Hillstrom K., Hillstrom L.C. Vietnam war. Almanac

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

martial law (meaning that the military

took charge of the nation) and

launched a massive crackdown across

South Vietnam in an effort to stamp

out the Buddhist-led demonstrations

once and for all. Ngo Dinh Nhu’s U.S.-

trained military troops stormed Bud-

dhist temples—known as pagodas—all

across the country. They arrested

approximately 1,400 monks and nuns

in these raids. The attacks were espe-

cially bloody in Hue. About 30 monks

and student followers were shot or

clubbed to death in assaults on Bud-

dhist temples in the ancient city.

Madame Nhu personally observed a

raid on one of the main Buddhist tem-

ples in Saigon. She later called it “the

happiest day of my life.”

But the government crack-

down failed to silence the anti-Diem

protestors. Instead, riots broke out at

several places across the country,

including Saigon University. Diem

promptly closed the university, only to see several Saigon

high schools erupt in riots. Many of these schoolchildren

were the children of important Vietnamese officials and busi-

nessmen. Around this same time, Madame Nhu’s father, Tran

Van Chuong, resigned from his post as ambassador to the

United States. He announced that there was “not one chance

in a hundred for victory” over the Communists with his

daughter, her husband, and brother-in-law in power.

Observers saw these developments as further signs that Diem’s

rule was in grave danger.

Henry Cabot Lodge arrives in Vietnam

In August 1963, the same month that Diem and his rul-

ing family launched their desperate crackdown on the demon-

strators, a new U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam arrived in the

country. Henry Cabot Lodge (1902–1985) replaced Frederick

Nolting, a longtime defender of Diem’s government. After

70 Vietnam War: Almanac

Henry Cabot Lodge served

as the U.S. ambassador

to South Vietnam in the

mid-1960s. During his first

stay in Saigon, Lodge

helped convince the U.S.

government to support the

coup that removed Ngo

Dinh Diem from power.

Reproduced by permission of

the Library of Congress.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 70

reviewing the situation in Saigon, Lodge quickly concluded that

Diem’s regime was doomed. A week after his arrival, he sent

President Kennedy a top-secret message in which he said, “We

are launched on a course from which there is no respectable

turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government. There is

no possibility, in my view, that the war [against the Commu-

nists] can be won under a Diem administration.”

Lodge’s report disturbed Kennedy, who had hoped that

the Diem government could be saved. But other reports con-

firmed Lodge’s view of the situation. The entire length of

The Fall of Diem (1963) 71

As the coup that toppled the Diem

government was launched, President Ngo

Dinh Diem (1901–1963) made a

telephone call to U.S. Ambassador Henry

Cabot Lodge (1902–1985). The transcript

of this last communication makes it clear

that Diem feared for his life. It also shows

that while the United States was willing to

take steps to protect Diem if he promptly

resigned, America would not intervene in

the coup attempt.

Ngo Dinh Diem: Some units have

made a rebellion and I want to know what

is the attitude of the U.S.?

Ambassador Lodge: I do not feel

well enough informed to be able to tell

you. I have heard the shooting, but am not

acquainted with all the facts. Also it is 4:30

a.m. in Washington and the U.S.

Government cannot possibly have a view.

Diem: But you must have some

general ideas. After all, I am a chief of

state. I have tried to do my duty. I want to

do now what duty and good sense require.

I believe in duty above all.

Lodge: You have certainly done

your duty. As I told you only this morning,

I admire your courage and your great

contributions to your country. No one can

take away from you the credit for all you

have done. Now I am worried about your

physical safety. I have a report that those

in charge of the current [coup] activity

offer you and your brother safe conduct

out of the country if you resign. Had you

heard this?

Diem: No. (Diem then pauses

before continuing.) You have my

telephone number.

Lodge: Yes. If I can do anything for

your physical safety, please call me.

Diem: I am trying to re-establish

order.

Diem Makes a Final Appeal for Help from America

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 71

South Vietnam, from its riot-torn cities to its Viet Cong-threat-

ened rural areas, seemed to be on the verge of collapse. Some

intelligence reports even suggested that Diem and his brother

Nhu had entered into secret negotiations with North Vietnam

in an effort to hold on to their positions. Determined to keep

the country out of Communist hands, the Kennedy adminis-

tration began preparing for the end of the Diem regime.

Diem’s last days

In early September 1963, Kennedy publicly expressed

his concerns about events in South Vietnam during an inter-

view with newsman Walter Cronkite. “I don’t think that unless

a greater effort is made by the government to win popular sup-

port that the war can be won out there [in South Vietnam],”

Kennedy said. “In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the

ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can

give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advi-

sors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the

Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I

don’t think that the war can be won unless the people support

the effort and, in my opinion, in the last two months, the gov-

ernment has gotten out of touch with the people.”

Around this same time, a group of South Vietnamese

military officers joined together in a plot to overthrow Diem

and take control of the government. The leaders of this group

were General Duong Van Minh, General Tran Van Don, and

General Le Van Kim. In October, Lodge secretly informed the

officers that the United States would not oppose a change of

leadership of the South Vietnam government. “It seems at least

an even bet that the next government would not bungle and

stumble as much as the present one has,” Lodge told the

Kennedy administration.

After the United States extended its promise not to

interfere in the coup (attempt to overthrow the government),

the generals set their plan in motion. On November 1, 1963,

they used a strong military force to seize control of several

strategically important outposts in Saigon and other areas of

South Vietnam. Initially, Diem and his brother refused to sur-

render. When it became clear that they could not stop the

coup from succeeding, however, the brothers used a secret exit

72 Vietnam War: Almanac

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 72

to escape the presidential palace after dark. But they proved

unable to elude their pursuers, and were captured a few hours

later at a Catholic church in Saigon. A short time later, Duong

Van Minh—also known as “Big Minh”—ordered the execution

of both men and assumed leadership of the country. Madame

Nhu, meanwhile, escaped capture and possible execution only

because she was in the United States at the time of the coup.

President Kennedy was stunned and upset when he

learned of Diem’s murder. He believed that South Vietnam was

better off with new leadership, but he had wanted the South

Vietnamese generals to simply remove Diem from office, not

assassinate him. “It was a shock to all of us,” said General

Maxwell Taylor. “But I think perhaps to the President more

than any of us—because he didn’t realize that we were all play-

ing with fire when we were at least giving tacit [implied or

understood] encouragement to the overthrow of this man.”

Today, the United States’ role in the overthrow of the

Diem government continues to be fiercely debated by govern-

ment officials and historians alike. Some people claim that it

was necessary for the Kennedy administration to withhold

support for Diem during the coup. They insist that the Com-

munists probably would have seized control of South Vietnam

in a matter of months if Diem had remained in power. But

other observers strongly disagree. For example, General

William C. Westmoreland called the U.S. approval for the

overthrow of the Diem government a “grievous mistake.”

Westmoreland, who commanded U.S. military forces in Viet-

nam from 1964 to 1968, claimed that “action morally locked

us in Vietnam. If it had not been for our involvement in the

overthrow of President Diem, we could perhaps have grace-

fully withdrawn our support when South Vietnam’s lack of

unity and leadership became apparent.”

Sources

Halberstam, David. The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during

the Kennedy Era. Rev. ed. New York: Knopf, 1988.

Hammer, Ellen J. Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York:

Dutton, 1987.

Karnow, Stanley. “The Fall of the House of Ngo Dinh.” Saturday Evening

Post (December 21, 1963).

The Fall of Diem (1963) 73

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 73

McMahon, Robert J., ed. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War.

Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1995.

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr. From Trust to Tragedy: The Political Memoirs of Fred-

erick Nolting, Kennedy’s Ambassador to Diem’s Vietnam. New York:

Praeger, 1988.

Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The 25-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam. Lex-

ington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam,

1941–1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam.

New York: Random House, 1988.

Willenson, Kim. The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War. New

York: New American Library, 1987.

74 Vietnam War: Almanac

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 74

n 1964, political chaos continued to grip South Vietnam. The

nation’s efforts to achieve political stability floundered, as

military and civilian leaders battled for power and influence. At

the same time, Communist Viet Cong forces continued to

make gains in the country’s rural areas and expand their oper-

ations in Saigon (the capital of South Vietnam) and other urban

centers. These advances convinced many U.S. officials that the

Communists who ruled North Vietnam were on the verge of

seizing control of the South as well.

In August 1964, a mysterious clash between Commu-

nist and U.S. Navy forces took place in the waters of the Tonkin

Gulf, off the shores of North Vietnam. American President Lyn-

don B. Johnson (1908–1973; president 1963–1969)—who

became president after John F. Kennedy (1917–1963; president

1960–1963) was assassinated in November 1963—took advan-

tage of this controversial event. Seizing on fears of Communist

aggression, Johnson and his administration convinced Con-

gress to approve expanded U.S. military action in Vietnam. The

administration hoped that the warning of military interven-

tion would help South Vietnam halt the Communist threat.

Lyndon Johnson and the

Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964)

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 75

The assassination of Kennedy

On November 22, 1963, U.S. President John F.

Kennedy was assassinated by gunman Lee Harvey Oswald

(1939–1963) while riding in a motorcade in Dallas, Texas. The

murder stunned people all around the world. As Americans

mourned the loss of their president, they also wondered how

the nation’s domestic and foreign policy might change under

Lyndon B. Johnson, who had been Kennedy’s vice president.

According to U.S. law, Johnson immediately became the new

president of the United States when Kennedy was killed.

76 Vietnam War: Almanac

Communism A political system in which

the government controls all resources

and means of producing wealth. By

eliminating private property, this sys-

tem is designed to create an equal soci-

ety with no social classes. However,

Communist governments in practice

often limit personal freedom and rights.

Coup d’etat A sudden, decisive attempt to

overthrow an existing government.

Great Society A set of social programs pro-

posed by U.S. President Lyndon John-

son designed to end segregation and

reduce poverty in the United States.

Military Revolutionary Council A group of

South Vietnamese military officers that

overthrew Vietnamese President Ngo

Dinh Diem and took control of South

Vietnam’s government in 1963.

North Vietnam The Geneva Accords of

1954, which ended the First Indochina

War (1946–54), divided the nation of

Vietnam into two sections. The north-

ern section, which was led by a Com-

munist government under Ho Chi

Minh, was officially known as the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, but

was usually called North Vietnam.

South Vietnam Created under the Geneva

Accords of 1954, the southern section

of Vietnam was known as the Republic

of South Vietnam. It was led by a U.S.-

supported government.

Tonkin Gulf Resolution Passed by Con-

gress after U.S. Navy ships supposedly

came under attack in the Gulf of

Tonkin, this resolution gave U.S. Presi-

dent Lyndon Johnson the authority to

wage war against North Vietnam.

Viet Cong Vietnamese Communist guerrilla

fighters who worked with the North Viet-

namese Army to conquer South Vietnam.

Words to Know

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 76

Upon taking office, President

Johnson (commonly known by his

initials, “LBJ”) ordered an investiga-

tion into rumors that Oswald had

been part of a conspiracy to kill

Kennedy. This investigation, headed

by Chief Justice Earl Warren

(1891–1974), determined that Oswald

had acted by himself. But some people

continued to believe that others had

been involved in the assassination.

As he settled into his new

duties, Johnson promised the Ameri-

can people that he would continue

Kennedy’s policies, which included

providing support for South Vietnam

in its fight against communism. He

even retained most of Kennedy’s staff

and administration as part of an effort

to keep the U.S. government operating

smoothly. The assassination had

shocked and horrified people all across

America, and Johnson wanted to reas-

sure them that the United States and

its democratic institutions remained

strong.

Johnson and the

“Great Society”

As president, Johnson ex-

pressed great interest in correcting

some social problems that persisted

across most of the United States. For

example, he believed that prejudice

against minorities was a major prob-

lem in America. Johnson promised to pass laws to eliminate

segregation and other racist practices that separated minorities

from whites in the nation’s schools, restaurants, businesses,

and other institutions. In addition, Johnson believed that far

too many people were living in poverty in the United States.

Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) 77

People to Know

Barry Goldwater (1909–1998) U.S. sena-

tor from Arizona and Republican pres-

idential candidate in 1964. He sup-

ported increasing U.S. military

involvement in Vietnam during his

campaign; he was defeated by Lyn-

don Johnson.

Lyndon B. Johnson (1908–1973) After

serving as vice president under John

Kennedy, he became the 36th presi-

dent of the United States after

Kennedy was assassinated in 1963.

Johnson sent U.S. combat troops to

Vietnam. Opposition to his policies

convinced him not to seek re-election

in 1968.

John F. Kennedy (1917–1963) Served as

the 35th president of the United

States from 1960 until he was assassi-

nated in 1963.

Robert McNamara (1916–) Served as

U.S. secretary of defense during the

Kennedy and Johnson administra-

tions, 1961–1968. After helping to

shape U.S. policy toward Vietnam, he

privately began to doubt that America

could win the war.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 77

He promised the American public that

he would wage war on poverty by

increasing educational and business

opportunities for poor families.

Johnson proposed to end seg-

regation and reduce poverty through a

set of ambitious government pro-

grams. He claimed that once these pro-

grams were put in place, a “Great Soci-

ety” would develop in the United

States. But soon after taking office,

Johnson recognized that the unsettled

situation in South Vietnam might

endanger his vision for a more prosper-

ous America. He knew that the govern-

ment might not have enough funds to

finance his social programs if the

United States devoted large amounts of

money to the conflict in Vietnam.

During his first months as pres-

ident, however, Johnson refused to

reduce the U.S. military and economic

aid to South Vietnam. Johnson and

most other officials in his administra-

tion feared that if the United States abandoned its position in

Vietnam, the government in Saigon would quickly come

under the control of the North Vietnamese Communists. They

believed that a Communist victory in South Vietnam might

then trigger a wave of Communist aggression all across Asia.

Continued political problems in Saigon

During the winter of 1963–1964, the Johnson admin-

istration’s concerns about the stability of South Vietnam’s gov-

ernment continued to grow. After President Ngo Dinh Diem’s

(1901–1963) regime (government) was overthrown in Novem-

ber 1963, the United States had hoped that it might be

replaced by a more effective government. As the weeks passed,

however, it became clear that South Vietnam’s new military

rulers lacked political experience. These officers—known as

the Military Revolutionary Council—quarreled over how best

78 Vietnam War: Almanac

The Kennedy family at the

funeral of John F. Kennedy,

November 1963.

Reproduced by permission

of Archive Photos.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 78

to lead the country. Many of them used

their power to increase their personal

wealth or plot against their political

enemies.

U.S. advisors tried to convince

the military rulers and community

leaders to work together to address the

country’s social and military problems,

but the bickering continued. This lack

of leadership in Saigon further dam-

aged the morale of South Vietnam’s

long-suffering people. Confused and

bitter, many South Vietnamese became

passive observers in the ongoing strug-

gle between the nation’s military and

the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas

(small groups of fighters who launch

surprise attacks).

In the first weeks of 1964, some

members of the Military Revolutionary

Council suggested that South Vietnam

negotiate an end to the war with the

Communists. The Viet Cong forces

operating in the South openly supported this idea. They pro-

posed that South Vietnam hold free elections that would allow

people to elect a new government of their choosing. But the

United States fiercely opposed this proposal, because they wor-

ried that such an election would install a Communist govern-

ment. U.S. officials also expressed great anger that South Viet-

nam would even consider negotiating with North Vietnam’s

Communist leaders. American intelligence experts and advi-

sors viewed the proposed negotiations as further evidence that

the new government was unfit to lead South Vietnam.

On January 29, 1964, General Nguyen Khanh seized

control of South Vietnam’s government. He pushed the coun-

cil out of power in a bloodless coup (takeover). The United

States reacted cautiously to this latest change in political lead-

ership. After all, American officials did not know whether

Khanh had the ability to hold power or fight the Viet Cong

effectively. But when Khanh indicated that he would rely

heavily on U.S. political and military assistance, the Johnson

Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) 79

As John F. Kennedy’s vice

president, Lyndon B.

Johnson assumed the

presidency after Kennedy

was assassinated in 1963.

Reproduced by permission of

AP/World Wide Photos.

VWAlm 001-090 7/30/03 3:04 PM Page 79