Duffy Christopher. Red Storm On The Reich (ENG)

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leiter, and consisted of concrete tubes which were partially sunk

in the earth and furnished with two machine-guns each. Escape

from the pots was out of the question once combat had begun,

and the concrete broke up the first hit from artillery, which was

profoundly discouraging. Closer to Königsberg the 14th Panzer-

Grenadier Regiment of the 5th Panzer Division found it im-

possible to hold the village of Gutenfeld, because the Russians

had infiltrated themselves into trenches which had built on the

orders of Koch. Captain Jaedtke complained that 'right from

the beginning of the actions in East Prussia those bloody

trenches did us more harm than good. We were a Panzer di-

vision, and as we were weak in infantry, we could not make

use of the trenches ourselves. If the Russians got into the

trenches first, it was difficult for us to get them out again' (Plato,

1978, 382).

Permanent Frontier Lines

It is just the same story when we turn to the powerful fortifi-

cations which had been built along the frontiers of Ger-

many before the war. In East Prussia work on the Heilsberg

Triangle (Heilsberger Dreieck) had begun while Germany was

still labouring under the restraints imposed by the Treaty of

Versailles. The scope was expanded gradually, when the pro-

visions lapsed, and the positions ultimately formed a broad

curve which extended for nearly two hundred kilometres from

the Frisches Haff to the Kurisches Haff. The triangle was stud-

ded with 1,100 main installations, and covered one-third of East

Prussia, including Königsberg and the most economically im-

portant regions. Too late the Germans discovered that nobody

had bothered to update the scheme of defence in accordance

with the recent developments on the Eastern Front. Early in

February the 24th Panzer Division was ordered to occupy the

westward-facing positions, but

the fact that it was impossible to procure maps of these

defensive installations or even keys for the bunkers was typ-

APPENDIX: THE GERMAN STYLE

379

ical of the confusion which characterised this phase of com-

bat. Apart from this the installations, which had been built

in the twenties, were unsuited for the use of our weapons.

The firing lanes had not been cleared for years and were thus

unsuited for the use of modern anti-tank weapons. Hence,

it was impossible to execute this order which had been issued

in absolute ignorance of the real situation. (Major Hans von

Knebel Döberitz, in Glantz, ed., 1986, 419)

Technically, the positions of the Meseritz Fortified Region

(Tirschtiegel Riegel) were considerably stronger, for they cov-

ered the direct approaches to Berlin and ran behind the pre-

1939 border with Poland in the rear of the recently annexed

Warthegau. They formed multiple lines, and were anchored on

the Netze and the Warthe in the north and on the Oder bend

in the south. As things turned out, the Russian spearheads

arrived there before the German field troops, and on 31 January

the Eighth Guards Army secured most of the region in spite of

an encounter battle with a German division which had been

rushed up from the rear. The Russians had arrived in a hurry,

but

luckily the men of the fresh German division were in a

similar predicament. Evidently, they had poor knowledge of

their own fortifications and consequently could not make the

most of their fire-power and advantageous positions. They

fought with determination but were lacking in skill. Of

course, if the German divisional command had a better

knowledge of the fortified area and had had just two days

to study the situation and organise the fire system and co-

operation with other German forces, it is difficult to say how

the events would have developed. I am inclined to think that

in that case we would have had to fight a long battle and

sustain heavy losses. (Chuikov, 1978, 151)

APPENDIX: THE GERMAN STYLE

380

Defended Towns and Cities

Incomparably the toughest and most successful kind of posi-

tional defence which the Germans offered was the one they

put up in the towns. An important model was set by Posen,

which fell only on 22 February, after nearly five weeks of re-

sistance.

Pre-existing fortifications were useful to the defenders, as at

Königsberg or at Posen itself, but less vital than a spirit of

resourcefulness. The Germans typically broke open cellar walls

to secure underground communications along whole rows of

buildings. Carpets and curtains were suspended across the

streets to screen the defenders from view. Thousands of mines

were manufactured daily, using fillings extracted from naval

mines or torpedoes, as at Königsberg, or from unexploded Rus-

sian bombs, as at Breslau.

The Germans were every bit as inventive as the Russians

when it came to applying solutions to unexpected problems.

At Breslau the whip-like crack of the well-camouflaged Soviet

anti-tank guns got on the nerves of the German infantry. Lieu-

tenant Hartmann, as commander of an assault gun, worked

out a procedure of his own:

This was not particularly easy, because these were low-

trajectory weapons and the noise of the discharge was readily

confused with that of the impact. I used to creep out to some

suitable corner, often detaching my periscope and taking it

with me, and if I was able to detect the target, I would bring

my gunner and show him exactly where to aim. Then we

would load the gun, charge around the corner like a fire

engine and within a few seconds send our first shell tearing

down the street. No Russian gunner would stand by his piece

at the sight of our assault gun, all spitting fire, and we could

then knock out the enemy anti-tank guns at our leisure. (Ahl-

fen and Niehoff, 1978, 65)

APPENDIX: THE GERMAN STYLE

381

Supporting Arms and Services

The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe

The contributions of the German navy and air force have been

treated in detail in the main body of the text. As commander-

in-chief of the navy, Grand-Admiral Doenitz made a 'fine im-

posing impression' (Goebbels, 1977, 1), and stood high in the

esteem of the Führer. The OKH reproached him for insisting

so long on keeping German forces bottled up in Kurland, to

help the U-boats to train and operate in the eastern Baltic.

However, the Kriegsmarine performed magnificently in lifting

2 million soldiers and refugees from the shores, and through

the fire of the Prinz Eugen and other celebrated warships, it

offered powerful fire support to the soldiers well inland.

The Luftwaffe, unlike the German navy, did not enjoy the

overall superiority in its element. It nevertheless offered the

Germans the one speedy means they had of striking at Soviet

breakthroughs, and in 1945 the tank-killing role emerged as

probably the most important contribution of the air forces. Ex-

ploiting local and temporary superiorities, the Luftwaffe helped

to contain the Russian bridgeheads in front of Berlin and to

make the fighting in Pomerania so costly for the enemy.

Logistics and Mechanical Repair

The Germans had no uniform logistic system as such, and the

expedients by which they had kept themselves going now un-

derwent a near-total collapse. At the most fundamental level,

the Germans no longer had the industrial and transport base

to forward the most necessary commodities to the various the-

atres of war. Lack of fuel precluded brilliant sweeping move-

ments by the mechanised forces, just as the near-universal lack

of ammunition for the artillery, tanks and assault guns had a

crippling effect on all arms in nearly every action (see the report

APPENDIX: THE GERMAN STYLE

382

by the Second Army in Pomerania, 25 February, in Murawski,

1969, 92).

And yet affairs could have been managed better than they

were. Some revealing comments are made by Lieutenant Schäu-

fler, from what he saw of the campaign in Pomerania. In his

experience the lack of fuel and ammunition was relative—

stocks indeed existed, but it was not always easy to obtain the

necessary release, the transport of these highly explosive loads

was a 'suicide mission,' in view of the enemy air superiority,

and the strict traffic controls imposed further delay (Schäufler,

1979, 87).

Schäufler likewise attributes the high rate of mechanical

losses to a failure of command and organisation. Tanks were

complicated and surprisingly delicate machines which de-

manded constant care and attention, and they were vulnerable

technical ignorance, lack of knowledge as to how tanks

operated and fought, and what their limitations were. To-

gether with a big-headed but narrow-minded way of think-

ing, and occasional applications of brute force, this led to

frequent losses and misfortunes when we were assigned to

non-mechanised units. Later all the blame was heaped on

the tank crews. For that reason every tank commander shud-

dered when he heard that he might be detached to the in-

fantry. (Schäufler, 1979, 46)

The German experience in East Prussia may serve as a mi-

crocosm of the Reich. The depots of the Kriegsmarine were

managed by an office in distant Kiel. The Volkssturm were

supplied both by the Wehrmacht and the SS. In addition, there

was separate logistic support for the SS, the Luftwaffe, the

gauleiter in his capacity as Reichsverteidigungskommissar, and the

two labour and construction outfits—the Reichsarbeitsdienst

and the Organisation Todt.

APPENDIX: THE GERMAN STYLE

383

The Third Panzer Army met the Russian attack in January

with fuel and ammunition for scarcely three days, and the com-

bat was so intense that one of its corps was expending am-

munition at a rate of three train-loads a day—which far

outstripped the capacity of the transport system. Mechanical

repair workshops were unable to operate sufficiently long in a

single place to do any useful work, even if there had been any

way of rescuing damaged vehicles from the battlefield. In the

5th Panzer Division Major von Ramin reported how his 53rd

Panzer-Jäger Detachment was virtually crippled in the course

of the month:

The roads were completely jammed by the columns of ref-

ugees, and the detachment did not have the means of re-

trieving all of the damaged Jagdpanzers in good time. Out

of our fourteen complete write-offs, only three were lost

through enemy action—the other eleven had to be blown

up, for we did not have the tractors to save them from the

enemy. (Plato, 1978, 383)

When the composite Armee Ostpreussen was finally driven

back to Pillau, the officers were outraged to discover that the

Samland woods concealed immense underground depots be-

longing to the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe. The contents

now had to be blown up, burnt, or, in the case of the stores of

fuel, pumped away like the hopes of Germany into the sand.

APPENDIX: THE GERMAN STYLE

384

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