Mackesy P. The War for America, 1775-1783

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old rebel militia and members of the rebel Council. The rest of the disaffected were disarmed, and required to

furnish provisions and transport instead of personal service. The export of rice to England was resumed, to restore

the colony's prosperity. James Simpson was confident that in a month or two South Carolina would return to peace

and loyalty, and looked forward impatiently to the restoration of the legislature.1

But while Cornwallis worked to consolidate, his gains were beginning to crumble. Thomas Sumter entered the field

as a guerrilla leader and rapidly seduced many of the militia, while a regular force of Continentals was pushing

south towards the border under Gates, the reputed victor of Saratoga. Cornwallis hurried up from Charleston to join

the army, determined to take the offensive and save his hospitals and magazines. He had only 2,000 men,2 but

1,500 of them were British regulars; and on 16 August he scattered Gates's force near Camden in a masterly attack.

Kalb was killed, Gates fled 200 miles on the fastest horse in the American army, and of 4,000 Americans only 700

assembled again in North Carolina. Two days later Tarleton with 160 men surprised Sumter's band and killed or

took 450 of them. For the second time a crushing victory had laid South Carolina at Cornwallis's feet.

Yet the triumph was delusive, and Cornwallis was far from clear how to use his victory. His troops had gained in

reputation; but even measured against the enormous losses of the enemy he could ill afford his own: his 300

casualties in the battle were irreplaceable. Still more serious was the disappointing progress of pacification. A

month earlier the country seemed to have submitted completely, and the people to be sincerely happy at their

release from rebel tyranny. It had been possible to look forward to the complete extinction of the rebel cause by

this time. But the approach of Gates had released a store of disaffection which had been wholly unsuspected.3

Sumter's emergence was the signal for a general rising between the Peedee and the Santee. Oaths of allegiance

were discarded, militia units deserted to the enemy, and fierce attacks were launched on British outposts. Nor did

Gates's crushing defeat extinguish the flames.

Against this resurgent violence Cornwallis was helpless. He could execute militiamen who had deserted to the

enemy after taking the oath of allegiance, and after the battle of Camden two or three of these deserters were

picked out of a bunch of thirty and hanged. But in an auction of terror the rebels could always outbid him. His aim

was to conciliate and pacify: theirs was

1 Sackville, II, 169; Royal Institution MSS., II, 158.

2 1,944 rank and file, 2,239 of all ranks.

3 Royal Institution MSS., II, 16970, 173; Sackville, II, 1856; Cornwallis-Wykeham-Martin, 325.

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to stoke the flames of hatred. After the defeat at King's Mountain an elderly militia colonel who had always been a

fair and open enemy to the rebels was hanged with eight other prisoners as a reprisal. Cornwallis was up against

western frontiersmen, trained in savagery by their encroachments on the Indians; and his own policy was hampered

by the high proportion of provincial troops in his army. Many an expedition contained no British troops; and the

loyalist units gave the campaign the murderous character of a civil war. The rebels persecuted even neutrality, and

little quarter was given. The loyalist regiments burned and ravaged in their turn. Tarleton's Legion became a by-

word, and 'Tarleton's quarter' was the cry which blessed the rebels' massacre of surrendering militiamen at King's

Mountain. In the face of rebel ruthlessness the long-oppressed loyalists were easily disheartened, and Cornwallis

despaired of them: 'when I see a whole settlement running away from 20 or 30 robbers, I think they deserve to be

robbed'.1 The militia could not be trusted. The great mass of citizens who were neither dedicated rebels nor

loyalists had returned to their allegiance from weariness of war and military service; and when they found

themselves forced into a new militia to serve against their friends, they deserted in droves.2

The choice after Camden was not an easy one. According to Germain's plan the army should now act as a covering

force while the liberated province was pacified by the loyalist militia. But after Gates's incursion Cornwallis was

certain that he could not protect the province effectively except by taking the offensive and smashing the rebel

strongholds in North Carolina. Two doubts suggest themselves. How was order to be maintained in his rear by a

militia in which he had no confidence amidst a population envenomed by civil war? And where could his own

advance be halted? When Savannah had been recovered the Governor had urged the invasion of South Carolina

for the protection of Georgia: now South Carolina had been won, and it was necessary to attack North Carolina.

Before Cornwallis's small force stretched the endless leagues of North Carolina and Virginia; and every mile it

advanced would incur fresh obligations to loyalists. If Cornwallis was right, Germain's concept of a methodical and

static consolidation was breaking down in face of the dynamic of rebel warfare.

Cornwallis was a commander who preferred the bolder course. Boldness

1 Ross, Cornwallis Correspondence, I, 5675. On the savagery which characterised the Southern war, see

Nelson, 149. Alden (The South . . . 235) cities the hanging of five loyalists taken while marching to join

Prevost at the beginning of 1779 as an early stimulus to the atrocious character of the struggle.

2 Thus A. Turnbull explained the collapse of British control in South Carolina in a letter to Shelburne. (CL,

Shelburne, Vol. 66, p. 641, letter of 1 Aug. 1781). The rebel South Carolina militia's failure to rise to the crisis

of the British invasion in 1780 lends it probability. (see Alden, The South . . ., 239, 241).

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had succeeded at Camden, and he chose it now. He appealed to Clinton to support him with a diversion in the

Chesapeake: 'It may be doubted by some whether the invasion of North Carolina may be a prudent measure; but I

am convinced it is a necessary one, and that if we do not attack that province, we must give up both South Carolina

and Georgia, and retire within the walls of Charleston.' On 7 September the army moved northwards towards the

border.

The first objective was Hillsborough, deep in North Carolina. But lack of forage slowed the army's progress, and

on 22 September it had only reached Charlottetown. Here Cornwallis was in a known area of rebellion where his

foraging parties were constantly harassed. Governor Martin, who had reported favourably on the inhabitants, issued

proclamations urging the loyalists to embody; but few came in, probably because they could not get through the

hovering rebel parties. Oppressed and intimidated, they dared not stir, though they promised to help when the army

reached them. Then came news of a misfortune which turned the course of the campaign.

Major Ferguson had been advancing from Ninety-Six across the back parts of South Carolina towards

Charlottetown to protect the army's rear against guerrillas. He was the most expert rifleman and partisan in the

British Army, and he felt a confidence in his militia which few still shared. In pursuit of a rebel party which had

attacked Augusta, he found himself suddenly in the presence of 1,400 mounted riflemen from beyond the

mountains. Ferguson turned at bay on King's Mountain. He had 1,000 militiamen and was the only British man in

his entire force; but he had a position of great natural strength and 100 picked Provincial troops, and was confident

he could hold the mountain. But the slopes of the hill were forested. A storm of bullets rained on the militiamen as

the backwoodsmen closed in from three sides. Ferguson was everywhere, animating his troops and cutting down

white flags until he was killed. The survivors attempted to surrender, but two men with white flags were shot

down, and the slaughter continued. At length a rebel officer was able to stop the firing. By then more than 300 of

Ferguson's men were dead or too badly wounded to be moved; 700 became prisoners, some of them marked for the

gallows.

The effect on Cornwallis was decisive. With a rebel force menacing his rear, further advance was impossible. The

North Carolina loyalists had done nothing to justify the risk of invading their province, and the army's departure

from South Carolina had put the British gains in peril. He broke off his offensive and fell back to a central position

at Winnsborough from which he could support both Camden and Ninety-six. Here the army remained till the end

of the year.

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The French Established

In New York the fall of Charleston had produced a euphoria which even the approach of a French expedition could

not damp. In the middle of July Lord Robert Manners heard predictions that North Carolina and Virginia would be

overrun before the winter, Pennsylvania cowed by the British approach, and the Jerseys enabled to throw off the

rebel yoke. Then would come a small expedition to re-occupy Rhode Island, and in the spring an attack on

Boston.1

Everything, however, awaited the appearance of the French. If they did not come, Clinton hoped to mount his

operation in the Chesapeake. But he felt cramped by the shortage of troops. The recruits from Europe had not yet

reached him; for it will be remembered that the despatch of the 2,000 British recruits had been opposed by Amherst

while there remained any possibility that England would be invaded.2 When Ternay's destination became apparent

in April, the Cabinet ordered them to sail. But when the German recruits reached England in June, there was only

enough shipping for 1,400 of the British recruits. Germain ordered the Admiralty to appoint an escort and despatch

the convoy to New York, and repeated the order on July 1. But we shall see that the naval situation at home

interposed to prevent their despatch till the end of the summer, and they did not reach New York till the end of

October.3

The army's dispositions in July were as follows4:

Rank and file: Fit for duty Total Effectives

Nova Scotia

1,862 3,145

New York and Long Island

14,285 20,048

South Carolina

4,870 6,733

Georgia

1,259 1,706

East Florida

351 457

West Florida

727 1,308

Bermuda

281 304

Providence

51 118

Totals

23,686 33,819

It will be seen from these figures that Clinton's only uncommitted reserve was at New York, where he could put

about 5,000 fit men in the field after finding garrisons. He asked Cornwallis to spare 2,500 men; but

1 Rutland, III, 312.

2 Above, p. 327.

3 G3002; CO 5/255, pp. 15, 21; below, p. 357.

4 CO 5/100, f. 53.

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Cornwallis could not afford to lose a man. To Germain Clinton complained of the shortage, so mortifying when

another 10,000 men might end the war 'as far as the Hudson River'.1

But before any decision could be taken about future operations, Clinton had to reckon with the approach of

Ternay.2 He had now to pay the penalty for evacuating Rhode Island in the previous autumn a penalty to which he

had not been blind when he gave the order. A French force established there would be a permanent menace to all

the British posts from Canada southwards. If Graves's squadron came in time there was one sure remedy: to attack

and destroy the French expedition at the moment of its arrival. But Ternay must be given no time to strengthen the

Newport peninsula or summon American reinforcements.

Clinton laid his plans accordingly. He considered two possible operations: a landing in the Sakonnet passage to the

east of Rhode Island; or to take the expedition through the Conanicut Passage as d'Estaing had done in 1778 and

land on the Rhode Island coast above Newport. An amphibious attack needs careful preparation, but Clinton had

the time. By 22 June he had 6,000 troops ready, and had warned Arbuthnot to assemble transports. The Admiral

had everything prepared so that Graves could be refitted on his arrival without crossing the bar at Sandy Hook.

Thus each commander was alert and ready. But there was no bridge of understanding between them.

The two services had co-operated well during the siege of Charleston. But scarcely had the city surrendered when

Arbuthnot's appointment to the Peace Commission re-opened the quarrel with Clinton. He now rejected both of

Clinton's proposed attacks; but he pleaded ignorance of Rhode Island and refused to suggest an alternative plan.

Ternay, in the meantime, was approaching. Like Graves he had had his troubles. The Ministry of Marine had

summoned the transports too late from Toulon, delaying the embarkation of the troops. Contrary winds then

prevented his departure, and when he finally sailed on 2 May he was detained for several days in the Bay of Biscay

by a westerly gale. He chose the southern passage, and south-west of Bermuda on 20 July he had a brush with an

inferior British force under Commodore Cornwallis which had been escorting a homeward-bound convoy from the

West Indies. But he pressed on to complete his own mission. Early in August he was sighted off Virginia; but on

the 13th Graves arrived off New York after an eight weeks' passage by the southern route. He was refitted in six

days, and his 700 sick were replaced with volunteers from New York. But on the 18th news arrived

1 CO 5/100, ff. 4952; Royal Institution MSS., II, 156.

2 The following account relies largely on Willcox's analysis based on the Clinton Papers (JMH, 1945).

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that Ternay had been at Rhode Island for a week. It has never been explained why Arbuthnot had no cruisers out to

watch for the enemy, but the fact remains that for seven days the French had been fortifying their base unmolested.

Graves was blamed in England for wasting time with a prize on his voyage; but though he arrived just a day after

Ternay, an earlier arrival would have made little difference unless Rhode Island had been watched.

Arbuthnot now had ten sail of the line against Ternay's six; and as soon as he learnt that the French were at

Newport he agreed with Clinton that the troops should be embarked and moved up Long Island Sound while the

fleet reconnoitred the enemy. But on embarking his regiments Clinton discovered that Arbuthnot had used the

transports' water to replenish the fleet, and the butts were empty. While they were being replenished the wind

changed, and the East River became impassable. Not till the 27th did the transports reached Huntington Bay in the

Sound.

Through sickness and the separation of a transport, the French had only 4,000 troops fit for duty, and no batteries

had yet been constructed. But Clinton knew only that they had been in possession of Rhode Island for nearly three

weeks, and the prospect of a coup de main was fading. Moreover, Washington's forces were gathering to threaten

Staten Island, and he was nervous about his rear. Holding the force where it lay, he sent his A.D.C. to Arbuthnot,

who sent back a message that the prospects were hopeless and he hoped the army would not come. The French, he

said, had been reinforced with American militia and artillery, the fortifications were too strong to be assaulted, and

the fleet could not provide a siege train as it had done at Charleston. Arbuthnot's report was decisive. Without

seeing for himself, Clinton dropped back towards New York to await developments.

Early in August a flag of truce was sent to seek intelligence, and the officer reported that the harbour could be

forced if troops could occupy one side of the passage. Arbuthnot proposed an immediate conference, and Clinton

rode day and night through Long Island to join the Admiral. But when he reached Gardiner's Bay the anchorage

was empty. Arbuthnot had put out on a report that the French were to sail, leaving not even a despatch boat in the

bay. General Mathew and Brigadier Dalrymple were sent in pursuit, found the fleet on 19 August, and proposed

the seizure of Conanicut Island if it would enable the fleet to force the passage. Arbuthnot replied that the attempt

was hopeless without a full scale siege by 1820,000 men.

So the opportunity passed untested, and the French obtained their lodgment in America, though even in September,

when batteries had been armed in the entrance to the harbour, Ternay feared that the British would pass up the

western passage between Conanicut Island and the mainland. The British commanders, angry and uneasy, settled

down to fix the blame on each other.

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Arbuthnot sent home long misleading reports and selections of correspondence to show that it was Clinton who

had shrunk from the risk; and Clinton despatched Brigadier Dalrymple to demand the recall of Arbuthnot, the

removal of the transports from naval control, and a reinforcement of at least 10,000 men. If these terms were not

met, he asked leave to resign. Germain concluded that the failure was caused by a total want of confidence and

communication between the two commanders: both were to blame.1 Separated by 100 miles of Long Island Sound,

and without previous agreement or present sympathy, it is no wonder that they missed the fleeting moment. Now a

French squadron and a corps of troops were established in 'the best and noblest harbour in America': an anchorage

too dangerous to blockade except in the summer, and with no shelter for the watching fleet nearer than the tip of

Long Island, eighteen leagues to leeward.

Treason among the Rebels

The commander of the French troops was Lieutenant-General the Comte de Rochambeau. Distinguished service in

the Seven Years War, and the command in 1779 of the picked assault force of Vaux's army of invasion, testified to

his military abilities. His new assignment called for other qualities; and he had the temperance, loyalty and

generosity which were needed for dealing with his strange allies. His orders were to land twelve battalions on

Rhode Island and place himself under the command of Washington. To the American commander the plan of

operations was left, with only the secret proviso that the French force should be kept together. Vergennes' hope was

to strike a decisive blow on the rebel coast, exploiting the division of force and universal inferiority which he

believed would be forced on the British in the summer of 1780. What he did not want was to further the American

passion for expanding into Canada and Nova Scotia; but this was a political question for Luzerne in Philadelphia.

Though Vergennes' hopes were to be realised in due course, the moment was not ripe. Rochambeau arrived when

American fortunes were running low. The French were shocked at the surrender of Charleston, and inclined to

believe in southern indifference to the rebel cause. Luzerne, who had been in America long enough to judge,

feared from the moderation of the British in South Carolina that they were contemplating a settlement with the

northern states and the consolidation of their gains in the south. The new arrivals were horrified by what they

found. Ternay, an orthodox officer and easily discouraged by the peculiar situation of the Americans, reported that

the revolution was not so far advanced as Europe believed, and that a

1 Sandwich, III, 258.

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single highly placed traitor in the American ranks could decide the fate of a campaign; a fear soon shown to have

substance. The state of the Continental forces was a shock for Rochambeau. 'Send us troops, ships, and money', he

wrote home five days after his arrival; 'but do not count on these people nor on their resources, they have neither

money nor credit, their forces only exist momentarily, and when they are about to be attacked in their own homes

they assemble during the time of personal danger to defend themselves.' He had been told that France's commercial

credits in America would support his force for a whole campaign: now he found that he could only supply his men

till the end of the year. Money was needed. But still more he needed men, for Washington's aim was to attack New

York, and he remembered d'Estaing's fiascos: 'il ne faut pas faire ici des affaires de Savannah'. Not only the British

believed that the rebellion had shallow roots.1

When Washington had learnt in the spring that the French were coming, he was deeply worried by the situation in

the south. But though cramped by the poverty of his resources, he was naturally a bold and aggressive commander,

and his instinct was to ease the pressure on Gates by a blow in the north. He suggested that if the whole British

force remained at Charleston, the French should sail straight for Sandy Hook and burst into the port of New York.

He foresaw that if they went first to Rhode Island, the events of 1778 would repeat themselves: the British would

have time to obstruct the approaches to New York and receive help from England. This indeed was what

happened. Clinton and Arbuthnot, like the Howes two years earlier, reached New York from the southward before

the French appeared. But on this occasion the reinforcing squadron from England arrived almost simultaneously

with the French; for Graves, sailing on the southern route, had better luck than Byron, and the British retained the

naval superiority which Rochambeau needed to assault New York.

The allied offensive was therefore stillborn; and while Washington and Rochambeau were inactive, Clinton was

planning a coup whose unmasking was to give the enemy one of their worst frights in the whole course of the war.

Benedict Arnold, the hero of Quebec and Saratoga, had formed a treasonable correspondence with the British.

Clinton had Germain's authority to use just such an opening, and Arnold's defection was the climax of an extensive

correspondence with American traitors which fed the hope of a rebel collapse.2 He commanded at West Point, the

impenetrable key to the Highlands. It was a tremendous opening. Success would win all the forts in the Highlands,

with their stores, siege guns, boats and men. If the blow did not break the war-weary Americans immediately, its

effects should

1 See correspondence in Sparks MSS., Vol. 78.

2 See Carl van Doren, The Secret History of the American Revolution.

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still be lasting and decisive; for Washington's lateral communications would be severed, and according to Arnold

he 'would be obliged to fight or to disband his army for want of provisions'.1

At the last moment the plot miscarried. The negotiations were managed by Clinton's Adjutant-General, Major

André. Returning from a conference with Arnold, he was cut off from his ship; and as he made his way back in

disguise, protected as he hoped by Arnold's safe-conduct, he was searched by a rebel party which found

incriminating papers in his boots. While Arnold fled to the British lines, André was sentenced to death.

Desperate efforts were made to save him. General Robertson went up the river to meet General Greene, who said

that there was no treating about spies; to which Robertson replied that no military casuist in Europe would call

André a spy. 'Greene now with a blush . . . told me that the army must be satisfied by seeing spies executed; but

there was one thing would satisfy them they expected, if André was set free, Arnold should be given up. This I

answered with a look only, which threw Greene into confusion. I am persuaded André will not be hurt.'2

But Robertson was wrong. The Americans were angry and frightened; and after their shamefaced attempt to trade

André's life for Arnold's they hanged him in the midst of their army, rejecting his petition to be shot. The first that

Clinton knew of it was when André's servant came into the lines with his baggage. Four days after the hanging he

received a peremptory demand from Washington for an explanation about the confinement of plotting prisoners of

war in South Carolina; to which he managed to return a civil answer.

Arbuthnot in the meantime had been cruising off Rhode Island to intercept a second French reinforcement which

was believed to be on its way. In the middle of September he returned to Gardiner's Bay resolved to wait there till

the winter was well advanced. If the French evaded him, he intended to detach all but his own flagship to Rodney

in the West Indies. But as we know, Rodney was even then approaching New York; and on the following day he

appeared with ten sail of the line.3

Rodney's arrival brought a new element into the quarrels of New York. While Clinton and Arbuthnot continued

their bickering, Arbuthnot set to with Rodney: 'You may guess how the service is carried on', wrote one of

Rodney's captains.4 Arbuthnot's grievance was said to be prize money:

1 CO 5/100, f. 301. See above, pp. 1434.

2 CO 5/100, f. 189.

3 CL, Germain, 13 Sept., from Arbuthnot.

4 Rutland, III, 39.

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