He insisted that there were no serious military objections to the cuts, and real political

and financial advantages.1

But Amherst stuck to his guns. It was his duty to present Jenkinson's proposals to the Cabinet, and he was able to

press his case against them. He maintained that as no pay was issued except for effectives, the financial saving

would be inconsiderable, though he admitted that under the present system some money lay dead for a time in the

hands of individuals. As a result of his efforts he was able to tell Jenkinson that the Cabinet 'seemed' to think that

the high establishments should be retained in the hope of filling them. But this was not the end of the matter.

Jenkinson had had a Treasury training, and was still very close to North. The national debt had nearly doubled

since the beginning of the war, and the next loan would have to be floated on extravagant terms. In Parliament,

where the Opposition's campaign for economy had threatened even the King's Household, he expected trouble over

the enormous extraordinaries of the troops in the West Indies and America. He demanded a more explicit

instruction from the Commander-in-Chief on which to prepare the Estimates, and obtained the Prime Minister's

support.2

Before the Cabinet would come to a decision about the reductions, they wanted to hear North and give Jenkinson

an opportunity to appear before them in person. A date and time were agreed, and Jenkinson won his case. But if

he could lean on the Prime Minister, Amherst could look to the King. When Amherst brought him the Cabinet's

resolution, King George expressed his understanding that no reduction was intended in regiments which had a

probability of completing their present establishments. Sixty-one battalions were cut instead of the seventy-six

which Jenkinson had proposed: a paper reduction of 7,630 privates instead of 12,470. Amherst had saved what he

could, but he considered that forty-nine of the reduced battalions were now tied to establishments well below the

efficient strength for active service.3

1 G 3266; WO 34/127, 31 Oct., North to Amherst, ff. 15261, 1846; WO 34/128, f. 15; Add. MSS. 38214,

ff. 21617; Add. MSS. 38383 (Jenkinson's draft speech).

2 WO 34/127, ff. 1846, 196; WO 34/128, f. 14; WO 34/235, p. 524; G 23434; WO 34/186, ff. 923.

3 WO 34/127, f. 61; WO 34/235, pp. 245, 5515; WO 4/112, pp. 12, 13, 278; Royal Institution MSS., II, 216.

On 1 December Amherst wrote to Germain in connection with a proposal to raise a special corps: ' . . .it is the

opinion of a very sensible and

(footnote continued on next page)

< previous page page_370 next page >

page_371

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_371.html[1/17/2011 2:27:35 PM]

< previous page page_371 next page >

Page 371

The dispute over the reductions emphasised the handicap imposed on Jenkinson by his exclusion from the Cabinet.

He was answerable for the army in the House of Commons, where he had to do solitary battle against several

senior officers in opposition. He maintained that though it was for the Cabinet to decide the army's strength, he

ought to have a voice in how to attain it. His constitutional position soon caused him further uneasiness. Early in

the New Year the Cabinet resolved to raise forty independent companies in Ireland for the English establishment,

in order to meet the expanding needs of home defence. But soon afterwards, on Amherst's representation that there

were not enough troops for essential services, the Cabinet ordered six further regiments to be raised in the same

manner. At this Jenkinson rebelled. He denounced the new regiments as jobs which he should have been given an

opportunity to oppose in the Cabinet, and threatened to resign rather than have anything to do with them. This time

he had the support of Amherst and Hillsborough, and the plan was dropped. It might have been killed at birth if

Amherst had spoken up in Cabinet as Jenkinson had expected: he must indeed have wished for a seat beside the

silent soldier at the Council table.1

The South Sea Enterprise

The outlook would have been very different if Spain could have been detached from the enemy alliance, and in the

course of 1780 the attempt begun in the previous autumn had proceeded, at first hopefully. Though there is no

evidence that Father Hussey was acting in collusion with the Spanish government when he approached Germain,

his arrival in Madrid at the end of 1779 was, as he had predicted, not unwelcome. The Spanish situation was

sufficiently embarrassing. They had counted on beating England in one campaign, taking their profit quickly, and

then securing their own colonies from the contagion of rebellion by sacrificing the Americans. Now they faced

prolonged war without the means to wage it. An immediate peace was alluring if they could get their price. They

were not bound by treaty to the American rebels; and for Gibraltar Floridablanca was willing to forego the hope of

other gains and desert the French alliance.

Hussey had made it clear from the beginning that Gibraltar was the vital condition for the Spaniards; and he

confirmed it on his return to London at the end of January. The price was stiff, and even Knox had not suggested

(footnote continued from previous page)

intelligent officer, of high rank, now in America, that the compleating of the present corps in that country

would be force sufficient to end the rebellion there'. (WO 34/235, p. 589).

1 G 3236, 3266; Abergavenny, 41; Add. MSS. 38214, f. 216.

< previous page page_371 next page >

page_372

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_372.html[1/17/2011 2:27:36 PM]

< previous page page_372 next page >

Page 372

more than the sacrifice of West Florida and perhaps the lodgments on the Nicaraguan coast. But it is probable that

when the first contacts were made the British Ministers concerned were willing to pay for peace with Gibraltar.

Hussey reported to Madrid that Germain saw little difficulty, and if Commodore Johnstone was speaking the truth

Lord North was also willing. Of Hillsborough's views there is no direct evidence at the time; but he was probably

of the same mind, for in the following September both he and Stormont would have been happy to pay for peace

with Gibraltar if public opinion would have allowed it. As Commodore Johnstone reminded Sandwich in a letter

from the coast of Portugal, there had been cries of doom when Calais, Tangier and Louisburg were successively

abandoned, yet England had survived and flourished without them.1

But when Hussey reappeared with the formal Spanish overture the Ministers could proceed no further without

Cabinet approval. Four successive meetings were devoted to the subject, and a list of possible equivalents for

Gibraltar was presented and discussed. In the end, however, the surrender of Gibraltar was rejected. Perhaps the

decision was influenced by the news which arrived at that moment of Rodney's victory over Langara; but always in

the background must have been the fear of public opinion, and we shall see that in the peace negotiations which

ended the war it was the same force which wrecked the statesmen's hopes of exchanging Gibraltar. Hussey,

indignant and disappointed at the decision, was soothed by Richard Cumberland, and sent a report to Floridablanca

which, while warning him that Gibraltar could not form part of the basis of negotiation, held out the hope that it

could subsequently be introduced. This letter was shown to Germain and Hillsborough, but was not officially

communicated to the Cabinet.

In April Cumberland was despatched to Lisbon to further the negotiation. As a subordinate of limited experience

he would not commit the government's prestige to his actions. He sailed without the power to discuss the one vital

concession, and the decision to withhold Gibraltar meant that his mission could not succeed. He was, however,

lured to Madrid by Floridablanca, who knew his instructions but hoped at the least to use his presence as a lever

against the French. His appearance did indeed alarm Vergennes into making strategic concessions to the Spaniards;

but it sowed confusion within the Bourbon ranks, disrupted their war planning, and opened the prospect of a

mediated peace in 1781 if the British government had thought it necessary.2

1 Doniol, IV, 502; Bemis, Hussey-Cumberland Mission, 95 n.; Sandwich, III, 190.

2 For these negotiations see Bemis, op. cit., supplemented for the British side by Coxe, Kings of Spain . . .

Cumberland remained convinced that it was the Gordon Riots which disrupted the negotiation, and that

between capture of Admiral Langara and the Riots a separate peace might have been attained without yielding

Gibraltar.

< previous page page_372 next page >

page_373

file:///C:/Users/User/AppData/Local/Temp/Rar$EX01.335/The%20War%20for%20America%20%201775-1783/files/page_373.html[1/17/2011 2:27:36 PM]

< previous page page_373 next page >

Page 373

In the meantime plans had been in hand for new and heavier blows against the Spanish Empire. When Brigadier

Garth's expedition sailed for Jamaica to seize a base in the Pacific, two plans for privateering expeditions in the

Pacific were in the air. One of them came from Sir John Dalrymple, Baron of the Scottish Exchequer and brother

of the young officer whose capture of Omoa had triggered the Jamaica expedition. Acting with a consortium of

Glasgow merchants, Dalrymple applied for government approval and subsidies for a squadron of privateers. Their

notion was that the Spaniards would expect a twenty months' respite in the Pacific from the outbreak of war, since

the declaration had come too late in the year to mount an expedition to round the Horn in the good months of

December and January. But the voyages of Captain Cook had shown that there were two safe routes to the South

Pacific at any season: from Britain by the Cape of Good Hope, and from India by the Philippines or New Holland.

An expedition by these routes in the course of 1780 would catch the Spaniards unprepared. Dalrymple imagined a

squadron of raiders from Britain sailing by the Cape of Good Hope and New Zealand to the south coast of Chile;

running before the south wind to scour the coast as far as Panama; and thence to sell the prizes and refit in India or

China. From there they could renew the cycle.1

This plan was taken seriously by Germain, and negotiations to mount it proceeded in the first half of 1780. But by

the late summer the government took up the project on its own account, and the Glasgow 'tobacco lords' dropped

out. The germ of the new plan was a proposal made in January 1780 by a somewhat different Scottish interest.

William Fullarton and Thomas Mackenzie Humberston proposed to raise a pair of regiments and fit out warships

to cruise in the Pacific and capture the Acapulco fleet. Humberston was a rich man who had helped his cousin

Lord Seaforth to raise the Seventy-eighth Highlanders and bought the Seaforth estates; and Fullarton, with estates

in Ayrshire and a seat in Parliament, was his closest friend. In February 1780 these lairds were given permission to

raise their regiments without expense to government, and Germain ensured that this new threat was conveyed to

the Spanish government.2 In the next few months they raised the Ninety-eighth and Hundredth Foot, which, after

splendid service in India, were disbanded at the peace. Humberston was at least a soldier; but Fullarton's

commission was attacked as a piece of political favouritism to a civilian. Like Thomas Graham of Peninsular fame

Fullarton came late to soldiering; and his brilliant services and original methods in India were to prove that the

slow ladder of seniority was not the only way to make

1 Harlow, 108; Dalrymple, Memoirs of Great Britain, Appendix, p. 32; Sackville, II, 1538.

2 Spanish memorandum by Hussey, communicated by Father Cullen.

< previous page page_373 next page >