68 Dynamical Systems
Proof. Let (¯x, ¯y, ¯c)beany program from x
˜
> 0. By using the conditions
(G) and (M) one gets
T
t=1
δ
t−1
[u(
¯
c
t
) − u(c
t
)] ≤
T
t=1
p
t
[
¯
c
t
− c
t
]
=
T −1
t=0
{[p
t+1
f (
¯
x
t
)−p
t
¯
x
t
]−[ p
t+1
f (x
t
)−p
t
x
t
]}+p
T
(x
T
−
¯
x
T
)≤ p
T
x
T
.
Hence,
T
t=1
δ
t−1
u(
¯
c
t
) −
T
t=1
δ
t−1
u(c
t
) ≤ p
T
x
T
.
Now, as T →∞, the terms on the left-hand side have limits, and the
condition (IF) ensures that the right-hand side converges to zero. Hence,
∞
t=1
δ
t−1
u(
¯
c
t
) ≤
∞
t=1
δ
t−1
u(c
t
).
This establishes the optimality of the program (x, y, c; p).
In his analysis of the problem of decentralization in a dynamic econ-
omy, Koopmans (1957) observed that “by giving sufficiently free rein
to our imagination, we can visualize conditions like (G) and (M) as be-
ing satisfied through a decentralization of decisions among an infinite
number of agents, each verifying a particular utility maximization (G)
or profit maximization (M) condition. A further decentralization among
many contemporaneous agents within each period can also be visualized
through a more disaggregated model. But even at this level of abstrac-
tion, it is difficult to see how the task of meeting the condition (IF) can be
“pinned down on any particular decision maker. This is a new condition
to which there is no counterpart in the finite model.” It should be stressed
that if any agent in a particular period is allowed to observe only a finite
number of prices and quantities (or, perhaps, an infinite subsequence of
p
∗
t
x
t
), it is not able to check whether the condition (IF) is satisfied.
The relationship between competitive and optimal programs can be
explored further; specifically, it is of considerable interest to know that
the converse of Theorem 9.2 is also true.
We begin by noting the following characterization of competitive
programs.