The 1st Brigade continued to push up the sparsely covered
slopes of Mt. Alifan, climbing in the open under
fire
from
the Japanese positions concealed
by
thick wood on the top. In
support of this direct advance toward the summit of Mt. Alifan, the
305th RCT cut north
to
reach the ridge running northeast from
Alifan and
to
secure the high ground above Road Junction 370.
By
1700 the brigade and the combat team were on their objectives and
had control of more than
3,000 yards of the final beachline.
While the corps troops were
attempting
to
secure their beach-
heads
on
22
July, General Geiger issued an order for the relief
of
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, to enable that unit
to
reorganize
and get into position for the attack on
Orote Peninsula. The de-
fense of the beachhead from Inalas southwest to the coast near
Magpo would be taken over
by
two RCT's of the 77th Division,
including the
305th RCT, which would revert
to
the division when
the relief of the brigade was effected
(Map
No.9,
page 38) . While
the 77th protected the corps' southern flank, the brigade was
to
prepare to capture Orote Peninsula. One RCT of the 77th was
to
remain afloat in corps reserve until ordered
to
land.
The
306th RCT was designated
by
the division to take over the
southern sector held
by
the marine brigade. A party headed
by
Col. Douglas
C.
McNair, Chief of Staff, and including Col. Aubrey
D. Smith of the
306th Infantry and his battalion commanders with
their staffs, went ashore on the 22d
to
reconnoiter the area and
coordinate plans with the brigade. Shortly before noon next day
the
306th began landing
at
Agat.' The 3d Batta
li
on, commanded
by
Lt. Col. Gordon
T.
Kimbrell, reached its position between Mt.
Alifan and Taene, and the 1st and 2d Battalions, under Lt. Col.
Joseph A. Remus and Lt. Col. Charles
F.
Greene, respectively, went
into assembly areas near the beach.
1 The
un
l
oa
ding itself was a difficult operation.
As
a reserve division, the 77th
had
no
LVT's. A
ss
ault divisions normally have two battalions. The
re
were
60
dukws but
th
ese
had
to
he
reserved for cargo
and
to
get the light artillery ashore. Consequently,
plans
had
to
be
made to carry
tr
oo
ps to the reef in landing craft, after which they
would wade ashore
at
low
tid
e carrying alt equipment. Vehicles were
to
be
dragged
from the reef to the beach
by
bulldozers.
The
Divi
sion
G-4,
operating from
an
SC1319
(Submarine Chaser) just o
ff
the reef, was to coordinate all landings. Although the
troops
got
ashore without difficulty, most of the vehicles drowned
out
in the water
between the
reef
and
beach,
and
practically all vehicles' radio sets, even the water-
proofed, were completely ruined.
One medium tank dropped
in
a large pot hole
and
disappeared from sight.
39