PUBLISHER: Indiana University Press
Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism
Volume 9, Number 1, 2009, pp. 77-111
E-ISSN: 1553-3956 Print ISSN: 1565-1525
Project MUSE - scholarly jouals online
19 pages
Subject Headings:
Crescas, ?asdai, 1340-ca.
1410. Or H.
Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677.
God (Judaism) - Attributes.
Ontology.
Abstract:
A passage in Or ha-Shem [Light of the Lord], the major work of ?asdai Crescas (1340-1410/11), the Jewish critic of medieval Aristotelianism, is adduced here as contributing to Spinoza's decisive step beyond the Aristotelian doctrine of God, namely, the integration of the attribute of extension into the "active essence" of God's infinite being. According to Crescas place, correctly conceived, is void. "Many among the ancients," he argues, identified a thing's place with its form. Although this identification is incompatible with his ontology, he uses it to equate God, metaphorically, with the infinite void that, on account of the identification made by "many among the ancients," constitutes the form of the world. Metaphorically, therefore, God can be described as active infinite extension that produces, individuates, and determines the bodies of things in the same way as God, according to Crescas' ontology, literally produces, individuates, and determines their forms. The ontological constraints that prevented Crescas from actually identifying God with active infinite extension no longer bound Spinoza, who adopted a dualistic ontology of thought and extension derived from Descartes. I argue that Spinoza's conception of the attribute of extension is modeled on his conception of the attribute of thought, which in tu is related in important ways to the conception of the divine intellect in the medieval Aristotelian tradition. Spinoza's decisive step beyond this tradition is to expand the ontological scope of God's activity from one confined to thought to one that includes both thought and extension. The philosophical payoff for Spinoza's conversion of active infinite extension into one of God's attributes is the solution of an ontological problem common, he believed, to medieval Aristotelians, Crescas, and Descartes: how can God, conceived as active and incorporeal, be causally related to the world, conceived as passive and corporeal?
Introduction: Spinoza’s Theology—Orthodox or Heretical?
Although the text of the herem banning Spinoza from Amsterdam’s
Jewish community in 1656 is unusually harsh, it does not specify
the nature of the the evil opinions and acts (mas opini?es e obras) .
Outline of the Argument
Spinoza’s understanding of the ancient Hebrew doctrine of God, I will
argue, may be traced to his study of medieval Jewish philosophy.
From Medieval Aristotelianism to Spinoza.
The Ontological Problem: Spinoza’s Critique of Aristotle and Descartes.
Crescas and Spinoza: The Intellectual Context.
Crescas and Spinoza on God’s Infinite Extension.
Excursus: Hasdai Crescas on the Pythagorean.
Identification of Void and Form.
Crescas on the Relationship Between Void and Form.
The God of the Philosophers and the God of the Bible.
Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism
Volume 9, Number 1, 2009, pp. 77-111
E-ISSN: 1553-3956 Print ISSN: 1565-1525
Project MUSE - scholarly jouals online
19 pages
Subject Headings:
Crescas, ?asdai, 1340-ca.
1410. Or H.
Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677.
God (Judaism) - Attributes.
Ontology.
Abstract:
A passage in Or ha-Shem [Light of the Lord], the major work of ?asdai Crescas (1340-1410/11), the Jewish critic of medieval Aristotelianism, is adduced here as contributing to Spinoza's decisive step beyond the Aristotelian doctrine of God, namely, the integration of the attribute of extension into the "active essence" of God's infinite being. According to Crescas place, correctly conceived, is void. "Many among the ancients," he argues, identified a thing's place with its form. Although this identification is incompatible with his ontology, he uses it to equate God, metaphorically, with the infinite void that, on account of the identification made by "many among the ancients," constitutes the form of the world. Metaphorically, therefore, God can be described as active infinite extension that produces, individuates, and determines the bodies of things in the same way as God, according to Crescas' ontology, literally produces, individuates, and determines their forms. The ontological constraints that prevented Crescas from actually identifying God with active infinite extension no longer bound Spinoza, who adopted a dualistic ontology of thought and extension derived from Descartes. I argue that Spinoza's conception of the attribute of extension is modeled on his conception of the attribute of thought, which in tu is related in important ways to the conception of the divine intellect in the medieval Aristotelian tradition. Spinoza's decisive step beyond this tradition is to expand the ontological scope of God's activity from one confined to thought to one that includes both thought and extension. The philosophical payoff for Spinoza's conversion of active infinite extension into one of God's attributes is the solution of an ontological problem common, he believed, to medieval Aristotelians, Crescas, and Descartes: how can God, conceived as active and incorporeal, be causally related to the world, conceived as passive and corporeal?
Introduction: Spinoza’s Theology—Orthodox or Heretical?
Although the text of the herem banning Spinoza from Amsterdam’s
Jewish community in 1656 is unusually harsh, it does not specify
the nature of the the evil opinions and acts (mas opini?es e obras) .
Outline of the Argument
Spinoza’s understanding of the ancient Hebrew doctrine of God, I will
argue, may be traced to his study of medieval Jewish philosophy.
From Medieval Aristotelianism to Spinoza.
The Ontological Problem: Spinoza’s Critique of Aristotle and Descartes.
Crescas and Spinoza: The Intellectual Context.
Crescas and Spinoza on God’s Infinite Extension.
Excursus: Hasdai Crescas on the Pythagorean.
Identification of Void and Form.
Crescas on the Relationship Between Void and Form.
The God of the Philosophers and the God of the Bible.