Faroqhi S.N. The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839

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that precluded unity of command in the Ottoman military. Harmful in that

sense or in its brutal outcomes, bipolar factionalism focused conﬂict in a

patrimonial polity somewhat as a two-party system does in modern electoral

politics.

While the great households need further research, some stages in their

evolutionare discernible.Withthe end of the princely governoratearound 1600

and the re-concentration of dynastic life in the palace, the inﬂuence accruing

to the sultan mother as the senior member of the dynasty sited many rivalries

in the imperial harem, whence references to the early seventeenth century as

‘the sultanate of women’. By 1656, this pattern had reached exhaustion; and the

sultan mother, Turhan, engineered the appointment of K

opr

uzade Mehmed

Pas¸a as grand vizier with full powers over policy and high appointments,

which the sultans had normally controlled.

A response to crises foreign and

domestic, this was also an attempt to reassert central control by empowering

one household to dominate all others. The K

opr

u family dominated politics

and patronage for ﬁfty years, although sultans periodically vied to reassert

themselves as commanders and heads of the one great household. Patterns of

appointment to high ofﬁce wavered between periods of household dominance

and episodes when appointees were drawn from the palace, military and

central administration.

With the failed second siege of Vienna (1683)and

the territorial losses ratiﬁed at Karlowitz (1699), both the K

opr

us and the

attempts to reassert palace control faltered.

The role of the households grew thereafter. The upper ulema’s aristocrati-

sation exempliﬁed this trend. Eventually, even notables of reaya origin formed

households and acquired high positions. Once governorships had been com-

bined with tax-farms and big provincial tax-farmers began to buy governor-

ships, men of reaya origin began to acquire the elites’ highest titles (bey, pas¸a).

The introduction of life-term tax-farms (malik

ane, 1695) and a 1726 decree,

ending sancakbeyis’ appointment from the centre and providing for provincial

notables’ appointment to those posts, made the local notables into the gov-

ernment’s chief provincial interlocutors.

Within a few decades, some such

57 Findley, Ottoman Civil Ofﬁcialdom,pp.70–80; Avigdor Levy, ‘The Military Policy of Sultan

Mahmud II, 1808–1839’, Ph.D. thesis, Harvard(1968), pp. 411, 473–9, 644–6; JaneHathaway,

A Tale of Two Factions: Myth, Memory, and Identity in Ottoman Egypt and Yemen (Albany,

2003).

58 Peirce, Imperial Harem,pp.255–7.

59 Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion,pp.10, 31, 43–8, 51–6, 82, 87, 90.

60 Inalcik, ‘Centralisation and Decentralisation’, pp. 39–40, 48–52; Khoury, State and Provin-

cial Society,p.43.

61 Tabako

glu, Osmanlı maliyesi,pp.222–6; Khoury, State and Provincial Society,pp.56–7, 123.

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Political culture and the great households

men had become warlords, dominating entire provinces. By 1808, one group

of notables, led by Bayraktar Mustafa Pas¸a, had grown strong enough to stage

a coup, enthrone Mahmud II, and get his reluctant assent to a ‘deed of agree-

ment’ ratifying their powers and implicitly limiting his.

By then, however, a

return towards centralisation had begun.

Back towards centralisation

Reverses such as the Russian war of 1768–74, the loss of the Crimea (1783) and

the French invasion of Egypt (1798) pushed the Ottomans into a new age of

reform. A reassertion of sultanic leadership under Selim III (r. 1789–1807) and

Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) marked its ﬁrst phase. Selim was overthrown in 1807;

but Mahmud II revived his initiatives after destroying the janissaries in 1826.

Their centralising efforts were of a piece and should be considered together.

Ottomans saw military reform as their foremost need. As in other states,

however, a better military required more revenue. Both sultans attempted

improvements in government ﬁnance; and Mahmud’s 1838 attempt to abolish

tax-farming and centralise government ﬁnance, if successful, would have done

more than anything else to provide the material resources for Ottoman revital-

isation. By the 1790s, it was also clear that military and ﬁnancial reform could

not succeed without overhauling and rationalising government completely.

The open-ended way in which Selim III solicited his advisers’ recommenda-

tions beforelaunching his ‘New Order’and the wide range of reforms that were

debated (many more than were implemented) implied a fundamental change

in thinking, replacing deference to custom with planning and systematisation.

The evidence on Selim’s ‘New Order’ reﬂects an emerging Ottoman aware-

ness of the ‘systematising spirit’ for which the European Enlightenment was

known. Selim’s adoption of permanent, reciprocal diplomatic representation

instead of the old temporary embassies exempliﬁes the range of his reforms.

His ambassadors’ reports also convey vast information about contemporary

Europe and, in notable cases, advocate the reformist agenda in terms that

merge Ottoman and Enlightenment ideas.

More than the military and ﬁscal

62 Bernard Lewis, ‘Dustur’, EI 2,pp.640–1. 63 Levy, ‘Military Policy’, pp. 27–171.

64 Findley, ‘Ebu Bekir Ratib’s Vienna Embassy Narrative’, 41–80; Carter Vaughn Findley,

‘Mouradgea d’Ohsson and his Tableau g

eral de l’Empire othoman: Redeﬁning the Self by

Deﬁning the Other’, in Making Sense of Global History: The Nineteenth International Congress

of the Historical Sciences, Oslo 2000, Commemorative Volume, ed. Sølvi Sogner (Oslo, 2001),

pp. 169–88.

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carter vaughn findley

reforms, this change in thought signiﬁes the growing Ottoman engagement

with modernity.

After Selim’s fall, Mahmud had to wait for years before he could revive the

reformist agenda. By 1820, he had regained control over much of Anatolia

and the lower Balkans. Provincial support had shifted in some places from the

warlords towards a revitalised sultanate implementing a ‘politics of notables’,

in which cooperative local notables retained major roles.

The Greek Revo-

lution of the 1820s and the Egyptian crises of the 1830s left no doubt about the

need for decisive action from the top. Mahmud responded by founding both

a new army and a new civil ofﬁcialdom. He established schools to train new

elites; resumed diplomatic representation abroad; reorganised the central gov-

ernment into ministries; standardised the tables of military, civil and religious

ranks; abandoned the system of annual appointments; introduced salaries; and

abolished some of the disabilities of ofﬁcial slavery. The last measure followed

the upheaval caused by the fall of Pertev Pas¸a (1837), whose prot

es would

become the leading statesmen of the next period. Proclaimed shortly after

Mahmud’s death, the G

ulhane Decree (1839), critical in improving ofﬁcials’

lot, extended its guarantees of rights and due process not just to the elites but

equally to the subjects. An autocratic centraliser, Mahmud even abolished the

grand vizierate (1838) and divided its functions, a short-lived change reversed

after his death.

The age of the households had ended. A new age had begun, characterised

by strong sultans during some reigns and consistently by new elites, civil

and military. Ironically, despite Selim and Mahmud’s desire to replace the

households with better-educated elites loyal to the sultan, some of these elites

would shift their loyalty to an abstract ideal of the state instead.

In time, the

constitutionalist opposition to centralising authoritarianism would emerge

from their midst.

65 Avigdor Levy, ‘Mahmud II’, EI 2, vol. VI, p. 58; Khoury, State and Provincial Society,pp.166–

78; Yuzo Nagata, Tarihte

anlar, Karaosmano

gullar

uzerinde bir ınceleme (Ankara, 1997),

pp. 23, 52–8, 193; Albert Hourani, ‘Albert Hourani and the Politics of Notables’, in The

Modern Middle East, ed. Albert Hourani et al. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), pp. 83–109.

66 G

oc¸ek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie,pp.45, 67.

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Introduction

Writing the history of Ottoman warfare and diplomacy from 1603 to 1838

is charting much unknown territory, and combating long-held assumptions

about Ottoman obscurantism, paralysis and obstinacy in the face of defeat,

shrinking borders and European incursion. In many ways, the era can be

characterised by a slow, imperceptible tilting towards European-style diplo-

macy, as Ottoman bureaucrats came to terms with ﬁxed borders and the

potential power and sometimes debilitating limitations of negotiations, what

J. C. Hurewitz long ago called ‘the Europeanization of Ottoman diplomacy’.

The eighteenth century, in particular, saw a hundredfold increase in the use

of diplomatic initiatives, including the sending of special envoys to Europe,

increasing emphasis on foreign affairs in the bureaucracy, establishing perma-

nent embassies in Europe in the latter part of the period under study, and the

sometimes adroit, sometimes maladroit manipulation of the large and unruly

European diplomatic community in Istanbul.

Ottoman warfare is not as easy to characterise, as studies of so many of

the major campaigns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and of the

1800s as well, for that matter) have yet to be undertaken from the Ottoman

point of view, a striking lacuna for an empire whose single raison d’

etre is

almost invariably described in military terms. Much of the debate on military

reform, or lack of it, in the Ottoman context has been inﬂuenced by western

European historiography, which pits rational and progressive against religious

and regressive societies, accounting for the spectacular success of the West

and, by-the-by, for the failure of the Ottomans to make the transition to a

modern-stylearmy. Legitimate attempts to reframe that picturein recentyears,

European or otherwise, have been hampered by a singular lack of interest in the

1 J. C. Hurewitz, ‘Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: The Conversion from Unilat-

eralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century’, Belleten 25 (1961), 455–66.

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virginia aksan

history of warfare in the late Ottoman Empire within the ﬁeld itself, with some

notable exceptions.

Thus the chance to discuss a two-hundred-year sweep of

the empire in terms of the intricate interdependence of warfare, diplomacy

and the economy, as well as the impact of these factors on Ottoman society

and legitimacy, comes at an opportune moment.

In very general terms from a military point of view, the seventeenth cen-

tury represented the eclipse of the ﬁef-based (timariot) provincial military, and

the complete desuetude of the devs¸irme levies of tributary children, while

the eighteenth century accelerated alternative systems, from militias to state-

contracted and ﬁnanced regiments, predecessors to Selim III’s (r. 1789–1807)

Nizam-ı Cedid, or ‘New Order’ army. As it became necessary to count on

the countryside for men and supplies there was a realignment of ruler and

ruled. In turn this change created opportunities for aggrandisement and the

consolidation of power which, similarly to European developments from 1660

to 1760, characterised these 200 years of the empire’s history.

In this chapter three main areas will be emphasised: changing techniques,

primarily of continental warfare in a comparative context, including a descrip-

tion of the campaigns which serve as signposts in that regard; concepts and

tools of diplomacy, highlighting signiﬁcant treaties,and alterations to Ottoman

diplomatic strategy; and ﬁnally, the political and social effects of military

defeat, which by the end of the period under discussion were profound enough

to encourage nineteenth-century reformers to reconstruct the empire along

western European absolutist lines.

Changing techniques of warfare

Between 1650 and 1800, European warfare altered in ways that are still the sub-

ject of debate, but which seem to have radically changed the face of war as well

as the government organisation and ﬁnancing required to maintain a continual

2 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990 (Oxford, 1990); David

B. Ralston, Importing the European Army (Chicago, 1990); Jeremy Black, European Warfare

1 660–1815 (London, 1994); Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern

Wo r l d (Berkeley, 1991) all include the Ottomans and comment on the paucity of stud-

ies. Notable exceptions include, for the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, the work of

the Hungarian scholars Gyula K

aldy-Nagy, G

eza D

avid and G

abor

Agoston. See also

Palmira Brummett on the representations of warfare; Caroline Finkel’s study of the

Long War (1593–1606); Mark Stein on seventeenth-century fortresses; Rhoads Murphey

on the Baghdad campaign (1638/9) and on warfare 1500–1700;

Onder K

uc¸

ukerman on

military manufacturing, and Virginia Aksan on the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–74 (see

bibliography).

3 Goldstone, Revolution,pp.3–4.

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War and peace

cycle of violence and control over local populations. The war and state forma-

tion arguments effectively asserted by Charles Tilly, Brian Downing, William

McNeill and Jeremy Black have considerably enriched the earlier, but equally

enlightening, ‘militaryrevolution’ debates of Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker

and their critics. Succinctly put, the ideas relevant to this context include the

fundamental contribution of warfare to modern state formation, in a cycle of

indebtedness and growth of bureaucracies forcing the rationalisation of the

military systems as well as the credit required to maintain them.

By ‘military

systems’ is meant mobilisation and supply as well as the technology of warfare,

the latter in earlier decades of the debate the primary indicators of military

reform. Examples might include the introduction of small ﬁrearms, or the

evolution and inﬂuence of mobile, lightweight ﬁeld artillery. Additionally, the

transition to modern armies requiredstructural and behavioural changes, such

as convincing well-organised and disciplined soldiers to stand fast in opposing

ranks and open ﬁre at one another, not breaking ranks in spite of friends and

comrades falling all around.

More generally, the period under discussion saw

the move away from a plethora of autonomous militias to a (national) standing

army, and the introduction of command-and-supply structures, as regimental

and contractual logistics were replaced by the military bureaucracy of the

state: in sum, a gradual monopolisation of the control over violence.

The same theoreticians of territorial warfare delineate a separate trajectory

for naval empires – namely, Britain, France and the Netherlands in the period

under discussion. Certainly the requirements of naval warfare and supply are

worthy of that kind of distinction, while the end result tended towards the

monopolisation of violence on the oceans of the world. However, this analysis

remains incomplete if the Ottomans, who struggled to maintain both an army

and navy with predictable effects on state budgets, are not taken into account.

Historiographically speaking, the Ottomans have never been allowed a naval

‘policy’, restricted as their naval endeavours were to the Mediterranean littoral.

The long debilitatingengagement around the island of Crete, from 1645 to 1669,

as part of the Venetian–Ottoman war, strains all credibility about the lack of

policy on the Ottoman side. But this spate of naval warfare does indeed point

to the technical and strategic impasses of the period, and also to the eclipse of

4 Brian Downing, The Military Evolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autoc-

racy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1992); Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution,

1560–1 660 (Belfast, 1956); Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and

the Rise of the West, 1500–1800, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1996); Tilly, Coercion, Black, European

Warfare.

5 William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, 1982), p. 133.

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both Venetians and Ottomans as substantial naval powers.

Ottoman attitudes

to the navy certainly included the protection of harbours and the freedom to

transport supplies; after all, feeding the armies on the battlefront and the

population of Istanbul had absolute priority in Ottoman political and strategic

thinking. Similar considerations were paramount in the maintenance of the

Black Sea and Danubian ﬂeets. For these purposes contractual and client

relationships with local power-holders were often utilised, although in the

late eighteenth century signiﬁcant naval reforms became a concern of the

bureaucracy, as exempliﬁed in the lengthy and very colourful career of Admiral

Gazi Hasan Pas¸a.

In the war and society debate just sketched, the Thirty Years War (1618–48)

and the Napoleonic wars act as beginning and end of a particular kind of

warfare which led to an impasse in all military systems of Europe just prior to

the French innovations by which the state-under-arms became a reality. Siege

warfare had proved its ineffectiveness, as soon as fortress construction and

the ﬁre-power of cannon reached an equilibrium. The ability to sustain long

campaigns, and feed and care for upwards of 100,000 men, their equipment

and transportation, had reached a breaking-point. Massive open confronta-

tions, while effective in the ﬂush of victory, were proving less so in inﬂuencing

diplomatic policy at the negotiating table, although standard military histo-

riography once masked the long-term effects of the spectacular successes of

Frederick the Great. The impact of that kind of warfare on the populace at

large was reﬂected in rebellions and desertions of villages, and often also in

resistance to taxation and billeting. This unrest, as well as the responses of the

elite groups – central and provincial – to the opportunities represented by the

upheavals of constant warfare, are two points of comparison that also work

well in the Ottoman context.

The Ottomans and the ‘military revolution’ debate

Due to the relative lack of monographs the Ottoman Empire has for the

most part been excluded from modern war and society debates. But this gap

is also due to the fact that historians have assumed the sultanate to have

been incapable of keeping pace with the technicalism and functionality of the

6 For more information on the debate about the Ottomans and the Mediterranean, see

works by Palmira Brummett, Andrew Hess, Salih

Ozbaran and Kenneth Setton in the

bibliography; see also

Idris Bostan, who has written on the imperial naval dockyards of

the seventeenth century and on the Ottoman navy in general.

Ismail Hakkı Uzunc¸ars¸ılı, ‘Sadrazam Halil H

amid Pas¸a’, T

urkiyat Mecmuası 5 (1935), 213–

67, and Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire Under Sultan Selim III,

1789–1807 (Cambridge, MA, 1971).

War and peace

developing state system in Europe. Similarly, an assumption about a cultural

divide has long hampered a recognition that warfare is a great leveller of social

behaviour, even though local cultures of course contribute powerfully to the

organisation of – and negotiation around – the military ethos of any particular

society.

John Keegan’s History of Warfare, for example, argues strenuously

for two styles of warfare, Eastern and Western, relegating the Ottomans once

more to their tents in Istanbul, indolently allowing the centuries to roll by.

The

issue of culture and military reform has been more intelligently approached in

David Ralston’s Importing the European Army, which suggests that the ﬁrst stage

of reform involved the assumption by local elites that imitating the technology

of the victorious enemy was the key to success on the battleﬁeld, without the

recognition that a cultural revolution was also required to create the well-

organised and disciplined troops of the new armies of Europe. The complete

rationalisation of military planning is as closely tied to the secularisation of

society as it is to the control of state ﬁnances.

In that context, a comparison between the two massive territorial empires

of the period, Russian and Ottoman, is revealing.Similar environments, similar

battlefronts, similar populations led to different and – in the Ottoman case,

devastating – results. In both cases it is possible to analyse the economic strains

imposed by warfare on large, agrarian societies, as well as the new centre–

periphery alliances that emerged, a road to the centralised, Europeanised

absolutist state of the latter-day Ottoman experience. Even though we still

lack detailed knowledge of the Ottoman context, it is possible to examine the

difﬁculties of and developments in military organisation with respect to the

battleﬁeld environments of the 1603–1838 period.

The arena of warfare, 1603–1838

It has often been claimed that the Ottomans were a one-front army with a

two-front empire. In the period under discussion, they did indeed have two

regularbattlefronts, with a third being added by 1800, butthat did not mean that

mobilisation could not occur on other fronts, although absorption on one front

could often lead to the neglect of another (and respite for local populations).

Multiple theatres of war also account for the increasing Ottoman systematic

reliance on and tolerance of semi-independent provincial lords, who managed

such territories in the name of the sultan.

8 John Guilmartin, ‘Ideology and Conﬂict: The Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453–1606’,

Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988), 746.

9 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, 1993), pp. 39 and 182.

virginia aksan

The ﬁrst and most often visited arena was and remained the Danubian

battlefront, as to the chief enemies initially they were Venetian and Austrian.

By 1699 the relevant borders, with some minor give and take, were essentially

ﬁxed. Latterly, the loci of major campaigns against the chief enemy of the

later 1700s and early 1800s, the Russians, became the mouth of the Danube

and the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Danube and its tributaries

deserve a monograph in and of themselves as the primal determinants of all

warfare in the area. Moving troops across the vast expanses of this region

was a constant preoccupation, where disease-inducing marshes and ﬂoods

decimated troops and animals alike.

Major Ottoman military disasters of

the period invariably included scenes of soldiers drowning in one river or

another as they tried to escape a surprise attack by the enemy. The Ottomans

were always adept at siege warfare, and remained so in this period. Once the

Danube region had come to serve as the primary Ottoman border after 1700

its fortress system became the focus of siege warfare between the sultans and

their enemies. Russian and Austrian military corridors and fortress systems

were likewise developed in the period under discussion.

Once the Ottomans

were forced to establish military headquarters on their own territory, south of

the Danube, they experienced the lack of supplies and the resistance of hostile

populations that characterised much of the campaigning of the eighteenth

century. Quartering troops on home territory was a situation strenuously

avoided by European commanders.

Distance to the front was another factor which inﬂuenced campaigning in

both the Danubian arena and on the eastern frontiers, the second of the regions

in which the Ottomans were forced to ﬁght in the period under discussion.

The Russians too were constantly plagued by the great difﬁculties of distance,

and losses of 25 or even 50 per cent of all soldiers were not uncommon.

The enemy in the east was ﬁrst the Safavids, Shiite Muslims, and then Nadir

Shah, the Afghan leader who conquered Iran after the fall of the Safavid

dynasty, followed by the Russians in the later period. Here the terrain was

far more inhospitable than even the Danubian arena, parts of which after all

10 John Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 1608–1730: Life and Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier

and Virtuoso (New Haven, 1994); Charles King, The Black Sea: A History (Oxford, 2004).

11 Carol Belkin Stevens, Soldiers on the Steppe: Army Reform and Social Change in Early Modern

Russia (Dekalb, 1995); Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia 1740–1881:

A Study of an Imperial Institution (Chicago, 1966); Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe

Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Bloomington, 2002).

12 This includes plague, famine and desertion. John L. H. Keep’s Soldiers of the Tsar: Army

and Society in Russia 1462–1974(Oxford, 1985) has no equivalent in the Ottoman context;

no reliable statistics have yet been established.

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served as the Ottoman bread basket. Nomadism played a signiﬁcant role in the

eastern context, as Tatar, Cossack and Kurdish bands all necessitated different

techniques of warfare, where horse and cold steel were more effective than

the sustained siege. Even Selim I (r. 1512–20) had had trouble convincing his

troops of the need for wintering over at such distances, the janissaries proving

unhappy with ﬁghting fellow Muslims and with the prevailing style of slash-

and-burn warfare, which inevitably crippled the supply systems. Logistics in

this arena were paramount, and account for success in the mid-seventeenth-

century retaking of Baghdad.

A third frontier,at the veryend of the period under discussion, wasEgypt and

the Hijaz. Here Muhammad Ali’s threat, growing out of the French invasion of

1798,forcedmajor reconsideration of theentire military and diplomatic system.

Nomadism in the Hijaz potentially interfered with the lucrative caravan and

pilgrimage trade, and initially the relationship between Muhammad Ali

and Istanbul was positively affected by his ability to quell the Wahhabi rebellion

and protect both the access of pilgrims to the holy cities and the transit trade.

Egypt had long played the role of client, supplying troops to Ottoman cam-

paigns elsewhere, and responsible for providing most of the annual subsidies

accorded by Istanbul to Mecca.

By the end of our period, with the virtual

independence of Muhammad Ali, Greater Syria and Palestine had become

a buffer zone; until 1918 this became a place to play out both the internal

and external challenges to the Ottomans, with a predictable impact on local

populations and resources.

Ottoman military, circa 1600

The wonder remains that the Ottomans survived the assaults on the territory

and hegemony of their empire at all. While it is easy enough to argue that they

were never in fact hegemonic in the period under study, operating as they did

with a considerable network of clienteles and vassals, it is nevertheless impos-

sible to write them off as an ‘arrested civilization’, as Toynbee would have

it.

The answer lies to some degree in the Ottoman success at allowing for,

13 Rudi Mathee, ‘Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid

Iran’, in Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed. Charles Melville

(London, 1996), pp. 389–416. Rhoads Murphey’s telling of the 1639 Baghdad campaign is

unparalleled: ‘The Functioning of the Ottoman Army under Murad IV (1623–1639/1032–

1049): Key to Understanding of the Relationship Between Center and Periphery’, Ph.D.

thesis, University of Chicago (1979).

14 Jane Hathaway, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazda

glıs

(Cambridge, 1997); Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans,

1517–1683 (London, 1994).

15 Arnold Toynbee,A Studyof History,abridged by D. C.Somervell (London, 1946), pp. 171–8.