Black J. World War Two A Military History

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better still, by turning the German flank there was now the opportu-

nity to roll up their entire position and turn operational success to

strategic advantage. The Germans were unable to establish a new

line, and Hitler’s ‘stand and hold’ policy was meaningless.

Advancing through the breach, American units moved into

Brittany, while others turned south towards the Loire and yet others

east towards the Seine. Rennes fell on 3 August and Le Mans on 8

August.A German panzer counterattack through Mortain, launched,

on 7 August, in pursuit of Hitler’s hope of wrecking the Second

Front and, more particularly, pinching the neck of the breakthrough,

was thwarted by strong American resistance and by Allied ground-

attack aircraft: these were more important than American tanks.

Combined with the advance of all Allied forces from their posi-

tions, this provided an opportunity to encircle the Germans in

Normandy. They were driven into a pocket between Falaise and

Argentan, but a gap existed to the east between Trun and Chambois,

and the Germans began to retreat through it late on 16 August.

Many escaped, although up to about 60,000 were killed or captured

and losses of equipment were heavy. The Allied failure to close the

gap quickly, for which General Omar Bradley, the head of the

Twelfth US Army Group, was principally responsible,

was a major

blunder which possibly cost victory in the West in 1944.

Hitler had hoped to create a line on the Seine, but rapid Allied

advances thwarted this. Chartres and Dreux fell to the Americans on

16 August, Orléans the following day, and on 20 August they estab-

lished a bridgehead across the Seine. Other Allied units liberated

Paris on 25 August: the Free French played a major role, an impor-

tant salute to French pride.The Germans put up only light resistance

in the city which, combined with the Allied decision not to bomb

it, helped ensure that Paris was one of the best preserved of the

many cities of Europe after the war. The breakout from Normandy

was followed by a deep exploitation that matched earlier operations

in North Africa, as well as the Soviet advance in 1944, but contrasted

with Allied operations in Italy. Rather than stopping on the Seine as

planned, Eisenhower decided to advance on the German border.

In Operation Dragoon, the Allies also landed successfully in the

south of France on 15 August. This was very much an American

operation and had been pushed hard by Roosevelt, the American

DEFEATING THE AXIS, 1944

174

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Eisenhower, all of whom were opposed to

Britain’s Mediterranean strategy, with its commitment to Italy and

its interest in an attack from there into Austria. Most of the initial

landing units were American, although much of the follow-up-

force was French. Due primarily to the weakness of the defending

force, but also to the strength of Allied naval and air support, the

landing did not lead to any major battle comparable to that in

Normandy: resistance both on the beaches and inland, where an

Anglo-American parachute force landed, was light. Casualties were

few.

Instead, the operation speeded the German withdrawal from most

of France.Advancing rapidly, the Allies took Avignon on 25 August,

Toulon on 26 August, Lyons on 3 September and Dijon eight days

later, although the Germans were able to withdraw their forces from

southern and south-western France.

The failure to cut them off helped ensure a greater density of

German troops when the Allies advanced towards the German fron-

tier, although it was difficult for amphibious forces to transform

themselves rapidly for fast-moving advances. In particular, it took

time to bring ashore large numbers of vehicles and to prepare for

large-scale tank conflict. German operations were stained by the

slaughter on 10 June of 642 people, most of the population of the

village of Oradour, a response, possibly, to the threat of partisan

activity that reflected the cruelty and total contempt for civilians

seen more generally whenever the Germans felt their authority

threatened. This underlines the extent to which German brutality

was not only directed against Jews and Slavs.

The withdrawal of the Germans from France was followed by a

popular fury directed against collaborators, many of whom were

killed. There was also a harsh gender dimension, with women who

had had sex with Germans being publicly stigmatised, for example

with their hair cut off.This fury was in part politically directed, but

it also reflected the popular enmities that had built up under occu-

pation, enmities that, in France and elsewhere, were also to play a

role in the texture of post-war politics, particularly at the level of

individual communities.

The Allied advances from Normandy and southern France led to

a speedy clearance of most of France and Belgium, although without

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175

inflicting casualties on the Germans comparable to those suffered at

the hands of the Soviets, in part due to the failure of encirclement

plans. The Allies advanced quickly across the battlefields of World

War One.Verdun fell on 31 August and Mons on 2 September.The

rapid seizure of ports, such as Cherbourg on 27 June and, more

belatedly, Le Havre on 12 September, helped ease logistical prob-

lems. The capture of Marseilles with its port undamaged on 28

August provided an important logistical support to Allied operations

in eastern France. Isolated German positions held out, including not

only the ports of Lorient and St Nazaire but also the Channel Isles.

However, the Allies focused on the broad front of advance, rather

than on gaining these positions.

Fuller felt that the war had been transformed militarily, such that

the Germans were now dependent on their opponents’ resolve. He

informed the readers of Newsweek on 10 July:

Though the German High Command is faced with forces

beyond its means to check, it doesn’t necessarily follow that

it is checkmated because utilization of these forces depends

upon the circumstances in which they are placed…the

Russians, being more war-worn than their Allies, are more

likely to welcome speedy termination of the war…the

Americans and the British also seek its speedy termination

so that they may still be fresh when they in turn fall on

Japan…if the war can be prolonged throughout next

winter, by spring or summer of next year political circum-

stances may have so changed that the Allied powers will be

willing to bring the war in the west to an end on terms

more favourable to Germany than those of unconditional

surrender….Time is the crucial factor not only strategically

but also tactically; tactically for the Russians in order rapidly

to beat their enemy; strategically for the Germans in order

slowly to sell ground at high cost.

This view seriously underrated the resolve of the Allies to defeat

Germany, but helps remind us of the uncertainties of contemporaries

and of the need to relate military developments to political objec-

tives throughout the war.

DEFEATING THE AXIS, 1944

176

The speedy liberation of France and Belgium created serious re-

supply problems as Allied forces advanced greater distances from the

ports. As Fuller pointed out in the Sunday Pictorial of 10 September,

‘at the moment, supply and not fighting power is the key factor of

our advance’.Thanks, in part, to Allied resources and the proximity

of supply sources in Britain, as well as the dense network of trans-

port routes in France and Belgium, the logistical situation was less

serious than that for the Red Army, and the effects were less dire, but

it seriously affected operations. In particular, the French rail system

had been effectively dislocated by Allied bombing, while the delay in

clearing the approaches to the port of Antwerp in the Scheldt

estuary prevented use of its facilities, which had been captured on 4

September.

More seriously, tough resistance was encountered, unexpectedly

so, as the German border was approached. Despite the strains of

retreat, small-unit cohesion was retained by the Germans, while their

supply lines shortened as they retreated. The fighting quality the

Germans showed in successfully resisting the Allied attack on

Arnhem in September, which was designed to create a bridgehead

across the lower Rhine, and in the Scheldt estuary in

October–November, as well as in opposing the American advance

near Aachen and in Lorraine that autumn, indicated the extent to

which defeat in Normandy had not destroyed the German war

effort in the West, and suggested that there would be no sudden

collapse once Germany was invaded. Hopes that the war would end

in 1944 proved premature.The strength of the resistance accentuated

the debate over Allied strategy and operational choices.

It is too easy, if space is at a premium, to jump from the

Normandy breakout to the Battle of the Bulge at the close of the

year, with British writers generally also stressing the Arnhem opera-

tion.That is to underrate the importance of the German success in

restricting the Allied advance, as well as of the Allied ability to

continue to make gains, albeit in a far more incremental manner

than during the heady days of rapid advances. There was a parallel

with the Soviet offensive into Poland in 1944; but, as in that case, it

is necessary to place due weight on the consequences of logistical

factors, exhaustion and the need to regroup on the part of the Allies,

as well as German resistance. The latter benefited from the strength

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177

of defensive positions when the Allies surrendered mobility in order

to clear particular areas, such as the Huertgen Forest near Aachen.

These led to attritional struggles that caused heavy casualties.

Although the German achievement in recovering from defeat in

Normandy and in stopping the Allied advance was impressive, it

would be mistaken, as some earlier commentators did, to underrate

Allied fighting quality. A comparison of American and German

performance indicates that the preference of the former for fire-

power support from air and artillery did not preclude a willingness

to close with the Germans and a high level of effectiveness in the

resulting combat.

British military effectiveness had also improved

since the early years of the war.The army had been transformed into

a stronger fighting force with better weapons, tactics and command,

including an effective use of artillery and anti-tank guns.

Canadian

units also made an important contribution to Allied effectiveness.

In December 1944, the Germans mounted a counter-offensive in

the Ardennes, which led to the Battle of the Bulge. This offensive

was aimed at repeating the success of 1940 by gaining the initiative,

pushing apart the Americans and the British and, finally, capturing

Antwerp and its supplies: the port had been opened on 28

November. In part because of an Allied failure to appreciate ULTRA

information about German military movements, the Germans

gained complete surprise when they attacked on 16 December.They

benefited from the exhausted and unprepared nature of the opposing

American troops, some of whom had been campaigning for months.

The uncharitable Montgomery blamed German success on inade-

quate Allied generalship over the previous three months. The

strength and novelty of the massed German armour was also a

factor: this was the first occasion on which American troops were

‘subject to a major enemy armoured offensive’.

Initial German successes could not, however, be sustained, in part

because of the swiftness with which the Americans deployed rein-

forcements and compensated for earlier weaknesses in the area.

Benefiting from their post-invasion build-up, the Americans

committed more troops than they had in Normandy. Ground-

support air attacks helped the Allies regain the initiative, although

they had to wait for the weather to improve; Hitler had deliberately

launched the attack when bad weather promised protection. These

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178

air attacks proved particularly important against German tanks. The

Germans also suffered from supply problems, particularly of fuel, as

well as from the narrowness of the front, the terrain and the eventual

strength of the American resistance, particularly at Bastogne, where

an encircled force fought well, refused to surrender, and thus

thwarted the pace of the German advance.

Other American units

halted the foremost German formations, as did British forces.

It is valuable to contrast the 1940 and 1944 offensives in order to

throw light on shifts in German military capability. The decision to

attack when the weather was bad was an obvious contrast: in 1940, the

Germans had wanted good weather in order to ensure air support, as

well as to use parachutists and glider-borne troops in Belgium and the

Netherlands. The German attack on a narrow front could not be

supported by advances elsewhere, as had been the case in 1940; in

1944, the Germans lacked the necessary forces, in large part due to

their commitments on the Eastern Front and in Italy. Although, as in

1940, the Germans attacked on a weak portion of the front in 1944,

the Americans (unlike the French) responded swiftly and were able to

deploy troops in support more swiftly than the Germans could

advance. In part, this reflected the tenacity of the defence, but the

forces defending the Meuse crossings in 1940 had also fought hard.

The differing response once the breach occurred was more significant,

and throws light on the deficiencies of Allied generalship in 1940;

although the German advance that year had been speeded by the

good weather. In tactical, operational and strategic terms, the Allied

response in 1944 was better than in 1940, while there was no equiva-

lent to the political collapse of France in 1940.

Debates over strategy

The failure of their own plan speeded up the German defeat. Heavy

losses of tanks and aircraft could not be replaced and, as with their

attack on the Western Front in 1918, the Germans had lost yet more

of the veterans they could not afford to lose. Nevertheless, the

important indication of Germany’s continued ability to launch

attacks provided by the Battle of the Bulge (there were smaller-scale

parallels in Hungary in October 1944 and February 1945) needs to

be included in the assessment of the long-running controversy as to

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whether the Allies followed the best strategy in the West in 1944.

This is often reduced to a debate over the virtues of the broad-front

approach advocated by Eisenhower and the narrow-front attempt for

a rapid advance beyond the Rhine advocated by Montgomery. This

clash was linked to Montgomery’s unsuccessful pressure for the

appointment, under Eisenhower, of a deputy entrusted with

command over ground forces.

The idea of a narrow-front advance

presupposed a war of manoeuvre in which the initiative and tempo

were dictated by the Allies. The German Bulge offensive indicated

the riskiness of this approach. An advance across the Rhine in 1944

would have been vulnerable to counterattack, as the Germans had

been building up a significant armoured force in northern Germany

from September. An Allied advance would also have been dependent

on a precarious supply route.

At the same time, the preference for a broad front helped the

Germans withdraw without heavy casualties after Falaise, while

Eisenhower’s caution greatly lessened the chance of cutting off

German forces. This was a serious Allied failure, as it ensured that

more troops, especially experienced units, were available to the

German defence as the retreat ceased. Eisenhower has also been crit-

icised for the amount of troops sent west into Brittany, as this

lessened the force initially available for the advance towards

Germany. His broad-front approach would have been more

successful in maintaining the pace of the Allied advance had the

American army had more combat divisions.

There has also been extensive criticism, particularly, but not only,

by some American commentators and scholars, such as Stephen

Ambrose, of Montgomery’s generalship and of British fighting

quality.

The British preference for the indirect approach and reluc-

tance to risk heavy casualties

is not always appreciated; nor, indeed,

are the heavy losses that were suffered, particularly in clearing the

Scheldt approaches, especially in the capture of Walcheren, given

sufficient attention. The serious issue of assessing capability and

generalship has not greatly been helped by the tone of some of the

discussion, although it originates in criticisms and disputes between

some of the generals in 1944.

To British observers, it appears that some American commenta-

tors are overly keen to ascribe faults to others and the responsibility

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180

for beating the Germans largely to themselves. This can be seen

throughout the discussion of the Normandy operation, such that the

presentation of D-Day is largely in American terms.This is particu-

larly true of popular works, as well as in the film Saving Private Ryan

(1998). This is understandable in terms of the audience, but also

contributes to the serious lack of knowledge about the wider

struggle, seen for example among the large number of Americans

who think that the war began in 1941, when the USA went to war.

To mention this in a discussion of the merits of strategic options in

1944 may seem far-fetched, but is a reminder of the wider resonance

of differences of opinion. In this context, it is worth underlining that

the generals who can be adopted as national standard-bearers, and

who were built up to that end by wartime propaganda, for example

Patton, Montgomery and, in the Pacific, MacArthur, were regarded

with considerable disfavour by many of their compatriots. Major-

General William Penney, Director of Intelligence, HQ, Supreme Allied

Commander, SE Asia 1944–5, who visited Manila in April 1945,

reported:

Theatre commanders are extremely independent and

resentful of interference. This as a matter of fact extends

through all U.S. formations…feuding between U.S. Army

and Navy, including Marines, is openly expressed. In the

General’s Mess at Manila I was astounded to listen to the

scornful references to operations on Okinawa and other

land battles fought under Naval or Marine command.

Given the resilience of the German military, hopes of victory in

1944 were exaggerated. From that perspective, Eisenhower’s broad-

front approach

and Montgomery’s methodical warmaking were

both sensible options.

Whether or not Hitler had chosen to launch the Bulge offensive,

the impact on German military manpower of continuous fighting in

France, Italy and on the Eastern Front in the second half of 1944 had

been heavy. The number of experienced troops had been greatly

depleted, and there was no time to train fresh levies. This led to a

serious compromising of fighting ability that matched the strains on

command structures posed by the burdens of a multi-front war and

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the erratic leadership of Hitler. German resources had to be spread

out across long front lines. On 7 December, Eisenhower ‘emphasised

the heavy rate of attrition they were forcing on the enemy, a rate very

much greater than our own. He pointed out that the enemy could

not afford losses on such a scale’.

Indeed, although thirty divisions

were launched in the Ardennes counter-offensive only nine days

later, the German army was weaker than it had been in the summer.

War with Germany at sea

The same was true at sea and in the air.The submarine war continued

to go the Allies’ way, although merchantmen were still sunk. The

build-up and supply in, and from, Britain of the massive American and

Canadian forces that landed in Normandy and subsequently were a

reflection of the failure of the German submarines to achieve strategic

results.After the Allied breakout from Normandy, the Germans evacu-

ated their submarine bases in west France and concentrated their force

in Norway. From there, the U-boats focused on British waters, but

they were no longer able to sink large numbers of merchantmen, and,

instead, suffered serious losses, both as a result of air attacks, not least

on their bases, and at sea, although there sinkings were due more to

convoy escorts and their use of forward-firing weaponry. However, the

submarine threat remained potent, as U-boat construction maintained

overall numbers.This obliged the Allies to continue to devote consid-

erable naval resources to escort duty and anti-submarine warfare.

Given Allied, particularly American, shipbuilding capability and the

resulting size of the Allied navies, this did not, however, limit or

prevent other uses of Allied naval power, particularly the movement of

British warships to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

The air attack on Germany

Air attacks on the economic capability and civilian morale of oppo-

nents were stepped up in 1944.The Germans, who had launched the

first such attacks of World War Two, bombing undefended Warsaw in

1939, offered a further refinement in 1944 with the beginning of

rocket attacks. Ground-to-ground V-1s, launched at Britain from 13

June, were followed, from 8 September 1944, by V-2s, which trav-

DEFEATING THE AXIS, 1944

182

elled at up to 3,000 mph, could be fired from a considerable

distance, and could not be destroyed by anti-aircraft fire as the V-1s

could be. Their explosive payload was small and they could not be

aimed accurately, but this was scant consolation to those killed and

maimed. Large numbers of rockets were aimed at London, although

other targets, particularly Antwerp once it had been captured by the

Allies, were also hit.The damage inflicted by rockets led the British

to devote particular effort to air raids on production facilities, as well

as to capturing the launching pads in the advance from Normandy.

The use of missiles reflected the inability of the Germans to

sustain air attacks, as well as Hitler’s fascination with new technology

and the idea that it could bring a paradigm leap forward in military

capability. Missiles, in fact, lacked the multipurpose capacity of

aircraft.

The manufacture of missiles was also symptomatic of the

nature of the German war economy, with the use of harshly treated

foreign slave labour leading to high death rates among the malnour-

ished and brutalised workers. The V-2s were constructed in the

underground Nordhausen factory in the Harz Mountains. The

workers were transferred from Mittelbau KL, a concentration camp.

An average of 100 died daily during the building of the factory.

The Final Solution continued to be brutally pursued by the Nazi

regime. By April 1944, there were twenty concentration camps. At

Birkenau, which was part of the Auschwitz complex, at least 6,000

people were being killed daily. However, the advance of Soviet forces

led, from the autumn, to the movement of slave labourers from

Poland to Germany.

The Allied air attack on Germany was stepped up in 1944. The

introduction of long-range fighters, especially the American P-38s

(twin-engine Lightnings), P-47s (Thunderbolts, which used drop

fuel tanks) and P-51 (Mustangs, which also used drop fuel tanks),

provided necessary escorts for the bombers, and also enabled Allied

fighters to seek out German fighters and thus to win the air war

above Germany. This contrasted with the Luftwaffe’s failed offensive

on Britain in 1940–1: the Germans had lost the air war over Britain

and had been unable to accompany serious devastation with the

destruction or degradation of the British air force.

The Mustang’s superiority to German interceptors was demon-

strated in late February and March 1944, when major American

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