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362 Chapter 20

discipline, or whether it is to provide a critical stance on the wider society:

Burawoy (2005a:16) seems to favor the first approach, stating “critical

sociology is committed to opening up debate within our discipline.” It is

certainly necessary for sociologists to continually interrogate themselves,

but it is also necessary for sociologists to critically interrogate the relations

of class, status, and power that permeate the wider societies in which they

live.

The international law of human rights provides a common standard of

achievement on the basis of which sociologists, like all other actors, can

be critical of the societies in which they live, whether local, national, or

global. Burawoy boxes himself in by focusing only on criticism within the

profession, and moreover by pronouncing himself a Marxist. The common

standard of human rights applies to all political regimes, including Marx-

ist, socialist, fascist, liberal, and social democratic. In the twenty-first cen-

tury, to box critical sociology into the functionalist/Marxist disagreement

is to engage in sterile debate that will be of little interest to the millions

of human rights actors all over the world. These human rights actors are a

significant part of the civil society that Burawoy (2005b:152–165) claims

ought to be the principal object of attention of, and the principal social unit

to be defended by, “third-wave” sociology. One does not have to accept

his ideal-type description of first, second, and third-wave sociology’s focus

on/defense of the state, market, and civil society respectively, to recognize

the importance of human rights to civil society actors all over the world, in-

cluding those who rejected Marxism completely in Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Bloc, or who struggle to overcome the human rights abuses

of allegedly Marxist regimes in China, Cuba, or North Korea today.

The common human rights standard of achievement does, however, ap-

ply as much to capitalist as to other societies. The principle of economic

rights fills a gap in (North) American conceptions of social justice. Never-

theless, until recently the international human rights movement did not

pay as much attention to economic as to civil and political rights. This is

in part because economic rights do not enjoy the same high standards of

immediate implementation as civil and political rights: rather, states are

mandated to progressively implement economic rights, to the maximum of

their available resources (ICESCR, Article 2 [1]). Yet universal human rights

entail the creation of a society in which all human rights are respected. This,

in effect, means a social democracy, laying equal stress on civil and politi-

cal, and economic, social, and cultural rights.

We are now living in the era of globalization: that is, the worldwide

spread of capitalism. Both socialism and various forms of national “self-

reliance” have failed abysmally as economic policies, in the former Soviet

Bloc and China and in the underdeveloped world. Burawoy (2005b:157)

views globalization, or, in his words, “third-wave marketization,” as a

Public Sociology and Universal Human Rights 363

human rights disaster, yet there is no substitute for market economies.

Moreover, countries in which there is no foreign investment are much

poorer than countries in which there is foreign investment; witness African

poverty. There is also much evidence that in the long run, societies that

become wealthier through capitalist investment are likely to democratize

and provide more complete protection for human rights, although such a

development is by no means inevitable (Howard-Hassmann 2005:1–40).

This is little comfort in the short run, however, for those who suffer

from structural adjustment policies, high debt loads (often accumulated by

dictatorial, anti-capitalist governments), lack of rights in export processing

zones, and the dislocations caused when peasant societies give way to mar-

ket economies. How can the rights of these billions of people be protected?

There is no easy answer to this question. Markets must be regulated, and

the rights of workers fully protected. Public policies to protect economic

human rights must be carefully delineated, with the input of all relevant

professionals. This must include the expertise of professional economists,

whose “neo-liberal” agenda may be based not on ideology, but on analysis

of the failures of past communist, proto-socialist, and protectionist econo-

mies.

Burawoy’s easy dismissal of the discipline of economics does a disservice

to the promotion and protection of human rights. One way for Burawoy

to be a more self-critical sociologist would be to take seriously the reason-

ing of economists, rather than simply praising “Post-Autistic Economics”

(Burawoy 2005a:24; for the origins of this term, see Hayes 2007). In order

to promote and protect economic rights, sociologists must work with, not

against, economists, and take seriously their theories about growth, market

mechanisms, and economic decision-making. It is disciplinary arrogance

to suggest that sociology “defends the interests of humanity” (Burawoy

2005a:24), as if philosophy, law, political science, and economics do not

also do so.

POLICY SOCIOLOGY

There are many debates about human rights to which sociologists can con-

tribute, by using their professional standards to research policy questions,

by contributing to policy-based research, and by addressing the relevant

publics.

Political sociologists and sociologists of law might consider whether eco-

nomic rights should be justiciable; that is, whether citizens should have the

right to sue their government, when it does not protect or provide their eco-

nomic rights. Canadians, unlike Americans, enjoy universal state-supplied

medical care, but the actual system is plagued by shortages, line-ups, and

364 Chapter 20

decisions by provincial authorities to reduce coverage. The Supreme Court

of Canada ruled in 2005 that since the Province of Quebec was unable to

always provide public health care in a timely manner, thus endangering

citizens’ rights under Canada’s 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms (sec-

tion 7) to life, liberty, and security, the province was obliged to legalize pri-

vate health care (Chaoulli v. Quebec 2005). Is it useful to rely on individual

or class action suits to protect economic rights such as the right to health

care, or should the level of protection always be left to political decision-

makers? What is the effect on a democratic system, if courts have a strong

say in allocation of scarce resources? This is a subject of much debate in

Canada, some commentators arguing that the Canadian political landscape

is too much dominated by Court decisions based on the Charter of Rights

and Freedoms (Morton and Knopff 2000).

Sociological theorists could also contribute to human rights policy. They

might consider the relationship between minimum standards of well-

being, as mandated by the international law of economic rights, and equal-

ity, both of opportunity and of outcomes. Commentators often confuse

minimum standards with equality of access. Under what conditions, if

any, is inequality of access so severe as to be degrading to an individual’s

self-respect and dignity, even if, in a wealthy society, that individual enjoys

minimum access to food, shelter, education, and health care? The term

“human dignity” is the underpinning concept in the UDHR, which begins

with the phrase, “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the

equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the

foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Yet the meaning

of human dignity is amorphous and undefined. Sociological theorists can

provide useful input on the meaning of human dignity, based on empiri-

cal observations of what individuals value, and on their theories about the

meanings individuals attribute to social life (Moore 1978).

The continued existence of degrading inequalities, even in the wealthy

Western world, forces the sociologist to confront the relationship between

capitalism and economic rights. Burawoy seems to believe that capitalism

is the worst violator of economic rights, and that the spread of capitalist

market relations to the rest of the world, in the process of globalization,

will have more detrimental than positive effects. Yet in general, capitalist

countries that are also democracies are the best protectors of economic

rights. In part, this is because markets are never actually “free,” or com-

pletely unregulated, in the manner that some critics of capitalism suggest;

they are always regulated to protect commerce and trade. To protect the

entire range of human rights, though, markets must also be regulated to

ensure that citizens will have access to their economic rights. The goal is

social democracy, not a completely free market economy, yet there is little

information available about how, if at all, poor countries can institute so-

Public Sociology and Universal Human Rights 365

cial democracy (Sandbrook et al. 2007). Instead of indulging in outmoded

proclamations that Marxism is a good alternative to capitalism, sociologists

could investigate the conditions under which economic growth is coupled

with economic rights.

Yet this is a perspective that many left-wing sociologists reject, preferring

to blame “the West” for all the economic ills of the underdeveloped world.

Sociologists adhering to the development-of-underdevelopment perspec-

tive might wish to know whether international human rights law mandates

any obligations by Western states to aid less developed countries. In 1986

the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed a Declaration on the Right to

Development, article 3 (3), of which notes that “States have the duty to co-

operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles

to development” (Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill:86). “Duty” is a strong

word, implying that development assistance is not a choice, to be bestowed

or withdrawn by wealthy states as they wish, but rather a positive obliga-

tion. Nevertheless, at present there is no serious legal obligation, even in

“soft” (non-enforceable) international law, for states to assist each other’s

development. In order to discuss whether there should be such an enforce-

able law, sociologists of development should first consider the vast litera-

ture which focuses on internal, not external, causes of poverty, especially

causes rooted in corruption, poor governance, and lack of democracy and

the rule of law (Easterly 2006).

The relationship between economic and civil/political rights is a very

serious policy question, which could interest political sociologists and

sociological theorists. Some critics argue that the stress on civil/political

rights in much of the earlier advocacy for human rights, for example by

Amnesty International, was mere Western bias. Yet without democracy; the

rule of law; freedom of speech, association, and assembly; and protection

from torture, citizens are mere subjects, possibly enjoying the substance of

economic rights should their rulers so decide, but unable to enforce their

rights. Governments make many mistakes when they try to organize econo-

mies, and some governing elites run entire national economies in their own

private interests. The rights to freedom of speech, press, and association al-

low critics of governments to speak out and correct these policies.

Burawoy (2005b:157–158) correctly stresses the importance of trade

union rights, a focus for sociologists of labor. Trade unions are the most

reliable route by which workers can express their needs and interests. How-

ever, it is also very important to develop the institutional capacity of less

developed states, and to end elite corruption. In this respect, Buroway’s

easy dismissal (2005a:7) of “neoinstitutionalists” who spread what he

calls “American” institutional forms does a disservice to underdeveloped

countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, lack of institutional capacity

is a major stumbling block to reform, even in countries that have adopted

366 Chapter 20

democracy. If Burawoy were less centered on the United States, he might

consider the variety of institutional forms that can promote democracy, the

rule of law, and human rights. The United States, with its unusual provisos

such as popular elections of judges, presidential vetoes over the will of

Congress, and appointment of non-elected individuals to the Cabinet, is

not institutionalists’ only model.

Critical sociologists often object to the power of multinational corpora-

tions (MNCs), whom they rightly see as agents of globalization. Yet they

have a hard task ahead of them, if they are interested in formulating serious

public policies for underdeveloped countries, rather than merely denounc-

ing MNCs’ very existence. There is no “hard” international human rights

law regulating the conduct of MNCs, although there is a developing norma-

tive law, in part based on the many voluntary codes of conduct for corpora-

tions that have emerged over the last 30 years (Steinhardt 2005:177–226).

Supplementing these voluntary codes, in 1988 the International Labor

Organization (ILO) issued a modest Declaration of Fundamental Principles

and Rights at Work: these rights include freedom of association, the effec-

tive recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all

forms of forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of child labor,

and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment (Brown-

lie and Goodwin-Gill 2006:571). In 1999 the UN formulated a Global

Compact, to which corporations could voluntarily adhere. Businesses were

asked to agree that they would respect international human rights, and

“make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.” They were

also asked to uphold the ILO Fundamental Principles (UN 2005). In 2003,

the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human

Rights drafted some “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cor-

porations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”

(Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2006:268–274). These principles and norms

provide policy guidelines to which sociologists can refer.

So far, radical sociologists and sociologists of underdevelopment might

find that the principles of economic rights support their analyses. But

modernization theory, roughly called, has not disappeared from the world

development agenda, even if Burawoy is correct that it has been superseded

in our discipline by the sociology of underdevelopment. One aspect of

modernization is protection of the right to own property. This is a much

contested right, so much so that it was included in the UDHR Article 17 (1)

(Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2006:26), yet disappeared from the ICCPR

and the ICESCR.

The principle of private property is generally anathema to the politi-

cal left, which associates it with the power of MNCs. Yet many relatively

powerless people need protection of their private property. The powerless

include indigenous peoples, who need their collective property protected;

Public Sociology and Universal Human Rights 367

peasants, who need their right to land protected from state, military, or pri-

vate capitalist expropriation; women, who need their rights to use land and

sell their own products protected from male family and village elites; and

ethnic minorities, who are often targets for expropriation, as scapegoats for

economic chaos. The right to private property is also fundamental to suc-

cessful economic development. Without property to use as collateral, en-

trepreneurs cannot borrow funds for investment. Entrepreneurial freedom,

combined with secure property rights, is one of the bases of Canadian and

American prosperity, and is increasingly recognized to be the basis of pros-

perity in less developed regions. Even the poorest owners need legal guar-

antees of their right to property in shacks, vehicles, and small businesses

(De Soto 2000). Here again, radical sociologists might do well to cast aside

their ideological blinkers, and reconsider whether Marx was correct in his

condemnation of private property.

Another preoccupation of those who make development policy is world

inequality. Burawoy (2005a:4) states confidently that “Unfettered capital-

ism fuels . . . untold inequities on a global scale.” Here, Burawoy might do

well to check economists’ evidence, rather than dismiss the entire discipline.

Bhagwati argues that the common belief that world inequality is increasing

is based on one 2001 study by the World Bank, which found that “a small

increase in inequality had occurred between the late 1980s and the early

1990s—an astonishingly small period to work with” (Bhagwati 2004:67).

Other studies, according to Bhagwati, show that “global inequality declined

substantially during the last two decades” (Bhagwati 2004:67). Moreover,

some economists believe that even if world inequality is increasing, the

rate of absolute poverty in some countries, such as China and Vietnam, is

decreasing (Wells-Dang 2002:180). The relationship among globalization,

foreign investment, domestic economic policy, economic growth, inequal-

ity, and poverty reduction is extremely complex, and cannot be reduced to

blanket formulas by sociologists about paths to social justice.

In any case, there is no human right to equality in material conditions or

wealth; rather, the rights are to basic material minima. Even if one argues

that world inequality is a proxy measure of the inability of some nations to

provide the economic rights of their citizens, one is treading on dangerous

empirical ground. Moreover, the right to absolute equality of condition

is a Marxist, if not a Stalinist, ideal. Ideological adherence to this ideal by

Marxist sociologists may fetter their understanding of the development

process; indeed, when imposed in practice, as in the Soviet Union, Cam-

bodia, or Cuba, this ideal results in de-development, along with extreme

violations of civil and political rights. The professional research skills so

central to all types of sociology should be used to inquire if absolute ma-

terial equality is indeed the best path to economic rights, without prior

assumption that it is.

368 Chapter 20

Finally, some sociologists might be interested in human rights monitor-

ing policy. The U.S. Department of State produces annual reports on the

human rights performance of every country in the world (except itself); the

U.S. government conditions its foreign aid partially on whether recipients

are good human rights performers. Sociologists, with their sophisticated

quantitative and surveying skills, are well placed to act as policy advisers

to the U.S. government in this endeavor. But activist sociologists, sensitive

to perceptions of hypocrisy among non-Western publics, might also wish

to suggest that the U.S. government monitor its own human rights perfor-

mance, to check how American economic policy, trade, consumer prefer-

ences, or tourism might contribute to human rights abuses elsewhere. It is

a salutary exercise, for example, to read the counter-report on human rights

in the United States, produced periodically by the Government of China

(China 2007). The United States, Canada, and all other Western states that

link foreign policy or aid to human rights, should be subject to human

rights scrutiny by scholars from other societies. American sociologists could

assist scholars from other countries to engage in such a project, by sharing

their methodological skills.

PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY

Burawoy (2005a:20) notes that American sociologists tend to assume that

theirs is a universal sociology, and that it would be wise, instead, to view it

as provincial. McLaughlin, Kowalchuck, and Turcotte, all Canadian schol-

ars, agree with him and point out how Canadian—and other—national

groups of sociologists differ from American (McLaughlin, Kowalchuck, and

Turcotte 2005:147). Nevertheless, from the point of view of human rights,

it is worthwhile to focus on the American public. Americans do not know

their rights under international law: they are especially ignorant of the prin-

ciple of economic rights. Yet indicators of economic rights in the United

States are usually much worse than those of other Western countries, with

Canada closer to the lower U.S. end than to its Western European counter-

parts, for example with regard to public social expenditure as a percentage

of Gross Domestic Product (Organization for Economic Co-operation and

Development 2007:193).

Some obvious differences between the United States and Canada are

that the United States lacks universal health care, with 46.6 million people

without health insurance as of 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2006:22); and

that the United States lacks a policy of universal paid parental leave. U.S.

labor law also provides much poorer protection for workers than does Ca-

nadian (Atleson 2006:137–148). The differences between the United States

and other Western countries regarding economic rights are in part caused

Public Sociology and Universal Human Rights 369

by the strong racial divide in the United States. They are also caused by the

absence of a social democratic or communist presence in the United States,

these two political tendencies having endured severe political repression

throughout U.S. history (Goldstein 1987:430–436).

The United States has ratified the ICCPR. The only other international

human rights treaties it has ratified are the Convention against Torture and

Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Inter-

national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-

tion (CERD); and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

the Crime of Genocide (Weissbrodt 2006:45). It has also ratified, but not

entered into force, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-

crimination against Women (UN 2007). Of particular importance, regard-

ing Burawoy’s Marxist critique of market economies, is the United States’

failure to ratify the ICSECR, although it signed it in 1977.

Burawoy (2005a:7) speaks of there being many different types of pub-

lics, in whose service public sociologists might act. One public in dire need

of information about international human rights is African Americans.

Knowledge both of the international laws that the United States has rati-

fied, and of the many laws it has not, might assist African Americans to

mobilize in defense of their rights. Affected as they are by a racially dif-

ferentiated regime of capital punishment, African Americans might like

to know that the consensus of international law is moving toward capital

punishment’s abolition; for example, the International Criminal Court can-

not impose capital punishment. African Americans might also be interested

to know that the CERD (Article 1, 4) permits special measures such as af-

firmative action, as long as such measures are “not . . . continued after the

objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.” CERD (Article

4, a and b) also outlaws hate speech and organizations that promote racial

hatred, both permitted under U.S. freedom of speech laws (Brownlie and

Goodwin-Gill 2006:338, 339).

African Americans might also be interested in their right to the highest

attainable standard of health care. In 2005, 19.6 percent of African Ameri-

cans were without health insurance (U.S. Census Bureau 2006:21). They

might like to know—as, for that matter, might all other Americans—that

the UDHR (Article 25, 3) mandates special attention to motherhood and

childhood (Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2006:27). African Americans, and

all other Americans, might also like to know that they have a right to decent

housing, to social security, and to work; in short, to those rights that Presi-

dent Roosevelt advocated in his 1944 State of the Union Address.

Such rights are not mere statements of principle: they are often mobiliz-

ing tools. While the Marxism that Burawoy professes has little resonance in

the United States, universal principles of human dignity and human rights,

if made known to the American public, might have far more. But discussion

370 Chapter 20

of international human rights in the United States, with its various pub-

lics, would undoubtedly stir up controversy. Burawoy assumes that public

sociology would be consensual, stating “with public sociology knowledge

is based on consensus between sociologists and their publics” (2005a:16);

thus, there would be no disagreement between public sociologists and the

various publics they serve. Here, he appears to confuse policy and public

sociology. Whether the sociologists in question favor the political right or

the political left, if they assume at the outset that they will have no disagree-

ments with their clients or their publics, they are not doing their jobs as

disinterested professional scholars.

Public stakeholders in sociological research may have different interests

than professional sociologists, and adhere to different analyses of the same

problems, and the former may not like what the latter, as professional

scholars, have to say. In such a case, the sociologist who constrains herself

from stating her own viewpoint, if it differs from that of the stakeholder,

is acting as a policy sociologist, not a public one. Burawoy’s conflation of

Marxist, public, and consensual sociology is a recipe for self-censorship.

Indeed, he seems to recognize this danger himself, noting that “Public so-

ciology . . . can be held hostage to outside forces. In pursuit of popularity

public sociology is tempted to pander to and flatter its publics” (Burawoy

2005a:17).

SOCIOLOGISTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

As I noted above, the United States is a world human rights outlaw. As

Burawoy (2005b:158) states, moreover, the United States uses human

rights rhetoric as a cover for its imperialist interests. The hypocritical use

of human rights language by various American administrations should

not, however, deter sociologists from learning about, and using, interna-

tional human rights law. This law exists independent of the United States.

Members of civil society all over the world refer to it as their law, one that

protects their interests.

Sociologists ought to engage in the analysis, promotion, and protection

of universal human rights. These international principles provide much

room for theoretical, empirical, and socially engaged research. Moreover,

the current preoccupations of human rights researchers intersect nicely with

many sociologists’ interests. Economic rights are a central concern, as are

the emerging human rights obligations of private enterprises. The relation-

ship between market economies, democracy, and human rights is still not

completely understood. The rights of socially marginal groups, especially

children, the disabled, and homosexuals, are still not fully developed or

protected. Social psychologists and theorists can also address the more fun-

Public Sociology and Universal Human Rights 371

damental questions underlying all inquiry about human rights; how and

why do people do each other good rather than harm; what are the limits of

each individual’s sense of community and obligation; is there any way that

public policy can promote altruism (Jeffries 2005)?

Universal human rights provide a standard to which sociologists in

pursuit of a better world can adhere. They permit sociologists to use their

professional tools as a basis for policy advice, and for engagement with the

public. Reflection not only about why universal human rights are not pro-

tected, but also about what ought to be human rights, and what it means

to be human, is fodder for the critical sociologist.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am most grateful to Keith Calow, Gregory Eady, and Anastasi Bakolias for

research assistance, and to Vincent Jeffries and Neil McLaughlin for their

comments on an earlier draft. I thank the Canada Research Chairs program

for the time necessary to write this chapter.

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