32 Essential Histories • The Wars of the Roses 1455-1487
in changing both king and dynasty. The
Scots occupied Berwick from 1461 to 1483
and crossed the northern frontier
repeatedly in 1461-63 and in 1480-82.
Lesser raids occurred almost annually in
the 1460s and in 1472-74. There were
series of northern rebellions in 1469-71
and in 1486-92. Never before or since has
the kingdom of England seemed more of
an island, exposed to attack anywhere
along 2,000 miles of coast and land frontier
and nowhere more than a day from enemy
bases overseas or from Scotland. Hard
though they tried, no regime was able to
control the sea, although Warwick came
closest in 1459-61, and there were no
successful interceptions of seaborne
attackers throughout the period. Once
ashore, admittedly, small expeditions were
at risk, but they quickly outgrew the forces
available locally. No government could
guard effectively against landings that
could occur anywhere, in Kent or Devon in
1470, in Norfolk and Yorkshire in 1471, in
Essex and Cornwall in 1472-74, or at
Milford in Hampshire or Milford in
Pembrokeshire in 1485. Nor could they
afford to keep their defences alert for
prolonged periods. Often enough,
moreover, such landings were part of multi-
pronged attacks that diverted attention, so
where did the real threat lie?
One difference between the Wars of the
Roses and the periods before and after was
the willingness of foreign powers to dabble
in English affairs and in English politics.
Their actions were self-interested, arising
principally from the rivalry of the great
north European powers of France (and its
Scottish ally) and Burgundy. The Wars of
the Roses were part of the struggle between
France and Burgundy that was fought on
English soil. Merely providing the shipping
enabled Louis XI, Charles the Bold and
Margaret of Burgundy to exploit pre-
existing political divisions within England.
A handful of Burgundian handgunners
in 1461 and a few thousand French (1485)
and German professionals (1487) exerted
disproportionate force against amateur
armies that fell short of continental
standards of equipment, training, and
numbers. Relatively small diplomatic,
financial and military investments paid
foreign powers big dividends, at the very
least preventing effective English
intervention in Europe.
The campaigns themselves were very
short. Aggressors sought first to outgrow
local resistance and to recruit locally, and
secondly to force a battle with the ruling
regime's field army before all those owing
allegiance could join the king. Having
failed to prevent a landing, the
establishment also sought to crush its rivals
before they were too strong. Both sides
always hastened to settle the issue in battle,
so that neither faced the major logistical
problems of accommodating and supplying
armies for months and years in the face of
the enemy in the field. Outside the years
1461-64, when the Lancastrians
maintained their toehold in
Northumberland, there was little
garrisoning or blockading of castles or
towns. Multi-pronged attacks were as much
about distracting defensive efforts as
bringing together all the aggressor's
resources; only four times was such a
combination attempted - in 1455, when it
was successful, in 1459, when it took too
long, and in 1469 and 1470, when the
decisive battle happened first. Inevitably,
therefore, opposing sides joined in battle
before their fullest strength was achieved.
Each preferred known risks to what might
have been, hence there were no semi-
permanent frontiers between rival spheres
of influence, no gains or losses in one
another's territory and no stalemates
between rival front lines. Several times
efforts were made to settle quarrels by
negotiation - in 1455, 1459, 1460, 1470
and 1471 - always by securing the same
concessions as were sought by force, but
agreement was never achieved. It was
unusual for either side to refuse battle,
although the Scots did at Alnwick in 1463
and Warwick did at Coventry in 1471, and
rarer still for such policies to succeed. Four