Columbia. Accident investigation board

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The Columbia Accident Investigation Boardʼs independent

investigation into the tragic February 1, 2003, loss of the

Space Shuttle Columbia and its seven-member crew lasted

nearly seven months and involved 13 Board members,

approximately 120 Board investigators, and thousands

of NASA and support personnel. Because the events that

initiated the accident were not apparent for some time,

the investigationʼs depth and breadth were unprecedented

in NASA history. Further, the Board determined early in

the investigation that it intended to put this accident into

context. We considered it unlikely that the accident was a

random event; rather, it was likely related in some degree

to NASAʼs budgets, history, and program culture, as well

as to the politics, compromises, and changing priorities of

the democratic process. We are convinced that the manage-

ment practices overseeing the Space Shuttle Program were

as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the

left wing. The Board was also inuenced by discussions

with members of Congress, who suggested that this nation

needed a broad examination of NASAʼs Human Space Flight

Program, rather than just an investigation into what physical

fault caused Columbia to break up during re-entry.

Findings and recommendations are in the relevant chapters

and all recommendations are compiled in Chapter 11.

Volume I is organized into four parts: The Accident; Why

the Accident Occurred; A Look Ahead; and various appendi-

ces. To put this accident in context, Parts One and Two begin

with histories, after which the accident is described and then

analyzed, leading to ndings and recommendations. Part

Three contains the Boardʼs views on what is needed to im-

prove the safety of our voyage into space. Part Four is refer-

ence material. In addition to this rst volume, there will be

subsequent volumes that contain technical reports generated

by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA,

as well as volumes containing reference documentation and

other related material.

PART ONE: THE ACCIDENT

Chapter 1 relates the history of the Space Shuttle Program

before the Challenger accident. With the end looming for

the Apollo moon exploration program, NASA unsuccess-

fully attempted to get approval for an equally ambitious

(and expensive) space exploration program. Most of the

proposed programs started with space stations in low-Earth

orbit and included a reliable, economical, medium-lift

vehicle to travel safely to and from low-Earth orbit. After

many failed attempts, and nally agreeing to what would

be untenable compromises, NASA gained approval from the

Nixon Administration to develop, on a xed budget, only

the transport vehicle. Because the Administration did not ap-

prove a low-Earth-orbit station, NASA had to create a mis-

sion for the vehicle. To satisfy the Administrationʼs require-

ment that the system be economically justiable, the vehicle

had to capture essentially all space launch business, and to

do that, it had to meet wide-ranging requirements. These

sometimes-competing requirements resulted in a compro-

mise vehicle that was less than optimal for manned ights.

NASA designed and developed a remarkably capable and

resilient vehicle, consisting of an Orbiter with three Main

Engines, two Solid Rocket Boosters, and an External Tank,

but one that has never met any of its original requirements

for reliability, cost, ease of turnaround, maintainability, or,

regrettably, safety.

Chapter 2 documents the nal ight of Columbia. As a

straightforward record of the event, it contains no ndings or

recommendations. Designated STS-107, this was the Space

Shuttle Programʼs 113th ight and Columbiaʼs 28th. The

ight was close to trouble-free. Unfortunately, there were no

indications to either the crew onboard Columbia or to engi-

neers in Mission Control that the mission was in trouble as

a result of a foam strike during ascent. Mission management

failed to detect weak signals that the Orbiter was in trouble

and take corrective action.

Columbia was the rst space-rated Orbiter. It made the Space

Shuttle Programʼs rst four orbital test ights. Because it was

the rst of its kind, Columbia differed slightly from Orbiters

Challenger, Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour. Built to an

earlier engineering standard, Columbia was slightly heavier,

and, although it could reach the high-inclination orbit of the

International Space Station, its payload was insufcient to

make Columbia cost-effective for Space Station missions.

Therefore, Columbia was not equipped with a Space Station

docking system, which freed up space in the payload bay for

longer cargos, such as the science modules Spacelab and

SPACEHAB. Consequently, Columbia generally ew sci-

ence missions and serviced the Hubble Space Telescope.

STS-107 was an intense science mission that required the

seven-member crew to form two teams, enabling round-

the-clock shifts. Because the extensive science cargo and

its extra power sources required additional checkout time,

the launch sequence and countdown were about 24 hours

longer than normal. Nevertheless, the countdown proceeded

as planned, and Columbia was launched from Launch Com-

plex 39-A on January 16, 2003, at 10:39 a.m. Eastern Stan-

dard Time (EST).

At 81.7 seconds after launch, when the Shuttle was at about

65,820 feet and traveling at Mach 2.46 (1,650 mph), a large

piece of hand-crafted insulating foam came off an area

where the Orbiter attaches to the External Tank. At 81.9

seconds, it struck the leading edge of Columbiaʼs left wing.

This event was not detected by the crew on board or seen

by ground support teams until the next day, during detailed

reviews of all launch camera photography and videos. This

foam strike had no apparent effect on the daily conduct of

the 16-day mission, which met all its objectives.

The de-orbit burn to slow Columbia down for re-entry

into Earthʼs atmosphere was normal, and the ight prole

throughout re-entry was standard. Time during re-entry is

REPORT SYNOPSIS

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measured in seconds from “Entry Interface,” an arbitrarily

determined altitude of 400,000 feet where the Orbiter be-

gins to experience the effects of Earthʼs atmosphere. Entry

Interface for STS-107 occurred at 8:44:09 a.m. on February

1. Unknown to the crew or ground personnel, because the

data is recorded and stored in the Orbiter instead of being

transmitted to Mission Control at Johnson Space Center, the

rst abnormal indication occurred 270 seconds after Entry

Interface. Chapter 2 reconstructs in detail the events lead-

ing to the loss of Columbia and her crew, and refers to more

details in the appendices.

In Chapter 3, the Board analyzes all the information avail-

able to conclude that the direct, physical action that initiated

the chain of events leading to the loss of Columbia and her

crew was the foam strike during ascent. This chapter re-

views ve analytical paths – aerodynamic, thermodynamic,

sensor data timeline, debris reconstruction, and imaging

evidence – to show that all ve independently arrive at the

same conclusion. The subsequent impact testing conducted

by the Board is also discussed.

That conclusion is that Columbia re-entered Earthʼs atmo-

sphere with a pre-existing breach in the leading edge of its

left wing in the vicinity of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC)

panel 8. This breach, caused by the foam strike on ascent,

was of sufcient size to allow superheated air (probably ex-

ceeding 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit) to penetrate the cavity be-

hind the RCC panel. The breach widened, destroying the in-

sulation protecting the wingʼs leading edge support structure,

and the superheated air eventually melted the thin aluminum

wing spar. Once in the interior, the superheated air began to

destroy the left wing. This destructive process was carefully

reconstructed from the recordings of hundreds of sensors in-

side the wing, and from analyses of the reactions of the ight

control systems to the changes in aerodynamic forces.

By the time Columbia passed over the coast of California

in the pre-dawn hours of February 1, at Entry Interface plus

555 seconds, amateur videos show that pieces of the Orbiter

were shedding. The Orbiter was captured on videotape dur-

ing most of its quick transit over the Western United States.

The Board correlated the events seen in these videos to

sensor readings recorded during re-entry. Analysis indi-

cates that the Orbiter continued to y its pre-planned ight

prole, although, still unknown to anyone on the ground or

aboard Columbia, her control systems were working furi-

ously to maintain that ight prole. Finally, over Texas, just

southwest of Dallas-Fort Worth, the increasing aerodynamic

forces the Orbiter experienced in the denser levels of the at-

mosphere overcame the catastrophically damaged left wing,

causing the Orbiter to fall out of control at speeds in excess

of 10,000 mph.

The chapter details the recovery of about 38 percent of the

Orbiter (some 84,000 pieces) and the reconstruction and

analysis of this debris. It presents ndings and recommenda-

tions to make future Space Shuttle operations safer.

Chapter 4 describes the investigation into other possible

physical factors that may have contributed to the accident.

The chapter opens with the methodology of the fault tree

analysis, which is an engineering tool for identifying every

conceivable fault, then determining whether that fault could

have caused the system in question to fail. In all, more than

3,000 individual elements in the Columbia accident fault

tree were examined.

In addition, the Board analyzed the more plausible fault sce-

narios, including the impact of space weather, collisions with

micrometeoroids or “space junk,” willful damage, ight crew

performance, and failure of some critical Shuttle hardware.

The Board concludes in Chapter 4 that despite certain fault

tree exceptions left “open” because they cannot be conclu-

sively disproved, none of these factors caused or contributed

to the accident. This chapter also contains ndings and rec-

ommendations to make Space Shuttle operations safer.

PART TWO: WHY THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED

Part Two, “Why the Accident Occurred,” examines NASAʼs

organizational, historical, and cultural factors, as well as

how these factors contributed to the accident.

As in Part One, Part Two begins with history. Chapter 5

examines the post-Challenger history of NASA and its

Human Space Flight Program. A summary of the relevant

portions of the Challenger investigation recommendations

is presented, followed by a review of NASA budgets to indi-

cate how committed the nation is to supporting human space

ight, and within the NASA budget we look at how the

Space Shuttle Program has fared. Next, organizational and

management history, such as shifting management systems

and locations, are reviewed.

Chapter 6 documents management performance related to

Columbia to establish events analyzed in later chapters. The

chapter begins with a review of the history of foam strikes on

the Orbiter to determine how Space Shuttle Program managers

rationalized the danger from repeated strikes on the Or-

biterʼs Thermal Protection System. Next is an explanation

of the intense pressure the program was under to stay on

schedule, driven largely by the self-imposed requirement to

complete the International Space Station. Chapter 6 then re-

lates in detail the effort by some NASA engineers to obtain

additional imagery of Columbia to determine if the foam

strike had damaged the Orbiter, and how management dealt

with that effort.

In Chapter 7, the Board presents its view that NASAʼs or-

ganizational culture had as much to do with this accident

as foam did. By examining safety history, organizational

theory, best business practices, and current safety failures,

the report notes that only signicant structural changes to

NASAʼs organizational culture will enable it to succeed.

This chapter measures the Shuttle Programʼs practices

against this organizational context and nds them wanting.

The Board concludes that NASAʼs current organization

does not provide effective checks and balances, does not

have an independant safety program, and has not dem-

onstrated the characteristics of a learning organization.

Chapter 7 provides recommendations for adjustments in

organizational culture.

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Chapter 8, the nal chapter in Part Two, draws from the

previous chapters on history, budgets, culture, organization,

and safety practices, and analyzes how all these factors con-

tributed to this accident. The chapter opens with “echoes of

Challenger” that compares the two accidents. This chapter

captures the Boardʼs views of the need to adjust manage-

ment to enhance safety margins in Shuttle operations, and

reafrms the Boardʼs position that without these changes,

we have no condence that other “corrective actions” will

improve the safety of Shuttle operations. The changes we

recommend will be difcult to accomplish – and will be

internally resisted.

PART THREE: A LOOK AHEAD

Part Three summarizes the Boardʼs conclusions on what

needs to be done to resume our journey into space, lists

signicant observations the Board made that are unrelated

to the accident but should be recorded, and provides a sum-

mary of the Boardʼs recommendations.

In Chapter 9, the Board rst reviews its short-term recom-

mendations. These return-to-ight recommendations are the

minimum that must be done to essentially x the problems

that were identied by this accident. Next, the report dis-

cusses what needs to be done to operate the Shuttle in the

mid-term, 3 to 15 years. Based on NASAʼs history of ignor-

ing external recommendations, or making improvements

that atrophy with time, the Board has no condence that the

Space Shuttle can be safely operated for more than a few

years based solely on renewed post-accident vigilance.

Chapter 9 then outlines the management system changes the

Board feels are necessary to safely operate the Shuttle in the

mid-term. These changes separate the management of sched-

uling and budgets from technical specication authority,

build a capability of systems integration, and establish and

provide the resources for an independent safety and mission

assurance organization that has supervisory authority. The

third part of the chapter discusses the poor record this na-

tion has, in the Boardʼs view, of developing either a comple-

ment to or a replacement for the Space Shuttle. The report is

critical of several bodies in the U.S. government that share

responsibility for this situation, and expresses an opinion on

how to proceed from here, but does not suggest what the next

vehicle should look like.

Chapter 10 contains ndings, observations, and recom-

mendations that the Board developed over the course of this

extensive investigation that are not directly related to the

accident but should prove helpful to NASA.

Chapter 11 is a compilation of all the recommendations in

the previous chapters.

PART FOUR: APPENDICES

Part Four of the report by the Columbia Accident Inves-

tigation Board contains material relevant to this volume

organized in appendices. Additional, stand-alone volumes

will contain more reference, background, and analysis ma-

terials.

This Earth view of the Sinai Peninsula, Red Sea, Egypt, Nile River,

and the Mediterranean was taken from Columbia during STS-107.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE

The Space Shuttle is one of the most complex machines ever

devised. Its main elements – the Orbiter, Space Shuttle Main

Engines, External Tank, and Solid Rocket Boosters – are assembled

from more than 2.5 million parts, 230 miles of wire, 1,060 valves,

and 1,440 circuit breakers. Weighing approximately 4.5 million-

pounds at launch, the Space Shuttle accelerates to an orbital

velocity of 17,500 miles per hour – 25 times faster than the speed

of sound – in just over eight minutes. Once on orbit, the Orbiter

must protect its crew from the vacuum of space while enabling

astronauts to conduct scientic research, deploy and service

satellites, and assemble the International Space Station. At the end

of its mission, the Shuttle uses the Earthʼs atmosphere as a brake to

decelerate from orbital velocity to a safe landing at 220 miles per

hour, dissipating in the process all the energy it gained on its way

into orbit.

THE ORBITER

The Orbiter is what is popularly referred to as “the Space Shuttle.”

About the size of a small commercial airliner, the Orbiter normally

carries a crew of seven, including a Commander, Pilot, and ve

Mission or Payload Specialists. The Orbiter can accommodate a

payload the size of a school bus weighing between 38,000 and

56,300 pounds depending on what orbit it is launched into. The

Orbiterʼs upper ight deck is lled with equipment for ying and

maneuvering the vehicle and controlling its remote manipulator

arm. The mid-deck contains stowage lockers for food, equipment,

supplies, and experiments, as well as a toilet, a hatch for entering

and exiting the vehicle on the ground, and – in some instances – an

airlock for doing so in orbit. During liftoff and landing, four crew

members sit on the ight deck and the rest on the mid-deck.

Different parts of the Orbiter are subjected to dramatically different

temperatures during re-entry. The nose and leading edges of the

wings are exposed to superheated air temperatures of 2,800 to 3,000

degrees Fahrenheit, depending upon re-entry prole. Other portions

of the wing and fuselage can reach 2,300 degrees Fahrenheit. Still

other areas on top of the fuselage are sufciently shielded from

superheated air that ice sometimes survives through landing.

To protect its thin aluminum structure during re-entry, the Orbiter

is covered with various materials collectively referred to as the

Thermal Protection System. The three major components of the

system are various types of heat-resistant tiles, blankets, and the

Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on the leading edge of

the wing and nose cap. The RCC panels most closely resemble a

hi-tech berglass – layers of special graphite cloth that are molded

to the desired shape at very high temperatures. The tiles, which

protect most other areas of the Orbiter exposed to medium and

high heating, are 90 percent air and 10 percent silica (similar to

common sand). One-tenth the weight of ablative heat shields,

which are designed to erode during re-entry and therefore can only

be used once, the Shuttleʼs tiles are reusable. They come in varying

strengths and sizes, depending on which area of the Orbiter they

protect, and are designed to withstand either 1,200 or 2,300 degrees

Fahrenheit. In a dramatic demonstration of how little heat the tiles

transfer, one can place a blowtorch on one side of a tile and a bare

hand on the other. The blankets, capable of withstanding either

700 or 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit, cover regions of the Orbiter that

experience only moderate heating.

SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES

Each Orbiter has three main engines mounted at the aft fuselage.

These engines use the most efcient propellants in the world

– oxygen and hydrogen – at a rate of half a ton per second. At 100

percent power, each engine produces 375,000 pounds of thrust,

four times that of the largest engine on commercial jets. The large

bell-shaped nozzle on each engine can swivel 10.5 degrees up and

down and 8.5 degrees left and right to provide steering control

during ascent.

EXTERNAL TANK

The three main engines burn propellant at a rate that would drain

an average-size swimming pool in 20 seconds. The External

Tank accommodates up to 143,351 gallons of liquid oxygen and

385,265 gallons of liquid hydrogen. In order to keep the super-cold

propellants from boiling and to prevent ice from forming on the

outside of the tank while it is sitting on the launch pad, the External

Tank is covered with a one-inch-thick coating of insulating foam.

This insulation is so effective that the surface of the External Tank

feels only slightly cool to the touch, even though the liquid oxygen

is stored at minus 297 degrees Fahrenheit and liquid hydrogen

at minus 423 degrees Fahrenheit. This insulating foam also

protects the tankʼs aluminum structure from aerodynamic heating

during ascent. Although generally considered the least complex

of the Shuttleʼs main components, in fact the External Tank is a

remarkable engineering achievement. In addition to holding over

1.5 million pounds of cryogenic propellants, the 153.8-foot long

tank must support the weight of the Orbiter while on the launch pad

and absorb the 7.3 million pounds of thrust generated by the Solid

Rocket Boosters and Space Shuttle Main Engines during launch and

ascent. The External Tanks are manufactured in a plant near New

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Orleans and are transported by barge to the Kennedy Space Center

in Florida. Unlike the Solid Rocket Boosters, which are reused, the

External Tank is discarded during each mission, burning up in the

Earthʼs atmosphere after being jettisoned from the Orbiter.

SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS

Despite their power, the Space Shuttle Main Engines alone are not

sufcient to boost the vehicle to orbit – in fact, they provide only 15

percent of the necessary thrust. Two Solid Rocket Boosters attached

to the External Tank generate the remaining 85 percent. Together,

these two 149-foot long motors produce over six million pounds of

thrust. The largest solid propellant rockets ever own, these motors

use an aluminum powder fuel and ammonium perchlorate oxidizer

in a binder that has the feel and consistency of a pencil eraser.

Each of the Solid Rocket Boosters consists of 11 separate segments

joined together. The joints between the segments were extensively

redesigned after the Challenger accident, which occurred when hot

gases burned through an O-ring and seal in the aft joint on the left

Solid Rocket Booster. The motor segments are shipped from their

manufacturer in Utah and assembled at the Kennedy Space Center.

Once assembled, each Solid Rocket Booster is connected to the

External Tank by bolts weighing 65 pounds each. After the Solid

Rocket Boosters burn for just over two minutes, these bolts are

separated by pyrotechnic charges and small rockets then push the

Solid Rocket Boosters safely away from the rest of the vehicle. As

the boosters fall back to Earth, parachutes in their nosecones deploy.

After splashing down into the ocean 120 miles downrange from the

launch pad, they are recovered for refurbishment and reuse.

THE SHUTTLE STACK

The rst step in assembling a Space Shuttle for launch is stacking

the Solid Rocket Booster segments on the Mobile Launch

Platform. Eight large hold-down bolts at the base of the Solid

Rocket Boosters will bear the weight of the entire Space Shuttle

stack while it awaits launch. The External Tank is attached to

the Solid Rocket Boosters, and the Orbiter is then attached to the

External Tank at three points – two at its bottom and a “bipod”

attachment near the nose. When the vehicle is ready to move out of

the Vehicle Assembly Building, a Crawler-Transporter picks up the

entire Mobile Launch Platform and carries it – at one mile per hour

– to one of the two launch pads.

A Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Demonstration Motor being tested

near Brigham City, Utah.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO NASA

“An Act to provide for research into the problems of ight within

and outside the Earthʼs atmosphere, and for other purposes.” With

this simple preamble, the Congress and the President of the United

States created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) on October 1, 1958. Formed in response to the launch of

Sputnik by the Soviet Union, NASA inherited the research-oriented

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) and several

other government organizations, and almost immediately began

working on options for manned space ight. NASAʼs rst high

prole program was Project Mercury, an early effort to learn if hu-

mans could survive in space. Project Gemini followed with a more

complex series of experiments to increase manʼs time in space and

validate advanced concepts such as rendezvous. The efforts con-

tinued with Project Apollo, culminating in 1969 when Apollo 11

landed the rst humans on the Moon. The return from orbit on July

24, 1975, of the crew from the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project began

a six-year hiatus of American manned space ight. The launch of

the rst Space Shuttle in April 1981 brought Americans back into

space, continuing today with the assembly and initial operations of

the International Space Station.

In addition to the human space ight program, NASA also main-

tains an active (if small) aeronautics research program, a space

science program (including deep space and interplanetary explora-

tion), and an Earth observation program. The agency also conducts

basic research activities in a variety of elds.

NASA, like many federal agencies, is a heavily matrixed organiza-

tion, meaning that the lines of authority are not necessarily straight-

forward. At the simplest level, there are three major types of entities

involved in the Human Space Flight Program: NASA eld centers,

NASA programs carried out at those centers, and industrial and

academic contractors. The centers provide the buildings, facilities,

and support services for the various programs. The programs, along

with eld centers and Headquarters, hire civil servants and contrac-

tors from the private sector to support aspects of their enterprises.

THE LOCATIONS

NASA Headquarters, located in Washington D.C., is responsible for

leadership and management across ve strategic enterprises: Aero-

space Technology, Biological and Physical Research, Earth Science,

Space Science, and Human Exploration and Development of Space.

NASA Headquarters also provides strategic management for the

Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs.

The Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, was established in

1961 as the Manned Spacecraft Center and has led the development

of every U.S. manned space ight program. Currently, Johnson is

home to both the Space Shuttle and International Space Station Pro-

gram Ofces. The facilities at Johnson include the training, simula-

tion, and mission control centers for the Space Shuttle and Space

Station. Johnson also has ight operations at Ellington Field, where

the training aircraft for the astronauts and support aircraft for the

Space Shuttle Program are stationed, and manages the White Sands

Test Facility, New Mexico, where hazardous testing is conducted.

The Kennedy Space Center was created to launch the Apollo mis-

sions to the Moon, and currently provides launch and landing facili-

ties for the Space Shuttle. The Center is located on Merritt Island,

Florida, adjacent to the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station that also

provides support for the Space Shuttle Program (and was the site

of the earlier Mercury and Gemini launches). Personnel at Ken-

nedy support maintenance and overhaul services for the Orbiters,

assemble and check-out the integrated vehicle prior to launch, and

operate the Space Station Processing Facility where components of

the orbiting laboratory are packaged for launch aboard the Space

Shuttle. The majority of contractor personnel assigned to Kennedy

are part of the Space Flight Operations Contract administered by

the Space Shuttle Program Ofce at Johnson.

The Marshall Space Flight Center, near Hunstville, Alabama, is

home to most NASA rocket propulsion efforts. The Space Shuttle

Projects Ofce located at

Marshall—organization-

ally part of the Space

Shuttle Program Ofce

at Johnson—manages the

manufacturing and support

contracts to Boeing Rock-

etdyne for the Space Shut-

tle Main Engine (SSME),

to Lockheed Martin for the

External Tank (ET), and to

ATK Thiokol Propulsion

for the Reusable Solid

Rocket Motor (RSRM, the

major piece of the Solid

Rocket Booster). Marshall

is also involved in micro-

gravity research and space

product development pro-

grams that y as payloads

on the Space Shuttle.

The Stennis Space Center

in Bay St. Louis, Missis-

sippi, is the largest rocket

propulsion test complex in

the United States. Stennis

provides all of the testing

facilities for the Space

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Shuttle Main Engines and External

Tank. (The Solid Rocket Boosters are

tested at the ATK Thiokol Propulsion

facilities in Utah.)

The Ames Research Center at Moffett

Field, California, has evolved from its

aeronautical research roots to become

a Center of Excellence for information

technology. The Centerʼs primary im-

portance to the Space Shuttle Program,

however, lies in wind tunnel and arc-jet

testing, and the development of thermal

protection system concepts.

The Langley Research Center, at Hamp-

ton, Virginia, is the agencyʼs primary

center for structures and materials and

supports the Space Shuttle Program in

these areas, as well as in basic aerody-

namic and thermodynamic research.

THE PROGRAMS

The two major human space ight ef-

forts within NASA are the Space Shut-

tle Program and International Space

Station Program, both headquartered at

Johnson although they report to a Dep-

uty Associate Administrator at NASA

Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

The Space Shuttle Program Ofce at

Johnson is responsible for all aspects

of developing, supporting, and ying

the Space Shuttle. To accomplish these

tasks, the program maintains large

workforces at the various NASA Cen-

ters that host the facilities used by the program. The Space Shuttle

Program Ofce is also responsible for managing the Space Flight

Operations Contract with United Space Alliance that provides most

of the contractor support at Johnson and Kennedy, as well as a small

amount at Marshall.

THE CONTRACTORS

The Space Shuttle Program employs a wide variety of commercial

companies to provide services and products. Among these are some

of the largest aerospace and defense contractors in the country, in-

cluding (but not limited to):

United Space Alliance

This is a joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin that

was established in 1996 to perform the Space Flight Operations

Contract that essentially conducts the day-to-day operation of the

Space Shuttle. United Space Alliance is headquartered in Houston,

Texas, and employs more than 10,000 people at Johnson, Kennedy,

and Marshall. Its contract currently runs through 2005.

The Boeing Company, NASA Systems

The Space Shuttle Orbiter was designed and manufactured by

Rockwell International, located primarily in Downey and Palmdale,

California. In 1996, The Boeing Company purchased the aerospace

assets of Rockwell International, and later moved the Downey op-

eration to Huntington Beach, California, as part of a consolidation

of facilities. Boeing is subcontracted to United Space Alliance to

provide support to Orbiter modications and operations, with work

performed in California, and at Johnson and Kennedy.

The Boeing Company, Rocketdyne Propulsion & Power

The Rocketdyne Division of Rockwell International was responsi-

ble for the development and manufacture of the Space Shuttle Main

Engines, and continues to support the engines as a part of The Boe-

ing Company. The Space Shuttle Projects Ofce at Marshall man-

ages the main engines contract, with most of the work performed in

California, Stennis, and Kennedy.

ATK Thiokol Propulsion

ATK Thiokol Propulsion (formerly Morton-Thiokol) in Brigham

City, Utah, manufactures the Reusable Solid Rocket Motor seg-

ments that are the propellant sections of the Solid Rocket Boosters.

The Space Shuttle Projects Ofce at Marshall manages the Reus-

able Solid Rocket Motor contract.

Lockheed Martin Space Systems, Michoud Operations

The External Tank was developed and manufactured by Martin

Marietta at the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility near New Or-

leans, Louisiana. Martin Marietta later merged with Lockheed to

create Lockheed Martin. The External Tank is the only disposable

part of the Space Shuttle system, so new ones are always under

construction. The Space Shuttle Projects Ofce at Marshall man-

ages the External Tank contract.

Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control

The Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels used on the nose

and wing leading edges of the Orbiter were manufactured by Ling-

Temco-Vought in Grand Prairie, Texas. Lockheed Martin acquired

LTV through a series of mergers and acquisitions. The Space Shuttle

Program ofce at Johnson manages the RCC support contract.

Human Exploration & Development of Space

Associate Administrator

International Space Station and

Space Shuttle Programs

Deputy Associate Administrator

Space Shuttle Program Office

Manager, Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Manager, SSP Safety and Mission Assurance

Manager, Launch Integration (KSC) Manager, SSP Development

Manager, Program Integration Manager, SSP Logistics (KSC)

Space Shuttle

S&MA Office

Space Shuttle

Administrative Office

nag

ent

Space Shuttle

Business Office

(SFOC COTR)

Space Shuttle

KSC Integration Office

Space Shuttle

Vehicle Engineering Office

Space Shuttle

Processing (KSC)

Space Shuttle

Systems Integration Office

Space Shuttle

Customer and Flight

Integration Office

Space Shuttle

Projects Office (MSFC)

Missions Operations

Directorate

Flight Crew Operations

Directorate

Extravehicular Activity

Solid Rocket Booster

(SRB) Office

Reusable Solid Rocket

Motor (RSRM) Office

Space Shuttle Main Engine

(SSME) Office

External Tank (ET)

Office

Administrator

Space Shuttle Program

NASA Organization

The launch of STS-107 on January 16, 2003.

A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D

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R e p o r t V o l u m e I A u g u s t 2 0 0 3

Part One

The Accident

“Building rockets is hard.” Part of the problem is that space

travel is in its infancy. Although humans have been launch-

ing orbital vehicles for almost 50 years now – about half the

amount of time we have been ying airplanes – contrast the

numbers. Since Sputnik, humans have launched just over

4,500 rockets towards orbit (not counting suborbital ights

and small sounding rockets). During the rst 50 years of

aviation, there were over one million aircraft built. Almost

all of the rockets were used only once; most of the airplanes

were used more often.

There is also the issue of performance. Airplanes slowly

built their performance from the tens of miles per hour the

Wright Brothers initially managed to the 4,520 mph that Ma-

jor William J. Knight ew in the X-15A-2 research airplane

during 1967. Aircraft designers and pilots would slightly

push the envelope, stop and get comfortable with where they

were, then push on. Orbital rockets, by contrast, must have

all of their performance on the rst (and often, only) ight.

Physics dictates this – to reach orbit, without falling back to

Earth, you have to exceed about 17,500 mph. If you cannot

vary performance, then the only thing left to change is the

amount of payload – the rocket designers began with small

payloads and worked their way up.

Rockets, by their very nature, are complex and unforgiving

vehicles. They must be as light as possible, yet attain out-

standing performance to get to orbit. Mankind is, however,

getting better at building them. In the early days as often

as not the vehicle exploded on or near the launch pad; that

seldom happens any longer. It was not that different from

early airplanes, which tended to crash about as often as they

ew. Aircraft seldom crash these days, but rockets still fail

between two-and-ve percent of the time. This is true of

just about any launch vehicle – Atlas, Delta, Soyuz, Shuttle

– regardless of what nation builds it or what basic congura-

tion is used; they all fail about the same amount of the time.

Building and launching rockets is still a very dangerous

business, and will continue to be so for the foreseeable fu-

ture while we gain experience at it. It is unlikely that launch-

ing a space vehicle will ever be as routine an undertaking as

commercial air travel – certainly not in the lifetime of any-

body who reads this. The scientists and engineers continu-

ally work on better ways, but if we want to continue going

into outer space, we must continue to accept the risks.

Part One of the report of the Columbia Accident Investiga-

tion Board is organized into four chapters. In order to set

the background for further discussion, Chapter 1 relates the

history of the Space Shuttle Program before the Challenger

accident. The events leading to the original approval of the

Space Shuttle Program are recounted, as well as an exami-

nation of some of the promises made in order to gain that

approval. In retrospect, many of these promises could never

have been achieved. Chapter 2 documents the nal ight of

Columbia. As a straightforward record of the event, it con-

tains no ndings or recommendations. Chapter 3 reviews

ve analytical paths – aerodynamic, thermodynamic, sensor

data timeline, debris reconstruction, and imaging evidence

– to show that all ve independently arrive at the same con-

clusion. Chapter 4 describes the investigation into other pos-

sible physical factors that might have contributed to the ac-

cident, but were subsequently dismissed as possible causes.

Sunrise aboard Columbia

on Flight Day 7.

A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D

COLUMBIA

A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G A T I O N B O A R D

COLUMBIA

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2 1

R e p o r t V o l u m e I A u g u s t 2 0 0 3

The launch of STS-107 on January 16, 2003.