Duffy Christopher. Red Storm On The Reich (ENG)

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roads were broken up and men were ripped apart' (Haupt,

1968, 283-84).

The first Russian troops moved forward at 0500. They came

not as a great wave, but in swarms of 'forward battalions'—

miniature combat teams which overwhelmed the outermost

German trenches and explored to a depth of some six hundred

metres to the rear, which was far enough to enable the Soviets

to pinpoint the major strongpoints which still survived between

the first and second trench systems.

The weight and ferocity of the first attack shook the Germans

so badly that they thought they were dealing with the main

assault, and not just a reconnaissance in force. They were un-

prepared for the principal attack, which had unsuspected hor-

rors in store. At 1000 the Russian artillery received the order

to open fire once more:

The recent silence gave way to a general thundering, boom-

ing, crackling and whistling. Shells and mortar bombs fell on

an area tens of kilometres wide and deep, from where there

arose plumes of smoke, fire and dust compounded with

snow. The ground quivered, and the very earth of the bat-

tlefield was blackened. (Lelyushenko, 1970, 275)

For the next 107 minutes the bombardment worked up and

down the full depth of the defences, and 'the detonations of

drum fire threw up mighty clouds of black explosive smoke

and brown dust. They blended with the enemy [Soviet] smoke-

screen to form a layer which extended to a depth of ten kilo-

metres over the battlefield' (Ahlfen, 1977, 47). Under the weight

of these terrible blows the headquarters of the Fourth Panzer

Army was destroyed, and the Germans lost about two-thirds

of their artillery and one-quarter of their personnel. The sur-

viving troops were ashen-faced and trembling, and for almost

the first and last time in that war the Soviets saw Germans

running from their positions in panic.

The main force of Russian infantry attacked late in the morn-

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY

ing, exploiting along 150-metre-wide lanes of ground which

had been left deliberately untouched by the shellfire. Specially

assigned tanks and assault guns acted in immediate cooperation

with the foot soldiers, but the Russians still had to commit their

two tank armies and three separate tank corps, which formed

an armoured fleet of more than two thousand tanks and mo-

torised guns. On the right centre the snow-plastered tanks of

the Fourth Army were scarcely visible against the landscape

when they moved off at 1400. They were in action an hour later,

and by 1700 they had advanced up to twenty kilometres and

were beginning to swing north-west behind the defended ur-

ban area of Kielce. The matching formation on the left centre

was Rybalko's Third Guards Tank Army, which accomplished

another breakthrough and joined the action which was devel-

oping against the armoured reserves of the Fourth Panzer

Army.

The reserves in question were the two armoured formations

of General Walther Nehring's XXIV Panzer Corps, standing

side by side in the path of the Russian tank armies, namely the

16th Panzer Division in the north and the 17th Panzer Division

in the south. Forces of this kind are supposed to hold them-

selves out of reach of an initial enemy attack, so as to preserve

the freedom to deliver counterstrokes, preferably into the flanks

of the advancing hostile forces. In the event, the restraining

orders imposed by Hitler kept the Panzers immobilised closely

behind the 'tactical zone of defence,' where many of their units

were caught by the second Russian bombardment. The damage

to command posts and radio communications was particularly

disruptive, and General Nehring had to wait impatiently while

the appalling noise of the Soviet attack crept around his south-

ern flank.

Nehring gained clearance to commit the XXIV Panzer Corps

only in the late afternoon, and then only in the form of an order

to close up to the 'cornerstone of Kielce' on his northern flank.

By the time radio communication was established with the

headquarters of both Panzer divisions, the Soviet armoured

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columns were cruising almost unchecked through or past the

assembly areas of the German tank forces. One fine battalion

of Tiger tanks was caught in the open while refuelling, and it

was completely annihilated. The remaining German forces

straggled north-west towards the appointed rallying area of

Kielce in disconnected fragments. The 17th Panzer Division had

the furthest to go, and in the course of the night and the fol-

lowing day, its headquarters was destroyed and the divisional

commander, Colonel Brux, was wounded and captured.

Colonel-General Josef Harpe lost contact altogether with the

right flank of the Fourth Panzer Army, where the LXVIII Panzer

Corps was disintegrating in the face of the forces which erupted

from the southern sector of the Sandomierz bridgehead. This

corps, in spite of its designation, did not have any full Panzer

divisions under its command, and lacked even the theoretical

counterpunch that was available to Nehring in the north.

On 13 January, the second day of the offensive, the Russians

burst right through the German rearward positions and ad-

vanced to depths of between twenty-five and forty kilometres

along a total frontage of sixty kilometres. On the fourteenth the

Russians made passages across the Nida River for most of its

length, and they girded their loins for the pursuit.

The Fourth Panzer Army meanwhile passed out of existence

as a recognisable entity. On the southern flank the LXVIII Pan-

zer Corps disappeared from the maps (its cadre was eventually

assigned to the Seventeenth Army). In the centre the remnants

of the infantry divisions of the XXIV Panzer Corps fell back in

the general direction of Kielce, screened by the survivors of the

16th and 17th Panzer divisions, which were engaged in bitter

battles with the Soviet armour. Nehring was unable to re-es-

tablish radio contact with his superiors, though his upbringing

(he was a West Prussian) and his instincts told him to take his

men along the roads which led north. He delayed his departure

out of a sense of obligation to his left-hand neighbour, General

Hermann Recknagel's LXII Corps, which had been standing on

the north flank of the Russian bridgehead and was now in

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY

3. Breakthrough on the Vistula, 12-18 January 1945

danger of being pressed against the Vistula. Recknagel's troops

abandoned their heavy equipment and reached Nehring's

forces on foot in the course of 18 January. The mixed command

is known in history as Nehring's 'roving cauldron,' and its

odyssey now began (see p. 81).

Zhukov and the 1st Belorussian Front

What had already happened to the Germans was assuming the

dimensions of a catastrophe, for Army Group A had lost one

of its three component armies (the Fourth Panzer) and the So-

viets had blasted a clear breach through the line in Poland. On

14 January, two days after the beginning of the offensive in the

south, Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front opened its great

assault from the Pulawy and Magnuszew bridgeheads.

Ready to meet the Russians was the Ninth Army. This was

one of the most proud and battleworthy formations of the

Wehrmacht. Its commander, General Freiherr Smilo von Lütt-

witz stood in line of succession with the celebrated generals

Walter Model and Fedor von Bock, and he cultivated a repu-

tation of leading his troops from the front. The Germans were

on a high state of alert after what had happened to the Fourth

Panzer Army, and their two Panzer divisions (the 19th and the

25th) were ready to be committed from operational reserve at

short notice. None of this was going to prove of much avail

against the weight of the Russian onslaught.

Zhukov had deployed two rifle armies and two tank corps

in the little Pulawy bridgehead on his left flank. The German

defences on this sector were shallow but very tough, and the

Russians designed an appropriate response—a single and con-

centrated bombardment of two hours' duration, followed by

attacks of the armoured and rifle forces in rapid succession.

The Russian troops in the Pulawy bridgehead spent a cold,

sleepless night, then at 0830 on 14 January the artillery opened

its bombardment and 'for kilometres on end the earth groaned

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY

and trembled under a veil of smoke. The discharges and the

bursting of the shells merged in a continuous thunder' (Yu-

shchuk, 1962, 107). As soon as the cannonade had ceased, the

Russians attacked on a frontage of thirteen kilometres. Already

on the first day the Thirty-Third and Sixty-Ninth Armies fought

their way to a depth of twenty kilometres, and the two tank

corps began to exploit very briskly indeed in the direction of

Radom, which was an important road and rail junction and the

main supply base of the German Ninth Army.

The attack from the Pulawy bridgehead had been timed to

the second with the opening of the larger offensive on the right

from the Magnuszew bridgehead, which involved three all-

arms armies and two full tank armies. General Bezarin's Fifth

Shock Army was poised to strike from the centre of the bridge-

head, and the staff had been unable to sleep:

Those final hours before the attack were wearisome and

anxious. Everything seemed to have been prepared, calcu-

lated and checked, and yet we were uneasy in ourselves. Our

eyes were drawn involuntarily to the map, which was

streaked with arrows, and crossed by the dark blue markings

which indicated the enemy defensive positions—and there

were seven of them between the Vistula and the Oder. . . .

It is easy to imagine the feelings of General Nikolai Erastovich

Bezarin, and in fact he kept consulting the time and smoking

cigarettes. . . . The dawn was approaching, but the dense

fog had not dispersed. (Bokov, 1979, 52)

Bezarin had been counting on heavy air support, and he knew

now that it would not be forthcoming. The tension was broken

when Zhukov arrived at the observation post to learn the state

of the army. He was pleased by what he heard, and he re-

marked that he had a 200 per cent guarantee of success.

Many of the Russian aircraft were indeed grounded by the

fog, but the targets for the artillery had already been registered,

and at 0825 the gunners received the order to load. The 'Ready'

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followed four minutes later, and at 0830 the bombardment be-

gan. The artillery strike was short (twenty-five minutes on most

sectors) but very intense, and it ranged up to seven kilometres

deep. Assault engineers and mine-clearing tanks worked in

close cooperation to clear eight hundred passages through the

enemy minefields. This systematic and dangerous work per-

mitted 'forward battalions' to pass through to attack the first

German trenches, which in turn opened the way for the assault

of the main rifle forces. No second bombardment proved nec-

essary.

In general terms, therefore, Zhukov had adopted the same

tactics as Konev, but once the attack had fairly begun he was

content to let his rifle forces and close-support tanks gnaw their

way through the depth of the German defences before he com-

mitted his two tank armies. The commanders of the tank forces

were straining at the leash. General M. E. Katukov of the First

Guards Tank Army was waiting in enforced idleness at the

tactical headquarters of Colonel-General Chuikov, whose

Eighth Guards Army was clearing the way for him: 'Chuikov

was hurling short phrases down the telephone, though I could

not distinguish what he was saying on account of the din.

Outside, a scattering of infantry showed black against the white

landscape. Otherwise Chuikov could scarcely bear to put down

his binoculars, for he knew that his most decisive minutes were

approaching' (Katukov, 1976, 346).

Just to the north the Fifth Shock Army was performing the

same service for the Second Guards Tank Army. The rifle forces

were crossing the Pilica River at a number of places—it was a

perilous business, for the thin covering of ice was pockmarked

with German shell holes, and broken in places by stretches of

fast-flowing and murky water. Artillery fire was still raining

down on the passages when one of the divisional commanders,

Colonel Antonov, reached the river during the night:

We deployed in a chain and began to cross the ice. We

had almost reached the opposite bank when shell fire burst

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY

near us. The ice split and a large lump struck me on the head.

I fell into the water, but the cold brought me to my senses.

Captain Konozobko hastened up, and with his help I was

retrieved from the water and brought to the bank. (Antonov,

1975, 218)

The German mobile reserves fared just as badly as their coun-

terparts which had confronted Konev two days before. On the

face of it the Germans should have done much better, for the

relevant formations, the 19th and 25th Panzer Divisions (see p.

72) received clearance for the counterattack as early as 0745 on

the fourteenth, and they crossed their start lines at 1030. The

Germans were undeniably quick on their feet, but they squan-

dered this single advantage by launching separate counter-

strokes on divergent axes—the 19th Panzer Division against

the Sixty-Ninth Army (from the Pulawy bridgehead) and the

Eighth Guards Army, and the 25th against the Fifth Shock Army.

On 15 January Zhukov's all-arms armies broke through the

rearward positions of the 'tactical zone of defence' against

heavy local counterattacks. Keeping up the impetus of the very

rapid advance from the Pulawy bridgehead, the Sixty-Ninth

Army covered fifty kilometres and burst into the city of Radom.

The nearest formation from the Magnuszew bridgehead was

Chuikov's Eighth Guards Army, which opened a formal attack

at 0900 in the direction of the railway leading north from Radom

to Warka on the lower Pilica. Chuikov was present in person

when the Russians smashed across the tracks at sunset with

the support of a full brigade of thirty-six Katyusha multiple

rocket launchers.

Northwards again the Fifth Shock Army had to contend with

German counterattacks against its bridgeheads across the lower

Pilica. Colonel Antonov had recovered from his ducking, and

he was up with his division south-west of Warka:

The morning was grey and misty. Under its white snowy

mantle the valley stretched below the hill where we stood

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. . . very close to its foot companies of riflemen were digging

trenches and preparing pits and foxholes. The artillerymen

and the detachments of the assault guns were setting out

their pieces. On all sides we were making ready for action.

Colonel Kazantzev led me to the binocular mount. Looking

through the lenses, you could see that enemy columns were

moving through the little woods which were scattered be-

tween the heights and the valley. They were in the process

of deploying into lines, and their tanks were moving at full

speed and outstripping the infantry.

Antonov alerted his regiments by radio and field telephone,

and for a little while yet the silence was undisturbed:

A first thunder-like sound carried through the morning

air—this was a salvo from the divisional artillery group. Al-

most simultaneously the German heavy artillery opened fire

from the direction of Warka against our positions. The

ground shivered from the exploding shells and the tracks of

the approaching tanks as they rumbled forward. The air was

filled with a curious tinkling noise. Disregarding the losses

from our artillery barrage, the German tanks, carriers and

dismounted infantry pressed on at speed and opened a com-

bined armoured and infantry attack which lasted for several

minutes. At that juncture there crashed out the salvoes from

Kovalevskii's artillery division, the self-propelled divisional

artillery and all the pieces which were deployed in the direct

fire role. The rifle battalions simultaneously opened fire with

all the weapons at their disposal. Plumes of black smoke now

arose from knocked-out German tanks, and their infantry

hugged the ground as protection against our shells and mor-

tar bombs.

By noon no less than five counterattacks had been beaten off

and 'the cannonade thundered on without pause. In the morn-

ing, the valleys, hills and clearings had been covered with pure

CHRISTOPHER DUFFY

white snow, but now everything was blackened' (Antonov,

1975, 219-21, 223). A sixth and final counterattack was repulsed

early in the afternoon.

Finally, even the demanding Zhukov was satisfied with the

progress of the rifle formations—they had broken through the

tactical zone of defence and beaten off all the counterattacks

against their gains on the far side. On his left centre the First

Guards Tank Army had been condemned to hours of frustrating

inaction. At last a field telephone shrilled, and General Katukov

received from Zhukov the simple message: 'Get the ball rolling!'

This was the agreed signal to commit his armoured fleet to the

breakthrough.

The First Guards Tank Army now roared through the sector

of Chuikov's Eighth Guards Army to deliver its blow in the

direction of Lodz and Posen. In the lead was the 44th Guards

Tank Brigade under the dashing Colonel 1.1. Gusakovskii, who

had the task of gaining a bridgehead on the far side of the Pilica

before the Germans could turn it into a defensive line. He

reached the river on the night of 15-16 January, and sent his

mechanised infantry over the ice on foot. It was imperative to

get tanks and assault guns across to lend immediate support,

but the cover proved to be too thin to bear these heavy ma-

chines. The engineers found a solution by discovering a ford,

and they blew a lane through the ice for the vehicles. Twenty

tanks and six assault guns drove into the black water, which

surged up to (and sometimes over) the exhausts, and piled frag-

ments of ice high against the turrets of the tanks. Six of the

tanks and two of the assault guns were abandoned in the river

(to be fished out later), but the rest struggled across and gave

Gusakovskii some desperately needed firepower.

The remainder of the parent XI Guards Tank Corps arrived

on the scene, together with a sixty-ton tank-bearing bridge, and

with the help of the companion 45th Tank Brigade, Gusakovskii

was able to beat off every counterattack delivered by the 25th

Panzer Division as it came on in line after line of tanks, assault

guns, personnel carriers and dismounted infantry.

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