As soon as news of the disaster reached the US headquarters of
Union Carbide in Danbury, Connecticut, a worldwide halt to the pro-
duction and transport of the gas was announced. Union Carbide
immediately sent a medical specialist and a team of technicians to
India to investigate the cause of the fatal leak. One day later, the
chairman of Union Carbide, Warren Anderson, flew personally to
Bhopal to see first hand what the situation was and to lead the investi-
gation. That initiative was not without risk, however. At that moment,
Union Carbide was already responsible for 1,200 deaths. The possi-
bility that the man would be arrested on the spot when he arrived in
Bhopal was not inconceivable. It was fitting that the management of
Union Carbide took that risk.
By 7 December 1984, four days after the disaster had begun, the
death toll had risen to more than 2,000. The number of seriously ill
and badly injured casualties also kept rising. Bhopal had in the mean-
time been overrun by journalists, representatives of environmental
associations, local politicians and experts – real or imagined – on poi-
sonous gases. Bhopal was suddenly a well-known name around the
world and the disaster was front-page news, and remained so for
more than a month. The management of Union Carbide were bom-
barded with questions that it was almost impossible to provide
answers to in the early days. That did not stop the journalists from
continuing to ask questions about the causes of the accident and all
aspects of the disaster, regardless of whether they were near by or far
away. What was safety like at the factory? Is it acceptable to build a
dangerous chemical factory in a densely populated residential neigh-
bourhood? Who was responsible for the disaster? Will the victims and
their families be able to file damage claims? Due to the lack of satisfac-
tory answers to those questions politicians, journalists and so-called
experts sent a tidal wave of guesses and speculation around the
world. In retrospect, many of the articles and reports in the initial
hours and days were based on vague eyewitness accounts and stories.
The messages contained inaccuracies and outright errors, which
caused significant damage to the corporate image of Union Carbide.
Even in the case of major dramas and disasters that occur at light-
ning speed, as was the case in Bhopal, it is not impossible to respond
quickly. Union Carbide saw that perfectly. Several hours after the dis-
aster, the company organized a press conference in the United States.
The hotel in Connecticut was filled to the rafters with journalists. They
fired off the standard questions, with a shocked undertone: How could
this happen? Who is responsible? How many casualties are there? Will
they be compensated? The speakers at the press conference them-
selves had little information available, hardly surprising given how
recently everything had taken place. They were under a great deal of
1166
Crisis Communication